Acknowledgements

1. Electoral Intimidation & Violence in Ghana and Newark:Can we define, measure, and explain patterns across different systems?Megan ReifCharles & Kathleen Manatt Democracy Studies Fellow, IFESPh.D. Candidate, University of MichiganThursday, September 29

2. Acknowledgements For rich resources, ideas, information, institutional and individual expertise, support, conversation, networking, advice, collaboration,… friendship… THANK YOU! With special thanks to Charles & Kathleen Manatt (All errors are mine and in no way reflect on the excellent work of IFES. To ensure accuracy and protect respondents in Newark, please cite only with permission.)

3. Presentation Objectives • Test a critical assumption of the proposed long-term dissertation research with available data • Identify practical issues of definition and measurement necessary to refine theory and implement research design • Solicit feedback on the validity of cross-cultural/contextual, cross-level comparison (local versus national election) and what we might learn from it • Compare legal contexts to begin to explore possible effects of institutional environment on violence

4. Methodology and Limitations Methodology • Developed tentative propositions and assumptions from (limited) secondary and case study literatures and election observation in Indonesia (03-04) • Coded incidents from Newark interviews and media; coding of media incidents in Ghana; entry of IFES monitor incidents in Ghana (interpreting and seeing how other interpreted events) (IFES) • Informal interviews with victims and perpetrators of electoral intimidation in Newark, NJ • Exploration of Newark, Ghana, and Iraq incidents Limitations • Case selection not designed to test theory • Deductive inferences • Incident data limited in time and space; cannot test potential explanations involving institutional change • Data not recoded for intensity scale and index creation

5. Critical Assumption Election Violence is STRATEGIC, aimed at: • Winning (gaining or retaining power and/or resources) • Protesting or signaling unfairness / seeking reform of unfair systems “It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive, or corrupt, that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside the established norms to achieve their objectives” (Fischer 2002, 2). (3) Discrediting or ending democracy as a system of government (insurgency) (4) Reciprocal / Escalatory (tit-for-tat or defensive response to coercive tactics by opponent)

6. Non-Strategic Conceptions of Election Violence

7. Assumption of Strategic Motives Politicians... • Seek to obtain or retain power and resources • Have a menu of electoral strategies at their disposal • View coercion as a costly substitute for non-violent electoral strategies because it risks: - Reputational costs/loss of legitimate supporters (even dictators seek legitimacy) - Prosecution and punishment - Higher probability of detection than fraud (DOJ) - Lower certainty of achieving desired outcomes • Yet Fischer (2002) and IFES experience demonstrates that electoral violence is important, even when rare.

8. “People don’t think they sit around a conference room table and plan these things [electoral intimidation and violence]. They do. They know exactly what they are doing.” - 2004 Candidate for Newark Board of Elections

9. Motivating Questions Given the costs of coercion, under what circumstances do politicians choose coercive electoral strategies when and where they do? Different answers imply different strategies for measurement and interpretation of violence, as well as intervention, and conflict resolution. Are the answers the same across contexts?

10. Tentative Empirical Expectations of Strategic Conception of Violence

11. Challenge of Defining and Mitigating Election Violence: Coercion and Fraud involve Creative Innovation • If politicians substitute and combine tactics, will addressing one type of electoral manipulation or changing aspects of the electoral process lead to substitution with another tactic? [Examples: Costa Rica, Indonesia, Newark]

12. “Having been thwarted by increasingly sophisticated and better organized election machinery, they could turn to violence to achieve their ends.” - Danville Walker, Director of Elections, Jamaica, November 10, 2002 (quoted in Jamaica Observer)

13. Substituting Means of Electoral Manipulation in Costa Rica (1901 – 46) Modern Electoral Code Nonviolent methods Secret Ballot Coercive methods Mandatory Turnout Laws Similar patterns in Egypt, 19th-century Kentucky, Kansas City, U.S. South Molina, Iván and Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq. 1999. "Political Competition and Electoral Fraud: A Latin American Case Study." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 30: 228.

14. Ternate The Sultan’s Curse Face Buying:

15. United States • Anonymous welfare and debt mailings to voters; newly covered under mail fraud laws • Fake police officers in Hispanic areas in the Southwest

16. Newark Even violence that appear spontaneous may be orchestrated: • Newark Booker Campaign Incident Log: “District 48: Sharpe had 15-20 people outside; -- Send Visibility” • Incitement / Provocation and Response [2005 Incident at Pennington Court designed to show candidate’s toughness]

17. Defining Coercion, continued • Where does nonviolence end and violence begin? [Newark code enforcers (film clip)] • How proximate to the election does an event have to be to “count” as election-related? Newark Mayor vetoed committed funds for social service group as punishment for support of opposition 1 month after election;birthday party fundraising occurs annually. Wilkinson (2004) argues that parties are always campaigning in India and use ethnic violence to play on fears.

18. Exploratory Assessment of Preliminary Hunches:Data, Qualitative Interviews, Glance at Legal Frameworks

19. Exploratory Research: Newark • Identified incidents from any Star Ledger article pertaining to elections from date of Booker’s candidacy to inauguration date • Identified 50+ potential respondents • Interviewed ~25 people, including former James employees and “intimidators” who have defected to the other side • Identified 38 incidents of coercion, combining media reports and campaign legal notes

20. Exploratory Research: Newark • High Stakes for Incumbent Sharpe James - “Resource Curse” of Port Authority revenue and opportunities for patronage (Newark collects only 83% of taxes; most city residents are employed by City Hall) - Highest paid official in New Jersey, paid more than any Governor and the VP - “Double Dipping” and shaping rules of the game as State Senator - Highest murder rate, one of poorest cities in the most affluent U.S. State • Faced first viable challenger in 2002 • Employees/dependents faced job loss, campaign reform under Booker

21. Sharpe’s Bundle of Strategies Prior to 2002 • City employees compelled to finance incumbent campaign (b-day tix) • Transfer or termination of anyone who supports opposition council members or mayoral challengers (Dana Rone family members) • Delivers votes to county, state, and national Democrats in return for favorable laws, lax enforcement in return (sign ordinances) • Reputation for having “eyes and ears everywhere” deters criticism and competition (Healey Invitation) • Coopts enemies with lucrative contracts or city jobs • Pendergast-style largess (Turkeys and Patronage) cultivates loyalty (voters like Sharpe’s goodies better)

22. Sharpe’s Nonviolent Levers • City Code enforcement • Union contract negotiation • Developer contracts • City employees (police, etc.) • Housing Authority • Authorization of Federal Block Grants • Large sums of unregulated revenue • Year-round campaigning & fundraising getting or delivering votes up the chain (“Campaigning is a year-round job around here”)

23. Sharpe’s Desperation in 2002: Employing Election Violence can be a POSITIVE Sign of Increasing Electoral Competition • Presence of viable, well-funded opponent leads to more open criticism and opposition, whereas 1998 Challenger Mildred Crump told reporters people were “terrified” to support her. • Polls show James losing support in South Ward • James hires consultants, conducts polls, and uses media advertising for the first time • Using uniformed and off-duty police to intimidate, vandalize, and restrict opponents’ movement • Hiring out-of-town street power • Alleged employment of gangs • Race-baiting, incitement and hate speech • Escalation of economic coercion

24. Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Explanations H: Violence is Merely Symptomatic of Ethnic Cleavages: • Booker Lawyers emphasized civil rights threat against Hispanics to invite Federal oversight, but the data pattern suggests James conceded Hispanic areas and intimidated in his stronghold. • Interviews suggest people believe it is easy for leaders to abuse their own and get away with it • A hotly-contested election turned a non-partisan, all-African American race into a racial conflict, not the other way around (See also Wilkinson 2004 on India).

27. Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Explanations, continued H: Intimidation/Violence is Expressive of Passionate Supporters • Strategic presence of mobs/crowds hired from Philadelphia • Interviews suggesting crowd presence deters voting because race has been won; compels voting because voters assume their choice will be found out; or convinces voters to vote for the side that will win • Cluster of incidents is non-random • Incidents cluster around GOTV operations & high turnout “Newark is Gangs of New York…Tammany Hall” -- leader of Union punished for backing Booker

29. Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Explanations, continued H: Violence is Associated with Crime • Some evidence to support gang involvement on election day, but strategic not criminal involvement (“When you have the same drug dealers & criminals who instill fear in the housing projects suddenly wearing James shirts at the polls, you can imagine what people will do” – Booker lawyer) • Interviewees suggest that low education and income level makes people vulnerable to manipulation and willing to commit or ignore crime • DOJ: Election crimes as indicators of other corrupt activity – Corrupt leaders’ fear of losing office

30. Data Exploration of Strategic Exploration • Timing of Intimidation Seems Strategic 1. Shift from pre-election deterrence of financial and volunteer support to opponent to… 2. GOTV operations on Election Day (seem to be associated with increasing support for James from 1998-2002) 3. Retribution against opponents’ supporters when levers of punishment become available. (NCC; Major McGreevey Donor)

31. Post-Election: Directed toward INSTITUTIONS/Donors Pre-Election Directed to Deterring Opposing Candidate & Supporters Election Day: Directed toward VOTERS

32. Data Exploration of Strategic Exploration • Location Seems Strategic 1. Clusters 2. East Ward was considered up for grabs, but any new turnout would go to Booker 3. Polls showed James weakest in South and East in 9/2001, yet he won them

35. Practical Considerations for Definition, Measurement, Inference • Number and location of incidents do not reflect level of intimidation because of combination of polling stations in key locations (higher number of districts affected than map indicates); • How would we know if intimidation influences the outcome? (Booker interviewees mixed on whether election was stolen or not; unprecedented 4,000 votes in S. Ward) • How do we characterize: - electricity outages in polling stations - rumors of Election Board machine tampering, - Union contract negotiation delays - Arena threat, - Strip club incident - legal harassment (parking tickets, 22 sign injunctions ($1000 ea) • Rumored verses verifiable incidents? (researcher versus practitioner)

36. Methodological Considerations • Choice of Sources: • Allegations (Lehoucq and Molina 2002) • Legal investigation (DOJ reported receiving over 100 incidents, with other organizations receiving more calls) (motives?) • Media Reports (Media & Culture in U.S. versus Ghana) * Acceptability of “rough and tumble” politics “Politics is war and I’m ready to fight….I’ve got a Ph.D. too, a Ph.D. in street politics....I rule the street operations.” -- Newark ward operations strongman * American complacency about what does and does not happen in U.S. * American tendency to report same incident with every new story and to summarize general trends (not conducive to the “who did what to whom where” data collection format typical of political science - Different legality for incidents (lack of a sense of outrage)

37. “The factual truth of the allegations [of intimidation and violence] is not what matters, but the perception that they are widespread and could happen to you.”- Interview with professor forced to resign a major university position because of his criticism of Newark’s City Hall economic policies

38. Ghana • Coded narratives and forms of IFES monitors in Ghana’s 2004 General Election (54 Incidents, ~6 of questionable relation to election and/or insufficient information) • Supplemented with Daily Media Monitoring of paper known for lack of bias, Ghanaian Chronicle, from Registration Date to Inauguration Date (additional 16 incidents, though general reports of intimidation could not be included)

39. Methodological Issues Raised by Ghana Incidents • Rolling primaries • Accusations and statements against violence • Coup Hoax • General Reports • Photography, surveillance

40. Rationale for Comparison • Approximately 20% unemployment in each case (leaving out Port Authority employment in Newark) • Newark Poverty Rate of 26% • Incumbent with 20-36 Years in Power • Centralized control of state apparatus and security forces • Although local, Electoral Systems are uniform only at the city level for municipal and county for state/federal elections in New Jersey

41. Ghana Incident Exploration

43. Severity of Tactics

44. Impact Severity

45. What Future Comparative Analysis Might Tell Us • Willingness of wrong persons to file complaints • System effects on type of perpetrators and victims • Social/cultural and legal/institutional explanations for severity of violence used • What is election violence an indicator of? Do shifts in the nature of violence (from one-sided to mutual, or two-party, suggest an important change)? • Motives of victims and perpetrators • Number and nature of parties (ideology, party discipline)

46. Do Institutions and Laws Matter? A deductive look at the legal framework

47. Legal Framework for Coercion • Right to vote • Legal definitions of election offences • Penalties and remedies for election offences • Enforcement (areas in need of further research) • Clarity and transparency of election authority • Independence of election authority • Detection and prosecution of violations • Statute of Limitations

48. Ghana Current Electoral Provisions • 1992 Constitution, Ch. 7: Representation of the People • Registration of Voters Regulations, 1968 (L.I. 587) • Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284) (“RPL”) • Presidential Elections Laws, 1992 (PNDCL 285) • Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act 451) • Public Elections (District Assembly) Regulations, 1993 (C.I. 4) • (repeals District Assembly Election Regulations, 1988 (L.I.1396) by applying to assemblies all provisions of the Public Elections Regulations (Parliamentary)) • Public Elections Regulations, 1996 (C.I. 15) • (repeals Public Elections (Parliamentary) Regulations, 1992 (L.I.1537 and Amendment L.I.1544) • Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574) • (repeals Political Parties Law, 1992 PNDCL 281))

49. Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana Right to Vote: Constitutionally guaranteed Defining Physical Coercion:“Undue Influence” and “Interference in Electioneering” include threat or use of force, abusive language, disruption of public tranquility, creating fear of spiritual or temporal injury or loss, including fear of divine displeasure in order to induce a voter to vote or not vote or a candidate to withdrawal. Criminal Penalties: (a) Cedi 1 million ($833, or 87% of average household income); (b) up to two years in prison for coercion, destruction of election materials, bribery, vote buying, etc. (c) 5 years disqualification as voter or party

50. Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana Remedies (1) Immediate: (a) If violence or natural disaster interrupts polling, polling can be postponed to following day; (b) Disorderly persons or those committing offences defined above removed from polling stations and charged. (2)Electoral: Petition and 20,000 Cedi (~$8.50) can be filed by voter or candidate within 21 days of the election to the High Court.