INTERAGENCY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

1. INTERAGENCY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS Col (Ret) Peter Leentjes Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance

2. “Modern war consumes governments and administrations in its path, leaving anarchy and chaos behind. If authority and the necessary minimum order and administration are not at once re-established, disorder and subversion can all too quickly erode the victory that has been won in the field.” CA Donnison, Civil Affairs & Military Government 1966

3. New Realities in Complex Contingencies • Increasing demand for coherence in multidimensional interventions • Increasing donor government involvement in practical work of agencies and decision making terms • Increased and more frequent military presence in essentially humanitarian activities • New frameworks guide the nature of the intervention and the relationships between component organizations • Focus towards political and security oriented ends • Focus on sustainable peace

4. New Realities in Complex Contingencies • Urban populations, dependent upon sophisticated economic and social infrastructures, are unable to provide for their own basic survival once these structures are destroyed by conflict • Globalization – nations have a clear desire to harness the commercial opportunities provided by post conflict reconstruction, and want to see their industries deriving benefit from peace operations Stuart Gordon, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001

5. New Realities in Complex Contingencies • Need to take into account `social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations • Contemporary military operations take place in complex environments with multiple civilian and humanitarian organizations • A challenging array of issues that are not precisely `military` in nature. Stuart Gordon, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001

6. The Requirement • Manage both the relationship and the separateness of the political / humanitarian community. • Understand the civil-military interface is extremely dynamic and there is no one model • Realize that the coordination structures will remain context dependent Stuart Gordon, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001

7. Military Provision of Assistance • Public relations exercise • Assist the immediate military mission • High visibility activities • Bolster support from constituencies • Look for high profile interventions

8. OUTLINE • The players in humanitarian operations • Model for civil – military operations • Some principles • If time permits – some perception issues and lessons learned

9. The Players in the Complex Emergency MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT OPERATIONS POLITICAL LIFE SAVING LIFE SUPPORT ECONOMIC & SOCIAL MILITARY CRISIS STABILISATION CIVILIAN

10. SRSG – Head of Mission – a political diplomatic figure DSRSG – Head of UN programs in Country International Political Staff – support the SRSG Election Monitors – drawn from trusted observers world-wide The Players: Political/Diplomatic

11. United Nations UNOCHA UNHCR UNICEF WFP WHO International/Non-Governmental ICRC Red Cross/Red Crescent CARE MSF The Players: Civilian Organizations • Host Nation • Government • Regional/Local authority • Tribal / traditional leaders • Business • Victims • Donors • Governments • Foreign vs. Individual • Religious

12. United Nations: Key Agencies • UNOCHA - Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (formerly DHA) • UNHCR - High Commissioner for Refugees • UNICEF - International Children’s Emergency Fund • WFP - World Food Program • WHO - World Health Organization

13. United Nations: Lead Agency • Autonomous and independent of the Secretary General or the General Assembly • Lead agency is assigned by Secretary General: • Prior to complex emergencies: UNDP • Bosnia: UNHCR • African drought: WFP • Sudan/Kurdish Crisis: UNICEF • Angola: UNDHA • Somalia: no lead agency • Rwanda: UNHCR • E. Timor: UNOCHA

14. United Nations: Coordination • UNOCHA - designated as the coordinator for the humanitarian assistance but has no authority over the agencies • single focal point of contact for humanitarian assistance in an emergency • information • funding • accreditation • has coordination role with NGOs/IOs

15. Non-Governmental Organizations Broad definition: • Every organization in society which is not part of government, and which operates in civil society Four defining characteristics: 1. Voluntary 2. Independent 3. Not-for-profit 4. Not self-serving in aims and related values

16. BASIC STRUCTURE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS Special Representative of the Secretary-General Deputy SRSG Human Rights Force Commander Head Civilian Police Component Head Election Component Head Humanitarian Assistance Component Chief Military Observer Chief Administrative Officer Lead Agency

17. Civil-Military Coordination Model Country AMBASSADOR Governmental Humanitarian Support Policy & Coordination Level Host Nation Combined Force Coord/Policy Humanitarian Coordinator LEAD AGENCY JOC HOC CMCC Battalion/ Region CMCC REGION Field Operational Level Battalion/ Region CMCC REGION Battalion/ Region CMCC REGION Battalion/ Region CMCC

18. POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS AT THE POLICY LEVEL • Commander / Deputy Commander CTF • SRSG • Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) • Heads of Agencies • Political (US Ambassador Rep) - link to USG Support & Evaluation - DART Team • Human Rights Coordinator • Host Nation Input as necessary • ICRC - observer • Major NGO/PVO Agencies CARE / World Vision (if running major programs)

19. POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL • Component G-5/Civil Affairs • Regional Representatives of the Lead Agency and other IOs • USG Aid Providers • Human Rights Monitors • Local Host Nation Input • ICRC - • NGO/PVO Agencies CARE / World Vision working in region

20. Humanitarians Seek From the Military • Security – environment, for personnel, convoys & facilities • Reaction forces to assist personnel in danger • Access to military ports, airfields and facilities • Communications • Transportation assets • Emergency medical support & evacuation • Emergency infrastructure repairs • Information

21. Humanitarians Provide to the Military • Humanitarian work that supports the achievement of the force mission • Trained and experienced personnel • A multiplier effect which allows the Commander to use resources for other missions • Increased security as needs of the population are met • A vital source of information and contacts

22. REMEMBER! • There are those agencies and NGOs that will never work with the Military • However they remain very interested in what is happening. • They derive benefits from the established humanitarian / military coordination and link indirectly into the system established

23. Principles for Provision of Support • The decision to support any humanitarian activity is a command decision based on: • Achieving the force mission • Ensuring force protection • Supporting end state & exit strategy • Meeting political factors deriving from the mandate • Meeting measures of effectiveness

24. Principles for Provision of Support • Last resort – which means all civilian / humanitarian alternatives have been exhausted • Unique capability – which means no appropriate civilian humanitarian resources exist which can do the task • Timeliness – the urgency demands immediate action • Maintain clear humanitarian direction in the use of the assets

25. APPROVAL - REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE • Need to confirm legitimacy of the demand • Is the support necessary or already being provided by someone else • What is the priority in relation to other demands • This process is best done outside the military - it does not have the capacity • Use the UN/IO/NGO interface

26. Key Measures to Ensure Effectiveness • Clarity of Mission • Joint Planning • Establishment of a Coordinating Center • Ability to adjust Organizations • Designation of Standby Capacities • Joint Exercises and Training

27. PERCEPTIONS

28. Political/Diplomatic • Civilian Administrators • International Staff • Mission Staff • Local Employees • Contractors • NGO Personnel • Humanitarians • UN Agencies • Governmental Orgs • Human Rights • UN / Other • Civilian Police • Election Officials Military

29. Commanders • Staff Officers • Headquarters • Contingents • Units • Military Observers • International Units • Military Police • Support Structures • Logistics • Transport • Financial • External Military • Airlift CIVILIANS

30. COORDINATING ISSUES • Early Agreement on Responsibilities • Familiarization with Mission and Responsibilities • Common AORs • Establishing Communications Protocols • Liaison • Joint Operations and Information • Interagency Meetings

31. Allstan A B C G F J I D K H E D Administrative Area

32. Allstan Humanitarian Responsibility

33. Allstan 1 4 2 3 2 Military Sectors

34. Allstan 2 1 3 4 Police Sectors 4

35. Allstan

36. COORDINATING ISSUES • Early Agreement on Responsibilities • Familiarization with Mission and Responsibilities • Common AORs • Establishing Communications Protocols • Liaison • Joint Operations and Information • Interagency Meetings

37. RELATIONSHIP ISSUES • Understand Mandate at all Levels • Create Complementary Systems • Avoid Parallel Structures • Establish Mechanisms for coordination at all Levels • Respect Existing Humanitarian Missions • Do Not Subordinate Humanitarian to Political Considerations • Decide how to deal with the Press

38. LESSONS LEARNED • Successful Civilian-Military operations must start with the same mission • vision and goals need to be established • the context of the mission must be understood • Decisions are made through discussion • military are often in a supporting role

39. LESSONS LEARNED - cont • Success depends on the good will and desire of the players on the ground to make the mission work. • developing understanding • willingness to be educated • quality of leadership is the key

40. LESSONS LEARNED - cont • Develop a joint strategy to prevent being manipulated on the ground. • consensus opinion on how to proceed • do not strip individual agencies of their independence and autonomy

41. LESSONS LEARNED - cont • The Operation will constantly change • leaders collate and direct the changes • technical experts provide input • establish what is doable • the analysis will continue to change

42. LESSONS LEARNED - cont • Agree on common operating procedures • who is in charge in certain situations • How you will pass and accept requests for assistance