The Politics of Labour Importation in Hong Kong and Macau: Identity, State and Democracy

1. The Politics of Labour Importation in Hong Kong and Macau: Identity, State and Democracy Alex H. Choi, University of Macau

2. Both HK and MO started their importation programs in the late 1980s. • But their programs display very different characteristics in terms of size, regulation, and most importantly, with very different political consequences • This paper is an attempt to look into these phenomena and offer some tentative explanations.

3. Migrant Workers in HK • The Supplementary Labour Scheme allows employers to import unskilled labour if there is no suitable local workers available. • Labour Dept Job match program • Labour Advisory Committee endorsement • Median wage • Admitted 1,101 persons in 2007

4. The current SLS replaced the General Labour Importation Scheme (GLIS) in 1996. The GLIS allowed a maximum quota of 25,000. On top of it, there was a special quota for migrant construction workers for the then airport project. GLIS has caused a lot of labour unrest and political upheavals. It was terminated in 1996. Since then migrant workers as an issue has never caused major political crisis in HK politics.

5. Apart from SLS, there are 245,531 foreign domestic workers working in HK in 2007, representing 6.7% of the working population.

6. Migrant Workers in Macau • Officially, MO started to import migrant labour in 1988. • In 2008, there is a total of 82,175 migrant workers representing 25.2% of the working population here. • Migrant workers are present in almost every sector of the economy. The exceptions are card dealing, civil service, and bus driving.

7. The regulation regime is very liberal with no import quota, no occupational restriction, no minimum wage, and no ceiling. • Migrant workers has become a hot political issue in MO. All the major recent demonstrations targeted migrant workers to be one of the key grievances.

8. Theoretical Framework • Why regimes import unskilled migrant workers? • Why some of them afford to allow the issue of migrant workers to remain a hot political issue, and for so long? • Current discussions on the importation of labour are always contextualized in a developed country background. • There is also a shift from economic (esp. pull-push theory) to political factors in those discussions.

9. Benefits are concentrated, costs are diffused (migrants took up low pay, low skill jobs), so importation is allowed to continue. • Liberal political regime: illegal workers can become legal workers through acquiring local connections, legal workers become migrants, migrants fight for family reunion. The court becomes a main battleground for all these issues, and always sides with the migrants. Migration becomes self-perpetuating phenomenon.

10. These factors are not very applicable in the Third World: no liberal political regime, and costs are concentrated on unskilled local workers. • I will propose a threefold framework to explain the importation of migrant workers in the less developed countries. This framework is adapted from Bartram (2005)*, (* David Bartram. 2005. International Labor Migration: Foreign Workers and Public Policy. Houndmills: Palgrave.)

11. 1) Identity: Many Third World countries are former colonies still very much in the process of building a national identity. If the construction of this concept of ‘us’ has achieved a measure of success, the closure of the state is likely. The entry of ‘others’ has to be strictly regulated. Those allowed in are often given a truncated or non- citizenship.

12. 2) State: State holds the ultimate authority on controlling who can get into the country. The importation of workers usually involves short term gains and long term pains. Only an autonomous state can resist employers’ pressure on labour import, and force them onto a path of capital reinvestment and productivity upgrade.

13. 3) Democracy: The presence of an autonomous and organized labour sector strong enough to counter-balance the employers’ political influence is an important factor in shaping the policy-making process. It is even more so if the political system is open and democratic such that the rights of the workers are better protected, and their voices are heard.

14. HK: the Crisis Resolved 1) Identity: The Vietnam boat people crisis and the influx of refugees from mainland China at the end of the 1970s not only led to a ‘crisis of people’ but also threatened the fledging sense of Hong Kong identity. The touch-base policy, long used as a measure to regulate labour supply, was terminated in 1980.

15. 2) State Autonomy: Because illegal immigrants as a source of labour power was found to be not socially and politically acceptable, the business resorted to migrant workers when they faced a so-called labour shortage in the mid-1980s. The colonial state initially resisted, but succumbed to the pressure in May 1989 by approving the import.

16. 3) Democracy: The pro-Beijing FTU and the independent CTU joined hand, albeit reluctantly, into a united front against migrant import, at a time when HK workers were facing serious unemployment due to industrial relocation. • The critical turning point, however, was the June 4 massacre, that prompted Chris Patten to introduce a democracy program in HK.

17. The democratized 1995 Legislative Council election returned an unprecedented number of candidates with labour sympathies. They threatened to pass a motion in Legco to terminate the GLIS. To prevent a huge embarrassment, the government replaced the GLIS with a greatly diminished SLS. The SLS has a labour import quota of merely 2000.

18. MO: the Unending Saga • Identity: Similar with HK, MO faced a huge influx of refugees from China in the late 1970s. Macau government closed its border in 1979, but large number of illegal immigrants still found their way in. The practice of granting amnesties encouraged more to come. IIs provided industries with cheap labour. They were found to be a problem only after the 3.29 incident in 1990 (massive demonstration by IIs clamoring for legal status). The border was closed more tightly since then.

19. 2) State: the colonial state was weak, corrupted and did not have a strong will to govern. Its continuous existence was contingent on the consent of Beijing. Since the 123 incident in 1966, Beijing has groomed up an ubiquitous and powerful network of social organizations headed by the Macau Chamber of Commerce (MCC). In 1988, the colonial government approved labour import in response to MCC’s demand. Actually, labour had already been imported before the demand was made.

20. 3) Democracy: The labour sector in MO was monopolized by the MO FTU (MFTU). MFTU was an important component of the pro-Beijing network. The approval of the labour import brought immediate role conflict to MFTU. MFTU resolved this conflict by voicing out constrained opposition while avoiding radical actions for fear of jeopardizing political stability. Opposition pressure simply was not strong enough to reverse the policy.

21. The colonial state placated the MFTU by enhancing social welfare (e.g. setting up the Social Security Fund in 1989), and periodic suspension of labour import (e.g. 1995-1996 high unemployment period). • There was no democratic opening in MO after June 4. The pro-Beijing business network dominated the colonial regime. The labour sector manipulated by a pro-status quo MFTU. All these led to the displacement of labour discontents to the peripheries of political power.

22. New conditions after the 1999 transition: 1) The pro-Beijing business network is in direct control of the post-colonial state. 2) Casino-led economic growth fueled an escalation of labour import which has caused a lot of social problems. 3) New labour group emerged to challenge the monopoly of the MFTU on labour issues

23. 4) The government softens labour discontents through the distribution of welfare and goodies (e.g., cash payment). 5) The welfare policy and the new prosperity help to consolidate a MO identity. 6) The issue is whether this identity can be developed into a democratic force leading to correcting the power imbalance between labour and capital in the political system

24. A brief Conclusion • In HK, the democratic opening in mid-1990s closed off the option of labour import except foreign domestic helpers. • In MO, the labour import issue helps to create a local identity. This identity can result in a demand for democratic opening. Before this democratic opening emerges, the politics of labour import will continue as usual.