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E xperimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile

E xperimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile. Presented by Gaurav Mastakar. Authors. Karl Koscher , Alexei Czeskis , Franziska Roesner , Shwetak Patel, and Tadayoshi Kohno Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of Washington

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E xperimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile

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  1. Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile Presented by GauravMastakar

  2. Authors Karl Koscher, Alexei Czeskis, FranziskaRoesner, Shwetak Patel, and Tadayoshi Kohno Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of Washington Stephen Checkoway, Damon McCoy, Brian Kantor, Danny Anderson, HovavShacham, and Stefan Savage Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of California San Diego

  3. Abstract • Automobiles are monitored and controlled • Introduction of new potential risks • Demonstration of fragility of system structure • Electronic Control Unit (ECU) • Range of experiments performed • Possible to bypass network security • Composite attacks

  4. Introduction • Automobiles contains myriad of computers • Luxury sedan contains 100 MB binary code spread across 50-70 computers • Safety the main concern • Onboard Diagnostics port • User-upgradable subsystems

  5. Introduction (contn’d) • Telematics system by GM’s OnStar features • Integration of internal automotive subsystems with a remote command center via a wide-area cellular connection • Hughes Telematics App Store • Ford’s Sync Telematics system

  6. Introduction (contn’d) • Experiments on two passenger cars • Test cars components to assess resilience • Demonstrate ability to control components • Combining these mount attacks • Evaluation of security properties of each component and analyze network substrate

  7. Background • 250 million automobiles in US • Automotive Embedded Systems: Self contained embedded systems called ECUs in 1970s • Integrated into cars functioning and diagnostics

  8. Background (contn’d) • ECU Coupling: complex interactions across ECUs • Electronic Stability Control (ESC): monitors wheel speed, steering angle, throttle position and accelerometers; modulates engine torque and wheel speed to increase traction • Antilock Breaking System (ABS) • Roll Stability Control (RSC): apply breaks, reduce throttle, modulate steering angle • Activity Cruise Control (ACC): scan road ahead and increase decrease throttle. Eg: Audi Q7 • Also provide pre-crash features

  9. Background (contn’d) • Luxury sedans even offer automated parallel parking features. eg: Lexus LS460 • Electric driven vehicles require precise software control over power management and regenerative braking to achieve high efficiency, by a slew of emerging safety features Eg: GM’s OnStar will offer integration with Twitter

  10. Background (contn’d) • Car contains multiple buses (high-speed and low speed) • Buses are bridged to provide subtle interaction requirements Eg: Central Locking System (CLS) controls power door locking mechanism CLS must also be connected to safety critical systems

  11. Background (contn’d) • Telematics: automation in automobiles • GM’s OnStar: analyze OBD detect vehicle problems • ECUs monitor crash sensors; OnStar personnel to perform functions; to do so bridge all important buses, connect to Internet via Verizon’s digital cellular service

  12. Related Work • Framing the vehicle security and privacy problem space • Security problems of vehicle-to-vehicle systems • Tuner subculture

  13. Threat Model • What an attacker could do? • How an attacker could gain access? 1. Physical access: insert malicious component into cars internal network via OBD-II port 2. Via wireless interfaces: five kinds of digital radio interfaces accepting outside input; remotely compromise key ECUs in our car via externally-facing vulnerabilities, amplify the impact using the results in this paper, and ultimately monitor and control our car remotely over the Internet.

  14. Experimental Environment • Two 2009 automobiles with electronically controlled components and telematics system • Two vehicles to allow differential testing and to validate the results were not tied to one car • Also purchased individual replacement ECUs via third-party dealers to allow additional testing.

  15. Experimental Environment (contn’d) • Experiments with these cars—and their internal components—in three principal settings: • Bench • Stationary car • On the road

  16. Experimental Environment (contn’d) Bench • Extract hardware • Variant of CAN protocol

  17. Experimental Environment (contn’d) Stationary car: • Used CAN-to-USB interface • Atmel AT90CAN128 development board with custom firmware

  18. Experimental Environment (contn’d)

  19. Experimental Environment (contn’d) On the road:

  20. Intra-Vehicle Network Security • Assess the security properties of CAN bus A. CAN Bus: link layer data protocol used for diagnostics used by BMW, Ford, GM, Honda

  21. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) CAN variant includes • Slight extensions to framing • Two separate physical layers • Gateway bridge is used to route data • Protocol standards define a range of services to be implemented by ECUs

  22. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) B. CAN Security Challenges: • Broadcast Nature: Malicious component can snoop packets • Fragility to DoS: CAN has priority based arbitration scheme with states dominant or recessive • No Authenticator Fields: Any component can send CAN packet to any other component

  23. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) • Weak Access Control: Protocol standards specify a challenge response sequence to protect ECUs • Reflashing and memory protection: • Tester Capabilities: restricts access to DeviceControlservices Fixed challenge-response pairs are 16 bits ECUs allow response attempt every 10 sec Multiple ECUs can be cracked in parallel Physically removing the component

  24. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) • ECU Firmware Updates and Open Diagnostic Control: • Software only upgrades to ECUs • As DeviceControl Service used in diagnosis of cars components, many attacks can be built on it

  25. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) • Deviation from Standards Not all components follow standards • Disabling Communications: ECUs should reject “disable CAN communications” • Reflashing ECUs while driving: “The engine control module should reject a request to initiate a programming event if the engine were running.” Could place ECM and TCM into reflashing mode

  26. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) • Noncompliant Access Control: Firmware and Updates: ECUs must be protected by challenge-response protocol • Telematics Unit connected to cars CAN buses use hardcoded challenge and response common to all units • can reflash the unit and can load our own code into telematics unit • Should deny rights to read sensitive memory areas

  27. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) • Standard states defining memory addresses that will not allow tester to read under any circumstances • But could read reflashing keys out of BCM • DeviceControl keys for ECM and TCM • Extract telematics units entire memory

  28. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) • Noncompliant Access Control: Device overrides: • DeviceControl service override state of components • ECUs should reject unsafe DeviceControl override requests • Certain requests succeeded without authenticating

  29. Intra-Vehicle Network Security (contn’d) • Imperfect Network Segregation: standard states that gateways between the two networks must only be re-programmable from the high-speed network • 2 ECUs on both buses and can bridge signals: BCM and Telematics unit which is not a gateway • Verified that we could bridge these networks by uploading code into telematics unit

  30. Component Security A. Attack Methodology 1. Packet Sniffing and Targeted Probing: • Used CARSHARK to observe traffic on CAN buses • Combination of replay and informed probing

  31. Component Security (contn’d) 2. Fuzzing: • Damage can be done by fuzzing of packets • DeviceControl allows testing devices to override normal output functionality of ECU • DeviceControl takes an argument called CPID Eg. BCM 3. Reverse Engineering: • Dumped code via CAN ReadMemory service and used third party debugger (IDA pro) • Essential for attacks that require new functionality to be added

  32. Component Security B. Stationary Testing:

  33. Component Security

  34. Component Security

  35. Component Security 1. Radio: completely control, disable user control and display arbitrary messages 2. Instrument Panel Cluster (IPC):

  36. Component Security 3. Body Controller: control is split across low-speed and high-speed buses 4. Engine: attacks were found by fuzzing DeviceControl requests to the ECM Attack like disturb engine timing by resetting the learned crankshaft angle sensor error 5. Brakes: how to lock brakes without needing to unblock EBCM with its DeviceControl key 6. HVAC: control the cabin environment

  37. Component Security 7. Generic DoS: disable communication of individual components on CAN bus C. Road Testing: car was controlled via a laptop running CARSHARK and connected to the CAN bus via the OBD-II port. Laptop controlled via wireless link to another laptop in chase car

  38. Component Security • EBCM needed to be unblocked to issue DeviceControl packets • Able to release brakes and prevent from breaking • Able to continuously lock brakes unevenly • Road testing helped to completely characterize the brake behavior

  39. Multi-Component Interactions A. Composite Attacks: 1. Speedometer: display an arbitrary speed or an arbitrary offset of the current speed • intercepting speed update packets • implemented as a CARSHARK module and as custom firmware for the AVR-CAN board • tested by comparing displayed speed with actual speed

  40. Multi-Component Interactions (contn’d) 2. Lights Out: disable interior and exterior lights • requires the lighting control system to be in the “automatic” setting 3. Self-Destruct: demo in which a 60-second count-down is displayed on the Driver Information Center • Kills the engine and activates the door lock relay

  41. Multi-Component Interactions (contn’d) B. Bridging Internal CAN Networks • BCM regulates access between two buses • Telematics unit connected to both buses can be reprogrammed from device connected to low speed bus; acts as a bridge • any device attached to low speed bus can bypass BCM gateway

  42. Multi-Component Interactions (contn’d) C. Hosting Code; Wiping Code: • Implant malicious code within telematics unit • Complicating detection and forensic evaluations • Perform action and erase evidence • if attack code installed as per above method simply reboot

  43. Discussion and Conclusions 1. Extent of damage: Didn’t anticipate that we would be able to directly manipulate safety critical ECUs or create unsafe conditions 2. Ease of attack: Automotive systems are fragile, simple fuzzing infrastructure 3. Unenforced Access Controls: could load firmware onto ECUs like Telematics unit and RCDLR without authentication; Critical ECUs respond to DeviceControl packets

  44. Discussion and Conclusions (contn’d) 4. Attack Amplification: • Maliciously bridging high-speed and low-speed networks • Design code to erase evidence • Components designed to tolerate failures but tolerating attacks not part of design

  45. Discussion and Conclusions (contn’d) Future Work: 1. Diagnostic and Reflashing Services: • Lock-down capabilities • How could mechanics service and replace components • Reflashing commands should only be issued with validation • Physical access to car required before issuing dangerous commands

  46. Discussion and Conclusions (contn’d) 2. Aftermarket Components: • Allow owners to connect external filtering device between untrusted component and vehicle bus 3. Detection versus Prevention: • if prevention is expensive, quick reversal is sufficient for certain class of vulnerabilities 4. Toward Security: • See what is feasible practically and compatible with interests of a broader set of stakeholders

  47. Questions ?

  48. THANK YOU !!

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