Report on an Educational Campaign

1. Report on an Educational Campaign The Cincinnati Plan for the United Nations

2. Authors • Shirley A. Star • Helen MacGill Hughes

3. The campaign • “In September, 1947 the American Association for the United Nations and the United Nations Association of Cincinnati, in co-operation with the Stephen H. Wilder Foundation of Cincinnati, launched a six-month crusade to make Cincinnati United Nations-conscious and to demonstrate, as they put it, “how a community may become so intelligently informed on world affairs as to be a dynamic force in the creation of an ordered and eventually a peaceful world.”” • An informational campaign rather than a persuasive one

4. Before and after surveys to determine its effectiveness • Basic question—”whether the flow of information into the local mass media of communication—the press, radio, films, etc.—has actually been increased” • “The second question is the extent to which the increased supply of information is accompanied by exposure to it.” • “Finally, there is the ultimate question of the effect of exposure to information on the individual’s personal stock of information, on his attitudes, and, eventually, on his behavior.”

5. Flow of information • “must be answered in the affirmative” • 12,868 people reached through the Parent-Teachers Associations which devoted programs to the topic of world understanding • Kids given literature to take home • Teachers given literature and included in their classes • 14,000 children in Weekday Church Schools held a World Community Day program • 150 leaders in the Cincinnati Council of Church Women took training courses in the arranging of United Nations Programs • 10,000 members of the Catholic Parent-Teachers Association were exhorted by their archbishop to support the United Nations • A group of club women united in sending 1,000 letters and 1,350 telegrams pledging their support to the American delegation to the United Nations

6. Flow of information 2 • “The radio stations broadcast facts about the United Nations, one of them scheduling spot programs 150 times a week. • The newspapers played up United Nations news and information throughout the six months. • In the last three months 225 meetings were served with literature and special speakers. • In all, 59,588 pieces of literature were distributed and • 2,800 clubs were reached by speakers supplied by the speakers’ bureau and by circular • Hundreds of documentary films were shown, and • The slogan “Peace Begins with the United Nations—the United Nations Begins with You” was exhibited everywhere, in every imaginable form—blotters, matchbooks, streetcar cards, etc. • The objective was to reach in one way or another every adult among the 1,155,703 residents of Cincinnati’s retail trading zone.”

7. NORC surveys • Before and after surveys • Panel design 745 persons first wave with 592 reinterviewed • (attrition due to inability to locate in second round or refusal to be reinterviewed) • After-only sample of 758 adults • Two samples representative of population, similar to one another • Some questions same as on national NORC survey • ‘Before’ survey used to plan intervention

8. Survey topics • General world orientation • Interest in international events • Information and opinion about the United Nations • Activist-apathy dimension • The extent to which individuals believed in the efficacy of personal and group action to support the United Nations and prevent war • ‘After’ survey included questions about exposure to the campaign

9. Changes in interest • “international events assumed greater importance in the minds of the people of Cincinnati in March than they had in September” • In March 47% ‘spontaneously mentioned an international problem as among those confronting the United States, but 74% did so at the second date”

10. “Whenyou think of the problems facing the United States now, which one comes to your mind first? What other problems do you think of?”

11. Interpretation • Most of the change in interest was due to Cold War concerns relating to the Russians • Looked at number of items in which ‘keen’ interest was expressed. When relations with Russia was removed, very little change from before campaign to after

12. “What appeared to be an increased interest in international relations is reducible to interest in one dramatic and alarming aspect of them, and this is scarcely attributable to the campaign.”

13. Fear of war • Prior to the campaign, 48% expected the US to enter another war within 10 years • By March, 73% felt this way • Parallels national surveys where 57% expected war within a decade in October and 74% expected war in March • Ways to prevent war • “Turn to God” (11% before and after) • “Co-operate with and understand other nations” (12% before, 10% after) • Action by the United Nations (6% before, 3% after)

14. Internationalist attitudes • U.S. should take an active part in world affairs rather than keep out of them • 65% before 66% after • Would like to see the United States join in the movement to establish an international police force to maintain world peace • 76% before 73% after • Feel there should be some sort of international control of atomic bombs • 60% before 57% after

15. “But these two-thirds and three-quarters majorities speaking out for internationalism dropped to halves and less when people were pressed about specific forms of internationalism.” • “only 52 per cent in September and 53 per cent in March agreed to the statement, “Do you think you would be better off personally if the United States would trade more with foreign countries?” • 45% before and 49% after thought “most foreign countries can be trusted to meet us halfway in working out problems together”

16. “The trouble was that people did not see in any detail the connection between their own fate and the fate of all.”

17. Knowledge of United Nations • Cincinnati people were asked “What is the main purpose of the United Nations.” • At least 30% had to be classified as knowing nothing about it • In March, 28% still knew nothing about it • Compared to a national survey, April, 1947 showing 36% did not know that the U.S. had joined any international organization working for peace

18. Among those who know of the United Nations • Asked additional questions about UN • Results were that before-after scores were “remarkably constant”

19. Correct answers • Distribution of percentages getting 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 right was almost identical before and after the campaign • “The inescapable conclusion is that in the six months the local level of information did not alter very much.”

20. Opinion toward UN • Those who knew about the UN were asked whether they were satisfied with its progress • 34% yes before campaign • 29% yes after campaign • However, they felt the US should continue to work within the United Nations • At the outset, “those not familiar with the United Nations tended consistently toward isolationism and were more likely than the better informed to criticize the organization.”

21. Opinion toward UN

22. Attitudes toward UN • Little change in specific praise of UN • Some increase in criticism, especially the idea that it is failing, there is too much bickering, arguing, etc.

23. Thus at the end of the six-month program in Cincinnati there was a small but growing minority which was interested in international relations and knew something about them. Whether this increase would have occurred apart from the campaign is conjectural. But it was a nation-wide phenomenon that could be attributed to the growing apprehension of Russia as the cold war progressed. Majority sentiment in Cincinnati remained generally unaware of international problems, though people felt that war with Russia was just a matter of time. Only a few were disposed to join organizations concerned with world affairs, and this group did not grow appreciably during the campaign. Criticism of the record of the United Nations mounted, but, on the other hand, apathy declined somewhat.

24. Channels • Newspapers were the “commonest” source • 50% of entire sample reported having seen items on the UN in the newspaper • 83% of those already familiar with UN

25. Sources of exposure to UN information

26. Exposure • Despite volume of messages, many did not hear more than a couple of them. • “Thus 43 per cent—even among the most accessible element of the public—had learned nothing or knew no more than what the press and radio reported.” • The slogan was not recalled by 51% of people. Those who remembered may not have understood it.

27. Failure to reach target The campaign was intended to reach “women, the relatively uneducated, the elderly, and the poor”

28. Conclusion • “the people reached by the campaign were those least in need of it and . . . the people missed by it were the new audience the plan hoped to gain.”

29. Predispositions • “The most exposed were in general the most favorably disposed.” • The attitude that the United Nations should take an active part in world affairs was expressed by 43% of those who reported hearing nothing of the campaign, 73% of those exposed to one or two media and 85% of those exposed to three or more. • “if there was an increase in exposure, it was their previous orientation which determined the extent to which people exposed themselves to further information about the United Nations.”

30. Interest • The interested were more likely to be pro-UN regardless of which group they are from—uninformed, poorly informed or better informed • “In a sense, then, interest is prior for an informational campaign.” • Interest is generated by demonstrating the personal relevance of something • “The campaign apparently did not stir the interest of those who were not interested in the first place”

31. Interest conclusion • “The Cincinnati plan for the United Nations demonstrates that lack of interest is a psychological barrier to the spread of information. The understanding of the barrier should make it possible to cope with it, and this must be a first step, if the expensive enterprise of funneling material to the public is not to be merely and ineffectual gesture.”

32. “The Cincinnati experiment has proved that the creating of interest is the first measure in building public opinion and that only after that will information be absorbed.”

33. “To have demonstrated that information must be functional to be heeded at all and that nonfunctional information makes little impression upon people is a considerable service to social psychology and a necessary preliminary task in the process of educating the public.”

34. Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail • Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley • “even if all these physical barriers to communication were known and removed, there would remain many psychological barriers to the free flow of ideas” • Use surveys from NORC to demonstrate psychological barriers

35. “The physical barriers to communication merely impede the supply of information. In order to increase public knowledge, not only is it necessary to present more information, but it is essential that the mass audience be exposed to and that it absorb the information. And in order to insure such exposure and absorption, the psychological characteristics of human beings must be taken into account.”

36. Psychological barriers • The Chronic “Know-Nothing’s” in Relation to Information Campaigns (sic) • The Role of Interest in Increasing Exposure • Selective Exposure Produced by Prior Attitudes • Selective Interpretation Following Exposure • Differential Changes in Attitudes After Exposure

37. “There Exists a Hard Core of Chronic ‘Know-Nothing’s’” • The same people know nothing about many events • “there is something about the uninformed which makes them harder to reach, no matter what the level or nature of the information” • People in small towns, on farms are slightly less informed concerning foreign affairs than are people from the city

38. One third of the sample could not correctly answer more than one of five foreign policy questions

39. Interest • Interest in foreign policy issues varies widely • Interest in one issue correlates with interest in other issues • Low levels of interest in a large portion of the population • “Almost one-quarter of the population, therefore, reported interest in no more than two of the eight issues—a state of apathy all the more significant when it is remembered that the list included such overpowering subjects as the atomic bomb and our relations with Germany and Russia, and that the respondent’s own estimate of his degree of interest, doubtless subject to prestige considerations, was accepted without question.” • Apathy/interest and knowledge are closely related

40. Relation between interest and knowledge (n=1292)

41. Relation between interest and knowledge • People could be uninterested because they are unexposed to the information • It is probably true that interest and knowledge are interdependent • “Nevertheless, from the point of view of initiating a specific campaign at some point in time, it remains true that in the case even of outstanding public issues, large groups in the population admit “little or no interest” in the problem.” • “Scientific surveys are needed to determine who these people are, why they lack interest, and what approach can best succeed in reaching them.” (italics in original)

42. People seek information congenial to their attitudes • “Our evidence from polling national samples in other information areas supports the view that people tend to expose themselves to information which is congenial with their prior attitudes, and to avoid exposure to information which is not congenial.” • Respondents who had heard about U.S. helping keep the peace in Palestine or had heard of a statement by the US and two other countries condemning Franco’s government in Spain were more likely to support these policies than those who had not heard about them.

43. People interpret the same information differently • “It is equally false to assume that exposure, once achieved, results in a uniform interpretation and retention of the material.” • “it has been consistently demonstrated [in a series of experimental studies] that a person’s perception and memory of materials shown to him are often distorted by his wishes, motives, and attitudes.”

44. Study showed that those who blamed Russia entirely for disagreements with US were less likely to say that their newspaper makes Russia “look worse than she really is” • “Here, then, is another psychological problem that faces those responsible for information campaigns. Exposure in itself is not always sufficient. People will interpret the information in different ways, according to their prior attitudes.”

45. Information does not necessarily change attitudes • “it is naïve to suppose that information always affects attitudes, or that it affects all attitudes equally.” • There is evidence, based on investigations made with academic samples, that individuals, once they are exposed to information, change their views differentially, each in the light of his own prior attitude.”

46. Survey/experiment • People were told that the proposed loan to England held economic advantages to the United States before being asked whether they supported the policy • Those with positive attitudes toward England increased from 50% to 70% approval for the loan • “But among those with hostile or suspicious attitudes toward England, the information had no effect whatever.”