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Airworthiness Subgroup

Airworthiness Subgroup. TASK TF-AIR06. Considerations for International General Aviation. 1) Maintenance………..(similar to commercial transport or not?) 2) Operations …………..(to recommend SRA or not?). TF-AIR06 members for IVATF/4. General Aviation Manufacturer Association (GAMA)

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Airworthiness Subgroup

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  1. Airworthiness Subgroup TASK TF-AIR06

  2. Considerations for International General Aviation • 1) Maintenance………..(similar to commercial transport or not?) • 2) Operations …………..(to recommend SRA or not?)

  3. TF-AIR06 members for IVATF/4 • General Aviation Manufacturer Association (GAMA) • International Aviation Business Council (IBAC) • OEMs (PWC, Cessna Textron, Bell Textron Helicopters) • Operators (Bristow Helicopters) • Authorities of States (CASA Australia, FAA, EASA) • ICAO Technical Officers

  4. Recall: TF-AIR06 IVATF/2 for :commercial aircraft • Globally Engine & Aircraft OEMs issued instructions for maintenance & inspection when flying in airspace with a low contamination of ash • Operators should follow those instructions • Guidance of ICAO Doc 9691 was recommended to be improved with the knowledge gained in 2010-2011 • The guidance was proposed by TF-AIR01 and TF-AIR06 in IVATF/2

  5. 1) Maintenance considerations • Also (globally) majority of OEMS for aircraft & engines that fall under the International General Aviation have issued instructions for maintenance & inspection • In principle there is no difference how ‘the commercial domain’ and the ‘International General Aviation Domain’ have responded • The group reviewed examples of OEM documentation issued on IGA products and reviewed the recommendations from IVATF/2 TF-AIR06, including the Appendix 3D)

  6. Conclusion for maintenance considerations for IGA: • Appendix 3D of IVATF/2 Report and IVATF Recommendation 2/16 sufficiently addressed the aspects of the International General Aviation • No further action is required than to adopt the Appendix 3D in the ICAO Doc 9691 guidance material

  7. 2) Operations considerations • Would IGA benefit from Safety Risk Approach as applied to the commercial transport sector? • Early conclusion: exclude the ‘recreational part’ of the IGA: It does not economically suffer; limited expertise to do SRA available; no serious negative effects expected in case of eruptions • Operators with organisations that are required to have a Safety Management System as listed in the provisions of ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft – the group concluded that it makes sense to require/consider SRA as part of the Safety Management System

  8. Provisions of Annex 6 PART II & III: • Part II: International General Aviation • Part III: International Helicopter Operations (commercial air transport) • Annex 6 refers to: Safety Management Manual (SMM) ICAO Doc 9859 • Chapter 4.3.6 discusses Natural Hazards • Paragraph 4.3.6 c mentions Geophysical Hazards including volcanoes (as example) • TF-AIR06 concluded: volcanic ash is or should be(as a safety hazard) an intrinsic part of the Safety Management System

  9. Remaining question: what to do with operations excluded from having an SMS as per Annex 6 Part II and III? • Not large turbojet • Non-commercial helicopter operations • Search & Rescue and medical emergency & evacuation operations with those aircraft / operations should be allowed with common sense regarding the specific nature of the operations. • Practical Solution: some States think that the State can request ‘a simplified form of SRA’. The expertise is within the State to require a simplified SRA or not.

  10. Text proposed to be added to Doc 9691(to already existing recommendation from IVATF/2) • Volcanic Ash shall - as a geophysical safety hazard – be addressed as an intrinsic element of the Safety Management System as required per ICAO Annex 6 Part I Operation of aircraft – Commercial Transport Aeroplanes, Part II – International General Aviation – Aeroplanes and Part III International Operation Helicopters - International Commercial Air Transport; • Guidance on Safety Management Systems can be found in in ICAO Safety Management Manual Doc 9859 and ICAO Doc 9974, which specifically addresses the risk of operations in airspace contaminated with volcanic ash;

  11. Text proposed to be added to Doc 9691(to already existing recommendation from IVATF/2) • For the types of operations which do not require an SMS, such as certain Search & Rescue or Medical Emergency or Evacuation operations, the States are recommended to consider the specific nature of the life- saving operations in order to allow for operations in emergency conditions in airspace contaminated with volcanic ash. A simplified safety Risk assessment with regard to the hazards of volcanic ash for these types of operations may be requested by the State of the Operator.

  12. Proposed Guidance for ICAO Doc 9691 included illustrations • For susceptibility of fixed wing aircraft with turbofans…. • But nothing for rotorcraft…… • TF-AIR06 recommends to include an illustration specific for rotorcraft (not in time for the deadline of this Working Paper) • A revised WP will handle the issue after IVATF/4 so we can include an illustration

  13. ‘Under construction’

  14. Conclusions of TF-AIR06 for IVATF/4: • In 2010 and 2011, the majority of engine and aircraft TC Holders for commercial transport aviation and International General Aviation issued, re-issued and updated their maintenance and inspection instructions with respect to operation in airspace with a low contamination of volcanic ash. It is advised that ICAO guidance should reflect on those instructions. • The aspects of the International General Aviation are sufficiently addressed with the proposed amendment to ICAO Doc 9691 that was included at Appendix 3D of the IVATF/2 Report (and IVATF/2 Recommendation 2/16), and as presented as Appendix A to this working paper. • Operation in airspace contaminated with volcanic ash should be addressed as an intrinsic part of the Safety Management System (SMS) as required by ICAO Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Parts I, II and III. • For the types of operations which do not require an SMS, such as certain Search & Rescue or Medical Emergency or Evacuation operations, the States are recommended to consider the specific nature of the life- saving operations in order to allow for operations in emergency conditions in airspace contaminated with volcanic ash. A simplified safety Risk assessment with regard to the hazards of volcanic ash for these types of operations may be requested by the State of the Operator.

  15. Recommendation • Proposed additional text for inclusion in the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (ICAO Doc 9691) is presented at Appendix B to this working paper, as a supplement to the proposal formulated at IVATF/2 (Appendix 3A of the IVATF/2 Report and IVATF/2 Recommendation 2/15 refers). • That, the IVATF invites the appropriate ICAO group to finalize and incorporate the proposed additional guidance material on standards that have resulted in safe operations during volcanic eruptions, as given at Appendix2 .. to this report, into the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (ICAO Doc 9691).

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