PO 326: American Foreign Policy

1. Whither American Foreign Policy Today? Isolationism, Wilsonianism, Power Politics, and “Neoconservatism” PO 326: American Foreign Policy

2. What ARE the Themes Underlying US Foreign Policy? • As noted, there appear to be several unifying themes underlying the American conduct of foreign policy over time • Perhaps the most important of these (according to conventional wisdom) are American “indepen-dence” and “exceptionalism” • The US is “too good” to engage in the baseness of Old World-style realpolitik, and should thus remain independent of it (isolationism) • When the US does engage the world, it does so fairly, and for the main purpose of upholding the causes underlying the American political ethic (Wilsonianism) • This, too, implicates a certain US “independence” from the simple, material interest-based “realities” of world politics

3. What ARE the Themes Underlying US Foreign Policy? • These themes seem quite important to understanding current American foreign policy • In the wake of the failure to find WMD in Iraq, the democratization of regions of threat has apparently been revealed as the foremost goal of the Bush foreign policy • “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one” (2005 Inaugural) • Apparent reaffirmation of the Wilsonian notion that America can only survive if its moral “exceptionalism” is allowed to spread – but is there something more to it than this?

4. What ARE the Themes Underlying US Foreign Policy? • Several questions should therefore be addressed: • Has the US acted as though it is truly exceptional amongst (or “independent” from) the states of the world? If so, should it have? • Is the American ethic truly the driving force? If so, has the conduct of US foreign policy changed the way other states conduct international relations? • Is the Bush foreign policy driven by something new, or by something entirely within the historical context of past experience?

5. Is America “Exceptional” and “Independent”? • The authors studied for today have nuanced views regarding the degree to which “exceptionalism” and “independence” are (and/or should be) germane to the USFP experience • Barber: American “independence” and “exceptionalism” are (and have always been) dangerous myths • Kagan and Kristol: America is not independent, but asymmetrically interdependent (i.e., others are dependent upon our power); American “exceptionalism” means both what it always has, but also something new

6. Is America “Exceptional” and “Independent”? • Barber’s work reaffirms that the US has historically thought itself to be “fresh and innocent” in relation to the politics of Europe • Our “civic religion” meant that our patriotism was “rooted in ideas not blood, in law not kinship, in voluntary citizenship not ascriptive roots, in constitutional faith not confessional orthodoxy,” and thus that our foreign policy began with the “presumption of American virtue”

7. Is America “Exceptional” and “Independent”? • However, such an approach is dangerously flawed • The assumption of innocence sometimes breeds ignorance, and a willingness to overlook or rationalize the transgressions that one commits (puts our motivesbeyond both interest and scrutiny – precludes real discussion of national interests and makes others cynical towards our aims) • The need to maintain innocence can lead either to isolation or the imposition of hegemony – little room for middle ground (moral absolutism, predisposition to unilateralism)

8. Is America “Exceptional” and “Independent”? • Moreover, as noted by many other analysts, the US has never really been independent • Mead: Even when we were supposedly “isolationist,” our foreign policy sought to establish balances of power and actively integrate the US into the major power system • Thus, Barber believes that both independence and exceptionalism are “pleasant fictions” that, while perhaps engendering a longstanding domestic view of the purpose of foreign policy, are untrue, have not served the US well in its FP, and have not allowed for a useful discourse (international or domestic) regarding what our role should be

9. Is America “Exceptional” and “Independent”? • Kagan sees American views regarding the rightful conduct of government as viable and important underpinnings of US foreign policy • However, the very success of the American worldview has resulted in a kind of juxtaposition of American and European foreign policy necessities • Weakened by two world wars, Europe has abandoned the conduct of power politics, and has instead focused upon developing a “Kantian” approach to international relations (elimination of war, integration, etc.) • However, this shift is only made possible (it is, indeed, protected) by the US taking up the mantle of “Hobbesian” power politics • Thus, the spread of American moral “exceptionalism” places the US in the position of physical guarantor; the realities of the international system leaves room for no other outcome but widespread dependence upon American strength • Thus, we have become “exceptional” at the one thing that our Founding Fathers wanted us to avoid • If we want our system of government to survive, we NEED to make sure that it flourishes elsewhere, and the only way to do that is through power • Causes a great deal of understandable friction between Europe and US; old ties are weakening

10. Neoconservatism • Kagan’s notion that the spread and protection of American ideals around the world is key to our survival is certainly not new (Wilson). However, the linkage of this notion to the importance of conducting “continental”-style power politics is at the heart of a “new” (?) worldview that is as much concerned with domestic policy as with foreign policy • In current parlance, this view is known as “neoconservatism”

11. The Domestic End of the “Neoconservative” Worldview • Begins at home with fiscal responsibility: • The stimulation of “steady economic growth” is absolutely crucial to the success of the American democracy, even if it results in short-term budget deficits. Growth results in the “trickle-down” enrichment of all classes, precluding the class struggle that so many have claimed would destroy democratic polities • Even in the era of necessary “big government,” government cannot become overly intrusive in the peoples’ affairs (hands-off attitude) • Neoconservatives marry this view of fiscal responsibility with the upholding and enhancement of moral values, for the ostensible purpose of maintaining democratic culture • As such, neocons are largely viewed as a “hybrid” between traditional fiscal conservatives and “religious traditionalists”

12. The Foreign Policy End of the “Neoconservative” Worldview • In its foreign policy prescriptions, we see connections with the dual focus on moral and fiscal responsibility prevalent in neoconservatism’s domestic policy prescriptions • A state’s “national interest” is both endogenously and exogenously determined; most notably, by a conjunction of its ideology and its physical capacity • The US is an enormous power; by itself, this means that it has an extraordinary number of international dealings. Moreover, because the US is largely defined by an ideology – responsible freedom – it will necessarily see the tenor of its international dealings shaped by that ideology • A focus on the importance and necessity of patriotism • A staunch opposition to world government (overreaching government=tyranny) • Statesmen should be able to distinguish friends from enemies – problematic even during the Cold War (old conservative refrain) • Thus – neoconservative foreign policy clearly has its roots in a religious/economic/exceptionalist hybrid of a domestic political agenda. Its prescriptions for international action largely seek to safeguard this agenda, but calls for an “Old World” style of foreign policy to establish those safeguards

13. Back to the Beginning • How does “neoconservative” foreign policy adhere to or deviate from the history of USFP that you have surveyed? • What role do exceptionalism and independence play in the neoconservative worldview? • Is its consideration of these historically prevalent factors dangerous to America’s long-term policies and interests (e.g., are Barber’s concerns, seemingly so crucial to neocons regarding the conduct of FP, worth keeping in mind)? • Reconsider the Bush Administration’s foreign policy, keeping in mind that the neoconservative worldview predates 9/11 • Did 9/11 spur the creation of a foreign policy primarily concerned with combating terrorism, or was 9/11 simply the first opportunity to employ a long-standing view of the rightful conduct of FP that had yet been given free reign? • Are the tasks of counterterrorism and ensuring the spread of freedom one and the same? Where does the Iraq war fit into these considerations? • What are your views concerning the “correct” conduct of USFP in the 21st Century?