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NERC Event Analysis Update. Member Representatives Committee Meeting October 28, 2008 Robert W. Cummings NERC Director of Event Analysis & Information Exchange. Active Event Analysis Teams. MRO System Separation – Sept. 18, 2007 Writing final report
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NERC Event AnalysisUpdate Member Representatives Committee Meeting October 28, 2008 Robert W. CummingsNERC Director of Event Analysis & Information Exchange
Active Event Analysis Teams • MRO System Separation – Sept. 18, 2007 Writing final report • FRCC South Florida Disturbance – Feb. 26, 2008 Writing final report • RFC PEPCO Disturbance – June 13, 2008 RFC Event Analysis Team – collecting data • SPP Southwestern Public Service Company Separation – June 17, 2008
Emerging & Ongoing Trends • Unexpected Generator Turbine Control Action (31) • Voltage sensitivity of generation auxiliary power systems (13) • Transmission equipment failures (11) • Human Error (8) • Protection system misoperation (8) • Near-term load forecasting error (6) • Wiring errors (6) • Inter-area oscillations (5) • Protection equipment failures (4) • System Integrity Protection Scheme Misoperations (SPS & RAS) (4) • Generation vs transmission protection miscoordination (3) • Lack of Redundancy (3)
Emerging & Ongoing Trends • Loss of station observability (SCADA) (3) • Relay loadability (3) – 1 of these was in Europe • Relay settings (drifting) (3) • Relays / controls out-of-date with manufacturers’ tech. bulletins (3) • Uncoordinated load restoration (3) • Handling of missing/bad data by EMS systems (2) • Failed or run-away operation of substation automation (2) • Gas supply / gen. dispatch coordination (2) • Line hardware / conductor failures (2) • Protection system design errors / misapplications (2) • SCADA system misoperation (1)
EA Trends – Top Two DisturbanceElements • 31 – Unexpected generator turbine control actions • 28 in 7 events since August 2007 (and counting) • 2 units CAUSAL in a system separation event • 13 – Voltage sensitivity of generation auxiliary power systems (not included above) • Problem: THESE BEHAVIORS ARE NOT MODELED OR STUDIED • Turbine controls (non-governor) are not modeled • Typically only analyzing t = 0 to t = 20 seconds
Generator – System Interface Issues System Conditions Trans Protection Gen Protection Gen Controls Turbine / Boiler Controls System Controls PRC-001 Coordination
Protection & Control Performance Issues • Relay Loadability • Standard PRC-023 – Relay Loadability passed by NERC Board, awaiting FERC approval • Protection System Redundancy • SPCTF White Paper & SAR – December • PRC Standards Technical Support • Protection misoperation analysis, maintenance, etc. • Protection System Coordination • Trans & Gen Protection Coordination – IEEE collaboration • Transmission Protection Coordination • System Performance & Protection Coordination with Turbine/Boiler Controls
Protection & Control Performance Issues • Elevate System Protection and ControlsTask Force to Subcommittee status • Increased emphasis on the importance of system protection • Collaborative efforts with • IEEE Power & Energy Society • IEEE Power System Relay Committee • Bridge between IEEE standards and NERC system performance requirements (in NERC standards)
Modeling Issues • If something in not modeled, how can you predict system behavior or interaction???? Dynamics Modeling Issues • Missing models • Data errors • Models may not match field equipment and settings • Issue of “proprietary models” • No models for many wind farms • No good indication of where wind farms are connected • Registrations issues
Need for New Modeling • Turbine / boiler control models needed • Units may remain stable, but ramp to zero and trip • Far more complex dynamic load models needed to analyze and predict FIDVR (Fault-Induced Delayed Voltage Recovery) behavior • More load composition data needed to do this • Better governor models • Better SPS/RAS models • Models for new power electronic devices