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A-SMGCS JAA Brussels 13th of September 2006 bengt.collin@eurocontrol.int. This presentation. A-SMGCS Validation Summary. Implementation Levels. Level 1: Surveillance Level 2 adds: Control (runway safety net) Level 3 adds: Guidance (ground based) Routing Level 4 adds:
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A-SMGCSJAA Brussels13th of September 2006bengt.collin@eurocontrol.int
This presentation • A-SMGCS • Validation • Summary
Implementation Levels • Level 1: • Surveillance • Level 2 adds: • Control (runway safety net) • Level 3 adds: • Guidance (ground based) • Routing • Level 4 adds: • On-board guidance
Surveillance A-SMGCS Level 1 Replace ATCOs visual view (when appropriate) • Non cooperative system (e.g. SMR) • Cooperative system (e.g. Mode S Multilateration)
A-SMGCS Level 2 • Level 1 Surveillance plus Runway Safety Net • Alerts given to Controllers only
A-SMGCS • Validation • Summary
ATC Simulation • Validation Objectives: • Safety, Capacity, Workload, Situation Awareness. • Simulations for CdG & Orly airports • 15 days of simulation • Compared SMR, A-SMGCS Level 1 and A-SMGCS Level 2 environments
Operational Trials • Verify & validate the concept & requirements for Levels 1 & 2 • Completed at • Helios: Heathrow, Zurich (ATC) • DLR: Frankfurt, Vienna & Zurich (AO) • Sofréavia: Paris CdG
Benefits • Safety • Level 1: 10% reduction in accidents • Level 2: 50% reduction in accidents • Efficiency • 4% reduction in taxi time • Throughput • 5% increase in throughput • 10% reduction in weather delays • Improved planning, situational awareness, Coordination, Data sharing (CDM), reduced impactof Low Visibility
Deliverables • Cost Benefit Assessment • Human Factors Case • Generic Safety Case • Training guidelines • Operational & technical requirements • Procedures & concepts of operation
Generic Safety Case • Safety case supposed to set the safety objectives and requirements for A-SMGCS Level 1 and 2 • Eurocontrol Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) • Wide spread Stakeholder involvement (seven work shops) • Demonstrate the feasibility through generic example (LHR)
Hazards • Total loss of A-SMGCS • Loss of the position function for one aircraft • Loss of the position function impacting multiple aircraft • Corruption of the position function for one aircraft • Corruption of the position function impacting multiple aircraft • Total loss of identification function • Loss of the identification function impacting multiple aircraft • Corruption of the identification function for one aircraft • Corruption of the identification function impacting multiple aircraft • Corruption of the conflict prediction function
Safety Case - Conclusions • Generic Safely Case • Based upon assumptions • Uses operational example implementation (i.e. Heathrow) • A-SMGCS Level 1 concept acceptably safe: • Failure modes analysed and safety margin exists when the concept is applied to Heathrow • A-SMGCS Level 2 concept acceptably safe: • Heathrow system improved during 2006 (limitations of SMR) • Needs (re)validating at local level • Supported by explanatory/guidance material • Final document November 2006 (following endorsement from AOT)
Mode S Transponder Operation Procedures • Transponder OFF at gate • Transponder ON from request for push back/taxi whichever is earlier until fully parked on gate • TCAS OFF on taxiways & aprons • Reply to selective interrogations • Inhibit replies to all call interrogations
ACAS on the airport surface • Working Paper delivered to ICAO Montreal • The paper clarifies why ACAS operation on the airport surface is not advisable • A number of reference documents included • Hard copies available for clarification
Transponder Procedure Progress • Should be used at every airport, regardless if A-SMGCS equipped or not • Will be delivered to ICAO later this year
A-SMGCS • Validation • Summary
Summary • A-SMGCS Surveillance improve safety and maintain the throughput , especially in reduced visibility • Mode S Transponder Operating Procedures delivered to ICAO (for global application) before end of 2006 • The benefits from A-SMGCS requires the Mode S Transponder to be operated correctly