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The importance of backbone. Rohan Samarajiva and Harsha Vardhana Singh (at time of data collection: Secretary, TRAI; since September 2005: Deputy Director General, WTO Usable knowledge for growing the sector: ICT policy and regulation research from LIRNEasia, New Delhi , 6 March 2006.
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The importance of backbone Rohan Samarajiva and Harsha Vardhana Singh (at time of data collection: Secretary, TRAI; since September 2005: Deputy Director General, WTO Usable knowledge for growing the sector: ICT policy and regulation research from LIRNEasia, New Delhi, 6 March 2006
Importance of backbone • Original decisions re open access based on recognition of the significance of backbone • Backbone networks = essential facilities • Essential facilities, as commonly defined • Controlled by one/more operators • Competitors must have access to them • Not feasible to substitute economically/technically
Limitations of the claim • Backbone network does not have to be owned by one entity • Though this may make sense in micro or city states • It is especially important in early stages of market opening when • Entrants are much smaller than incumbent
India, demand • Massive growth, not only across the country, but also in circles • Only 4 out of 23 circles have less than a million fixed+mobile customers • But unless infrastructure sharing is the practice (commercial arrangements or regulatory mandates), total subscribers not relevant • However, shows the significant effects that can be achieved if sharing occurs
India, demand • Decisions are taken by individual operators based on their current/projected demand • In 18 circles, BSNL and MTNL (govt-owned incumbents) have >1 million fixed customers in each circle; also in mobile Incumbents have incentives to build backbone • In contrast, fixed entrants have >0.5 m only in 8 (1 m in 3); and mobile entrants have >0.5 m only in 9 (1 m in 3)
Fixed (unified) entrants with > 0.5 million customers per circle (8/23)
Mobile operators with > 0.5 million customers per circle (10/23)
Supply, India • Data reported in terms of route kilometers, not capacity (in Gbps) • Not all fiber may be lit • Route km is a reasonable proxy for capacity at this level of abstraction • Dark fiber can be lit easily if fiber has been laid • Capacity can be upgraded easily
Backbone supply by operators (route km; March 2005, incl. leased capacity)
Backbone supply by infrastructure operators (route km, Q1 2005)
Connecting supply and demand • Estimated that 1 route km will cost USD 4500-5500 (INR 200,000-250,000) • TRAI calculation for India, based on consultation • Long-distance ARPUs in India = USD 14/yr (INR 600) • Based on TRAI data on incoming & outgoing LD minutes and current prices • Possibly better if ARPUs estimated for circles, not India as a whole • Conclusion: revenues from 140 subscribers needed to make fiber viable
Viability analysis for Reliance (viable if ratio <1; not viable if ratio >1)
Viability analysis for Reliance (viable if ratio <1; not viable if ratio >1)
Analysis • India as a whole is unviable for Reliance according to the analysis • However, 10% growth/yr (very realistic) will move India as a whole into viable range for Reliance • Various methods of estimating growth • Fiber has been built in areas that are “unviable” • Because traffic comes from “viable” areas
Analysis • USO funds (supply), government programs to increase broadband (demand) can change the viability frontier • Interconnection and access revenues • Better access regime can shift frontier • Infrastructure sharing can change the frontier • Likely to be highly significant in small markets