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Enhancing POC through R2P Early Warning Systems and Preventive Action RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICTS: Academic-Practitioner International Workshop, Sydney, 17/18 November 2010. Andrew Garwood-Gowers, QUT. Outline. Introduction
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Enhancing POC through R2P Early Warning Systems and Preventive ActionRESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICTS: Academic-Practitioner International Workshop,Sydney, 17/18 November 2010 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, QUT
Outline • Introduction • Relationship between R2P and POC • R2P’s potential to enhance POC: - fact-finding/monitoring missions - “preventive deployment” of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) • R2P early warning systems (EWS): - recent institutional developments - POC’s potential to contribute to information gathering for EWS • Concluding comments
Introduction – context and limits • Context: action under the 2nd pillar i.e. international assistance with government consent (not 3rd pillar non-consensual military intervention) • Focus on “direct/operational” preventive measures in the face of an imminent crisis (not the broader concept of “conflict prevention” including “structural prevention”) • Argument: by mobilising political will for earlier action R2P can enhance the scope of POC
Relationship between R2P and POC • Overlap between the 2 concepts but each is wider and narrower than the other in some respects • R2P limited to 4 mass atrocity crimes • Temporal aspect: more explicit focus on prevention in R2P than in POC • Peace operations with POC mandate are reactive (i.e. deployed after conflict has occurred) – no EWS • POC is increasingly recognised as applicable outside traditional “armed conflict” contexts
Enhancing POC through R2P • R2P’s 2nd pillar could mobilise international assistance at an earlier stage of an imminent crisis • 2 possible vehicles for advancing POC agenda: • Non-coercive action e.g. fact-finding/monitoring missions (Article 34 UN Charter) • Coercive action e.g. preventive deployment (before full-scale conflict) to stabilize and/or deter violence
Non-coercive measures • Article 34 Charter gives Security Council power to “investigate any dispute” • May deploy fact-finding or human rights monitoring missions to identify risks of impending crisis • Provide information to EWS and mobilise support for more robust international assistance • An international presence which may help to de-escalate a volatile situation e.g. UNHCHR field mission in Nepal (est. May 2005)
Preventive military deployment • Longstanding UN recommendations for “preventive” peacekeeping: An Agenda for Peace (1992) • But only 1 UN “preventive deployment”: Macedonia (UNPREDEP) (March 1995-Feb 1999) • R2P = political impetus for preventive deployment of peacekeeping operations with a robust POC mandate • But are UN forces adequately trained/resourced to protect civilians against possible mass atrocity crimes? • Specialised rapid response forces at regional/sub-regional level e.g. AU’s African Standby Force (ASF); EU capability
EWS: recent developments • World Summit 2005 commitment to establish an EWS identifying triggers/indicators of R2P crimes • EWS = a necessary (but not always sufficient) condition for generating political will for effective preventive action • July 2010 proposals on EWS (UN Doc A/64/864): - expanding Analysis Framework on genocide to other mass atrocity crimes - joint office of OSAPG and Special Adviser on R2P - procedure for presenting policy options to the UN SG • Regional/sub-regional level: African Union (CEWS) • Asia-Pacific region: plans for ASEAN EWS
EWS: information from POC actors • PKO and fact-finding missions as a “tool” for gathering information for EWS on R2P crimes • Require specialised training to identify risk factors which could indicate possibility of mass atrocity crimes – some resistance to this training • R2P sceptics (e.g. Pakistan) have noted the risk and adverse consequences of “false alarms” • UN recognition of dangers of approaching UN Sec-Gen too often on R2P situations
Concluding comments • R2P potential to expand the scope of POC by catalysing earlier, preventive action • Effective EWS necessary for identifying potential crises and mobilising political will • POC actors “on the ground”could contribute to information gathering for EWS in R2P architecture • R2P and POC as mutually reinforcing concepts?