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Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks

Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks. Presented by: Juan Du Nov 16, 2005. Outline. Wormhole attacks Related works Three neighbor discovery protocols Directional Neighbor Discovery Verified Neighbor Discovery Strict Neighbor Discovery Conclusion and future work.

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Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks

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  1. Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks Presented by: Juan Du Nov 16, 2005

  2. Outline • Wormhole attacks • Related works • Three neighbor discovery protocols • Directional Neighbor Discovery • Verified Neighbor Discovery • Strict Neighbor Discovery • Conclusion and future work

  3. Wormhole Attacks • A, B, C: nodes in wireless networks • X, Y: transceivers connected by a high quality, low-latency link • Attacker replays packets received by X at Y, and vice versa • Makes A and B believe they are neighbors • Selectively drop data messages to disrupt communications

  4. Wormhole Impact • Cost • Limited resources needed • No cryptographic material needed • Damage to routing • Impact beyond the endpoints’ neighborhoods! • Endpoints placed strategically • Worst case: disrupts nearly all network routes

  5. Related Works • Secure routing protocols such as SRP, SEAD, Ariadne, ARRIVE, … • Still vulnerable to wormhole attacks • Location based routing protocols • Have the potential • Have drawbacks • Localization systems become attack target • Need synchronized clocks and precise location knowledge

  6. Protocol Idea • Wormhole attack depends on a node that is not nearby convincing another node it is • Solution: • Verify neighbors are really neighbors • Only accept messages from verified neighbors

  7. The Technique: Directional Antennas • Divide transmission range into N zones clockwise starting with zone 1 facing east. • All nodes have the same orientation. • A node can get approximate direction information based on received signals

  8. Notations • A, B, C... Legitimate nodes • X, Y Wormhole endpoints • R Nonce • EKAB(M) Message encrypted by key shared between nodes A and B • zone The directional element, which ranges from 1–6 as shown in figure • ^zone The opposite directional element. For example, if zone=1 then ^zone=4. • zone (A, B) Zone in which node A hears node B • neighbors (A, zone) Nodes within one (directional distance) hop in direction zone of node A.

  9. 3 2 N 4 1 A 5 6 Directional Neighbor Discovery 1. A RegionHELLO | IDA Sent in every direction 2. N  A IDN | EKNA(IDA | R | zone (N, A)) Sent in zone (N, A) 3. A  NR Checks zone is opposite,sent in zone (A, N)

  10. Directional Neighbor Discovery (Cont.) • The protocol itself is vulnerableto wormhole attacks • Attack’s effectiveness is reduced • Only node pairs that are in opposite directions relative to the wormhole in each region will accept each other as neighbors (e.g. A and C) • How about A and B?

  11. Verified Neighbor Discovery • Observation: Cooperate! • Wormhole can only trick nodes in particular locations • Verify neighbors using other nodes • Need receive confirmation from a verifier node before accepting a new neighbor • Need prevent verifiers from acting through the wormhole • A valid verifier V for the link A B must satisfy: • zone (B, A) ≠ zone (B, V) B hears V in a different zone from node A • zone (B, A) ≠ zone (V, A) B and V hear node A from different directions

  12. Verified Neighbor Discovery (Cont.) • 1. A RegionHELLO | IDA • 2. N  A IDN | EKNA(IDA | R | zone (N, A)) • 3. A  NR Same as before • 4. N RegionINQUIRY | IDN| IDA| zone (N, A) Sent in directions except zone (N, A) and ^zone (N, A) • 5. V  N IDV | EKNV(IDA | zone (V, N)) V satisfies verifier properties and completed 1-3 • 6. N  AIDN | EKAN(IDA | ACCEPT) N must receive at least one verifier response

  13. Effect of Verified Neighbor Discovery • D as the verifier • zone (D, A) = 3‚ zone (A, D) = 1 • wormhole cannot convince D and A to accept each other as neighbors • B will not be able to verify A as a neighbor through D • Secure against wormhole attacks that involve two distant endpoints

  14. Strict Neighbor Discovery • Worawannotai attack • B and A are unable to communicate directly, but close enough to have a verifier that can hear both A and B

  15. Analysis • Advantage • Low overhead • Directional antennas • Energy conservative • Better spatial reuse of bandwidth • Disadvantage • May prevent legitimate links from being established because of no potential verifier node • For network density of 10 neighbors, less than 0.5% (or 40%) of links are lost and no (or 0.03%) nodes are disconnected in verified (or strict) neighbor discovery protocol

  16. Conclusion and Future Work • Conclusion • Wormhole attacks are a powerful attack which depend on a node misrepresenting its location • Directional antennas offer a promising approach • Future work • Multiple wormhole endpoint attacks • Robustness

  17. Questions? Thank you!

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