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Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. ( EBAO) Effect s Based Approach to Operations

Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. ( EBAO) Effect s Based Approach to Operations. LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.) DCOS, Chief Operations 25th ‘ György Klapka ’ Infantry Brigade Hungarian Home Defense Forces Tata, Hungary. CV. EDUCATION:

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Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. ( EBAO) Effect s Based Approach to Operations

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  1. Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. (EBAO)Effects Based Approach to Operations LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.)DCOS, Chief Operations25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry BrigadeHungarian Home Defense ForcesTata, Hungary

  2. CV • EDUCATION: • 1998-04 Ph.D. in Security Policy, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, HungaryDissertation with Summa Cum Laude: “The Five Central Pillars of the European Security” • 2002-03 #1 Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USAThesis: “The role of the Partnership for Peace Program and the State Partnership Program in the Process of NATO Enlargement. The Case ofthe Hungarian-Ohio Cooperation” • 2002-03 #2 Master of Arts in International Security and Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USAThesis: “Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy” • 1992-95 #3 Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, HungaryThesis: “Social Psychological Methods for Cognition of a Personality” • 1992-93 Miklós Zrínyi General Staff Collage with concentration in Intelligence, Hungary • 1986-89 #1 Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence with concentration in Long Range Special Operations and • #2 Bachelor of Science in Military Automotive Engineering, Lajos Kossuth Military College, HungaryThesis: “Development of Military Intelligence” • ASSIGNMENTS: • 2009- Chief Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, 25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry Brigade, Hungarian Home Defense Forces, Tata,Hungary • 2005-09 Strategic Representative, Office of the Hungarian Military Representative to NATO and EU, NATO HQ, Brussels • 2003-05 Chief Consultant, Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense • 2001-03 Postgraduate Student, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA • 2000-01 Deputy Head, Partnership Cooperation Branch, Ministry of Defense • 1998-00 Deputy Head, NATO Relations Branch, Ministry of Defense • 1995-98 Senior Military Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence Office • 1993-95 Graduate Student, National Defense University • 1989-93 Long Range Reconnaissance Special Team Commander, Hungarian Defense Forces • COMMISSIONS: • 2008-09 Dean, NATO Military Committee Strategic Representatives, NATO HQ, Brussels • 2005-09 Chief Coordinator in Scientific Development • Deputy Chief of Hungarian Transformation • 2003-05 Chief Coordinator in NATO/EU-Russia, NATO/EU-Ukraine, Mediterranean Dialogue, EUROMED and Iraq affairs • Chief Coordinator of the Political-Military Steering Committee, NATO HQ, Brussels • 1999- Hungarian Representative to PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Strategic Studies Institutes • 1999-01 Chief Coordinator of the NATO Membership Action Plan, Ministry of Defense • 1999-00 Chief Coordinator of the Western European Union, Ministry of Defense • 1997-98 Hungarian Representative to Intelligence Working Group on NATO Enlargement, NATO HQ, Brussels

  3. OUTLINE • Introduction • ACT-video • Basic points (ppt) • Forum-like discussion • Pointing out key elements • Escalating problems • Suggesting ways out

  4. TIMELINE • 2002 – Prague Summit > NATO Transformation > Capabilities • 2005 – CPG > §17 Effects Based Planning • 2006 – Riga Summit > CA • 2006 June 6 – Concept on EBAO by NATO MC/ACT • 2008 – Bucharest Summit > Plan of Action and CA • 2009 – Strasbourg-Kehl Summit > Progress Report • Planning and conduct of operations • Lessons learned, training, education and exercises • Enhancing cooperation with external actors • Public messaging • Stabilization and reconstruction

  5. ”CA vs./& EBAO” Operational spectrum Other Elements of Power (political, economic, civil) Comprehensive Approach Level of involvement Military Power Effect Based Approach to Operations War fighting Security Stability Reconstruction

  6. INTEGRATED ”END STATE” APPOACH

  7. BASIC MODEL Mechanism (Cause) Action (Tasks) Effect (Result) Mechanism (Cause) Action (Tasks)

  8. COMPLEX MIL. STRAT. MODEL Visualization Assessment Collaboration Improved InformationSuperiority and KnowledgeManagement Better identification of actions / capabilitiesrequired for desired effects Better dialog and interactionamong relevant PMESII experts(Hq staff, JIACG, COEs) Better prediction of PMESIIreactions and behaviorswithin Area of Operation Better identification of keyPMESII nodes and linkageswithin Area of Operation Situation Awareness Better prediction of 2nd, 3rd-order effects andunintended consequences Better identification andarticulation of keyPMESII effects More accurate and fasterdevelopment of node-effect-action matrix Situation Understanding PROCESS Improved Effects-Based Planning Process Better prioritization andlinkage of nodes-effects-actionswith Command Intent Better synchronization of effects and actions acrossDIME options Decision Making Greater % of targets andeffects within Daily ETOcontribute to Command Intent Lower % of targets andeffects within Daily ETOlead to unintended outcomes Command and Control Agility More Effective and Synchronized ETO More effective and efficientuse of military force Force Agility FocusedCombat Power OUTCOME Greater synergy in achievingNational Security Objectives ”Transformational” Perspective ”Network Centric” Perspective ”Dictatorial” Perspective

  9. THEORY OF PLANNING VS. EXECUTION

  10. DYNAMIC ”NC” MODULE APPOACH

  11. GRAVITATIONAL MODEL

  12. CAPABILITY APPOACH

  13. CIV. VS. MIL. STRUCTURES

  14. ”EFFECTS BASED TRANSFORMATION” Land Forces Land Forces Air Forces Air Forces Maritime Forces Maritime Forces SOF SOF Transition Period Effects-Based, Collaborative, Network Centric and Interdependent Deconflict Services & Cultures Stitch Nation Seams Integration of NRF Capabilities Land Forces Air Forces SOF Maritime Forces Deconflicting Coordinating Integrating Coherence Attributes of a Transforming NATO Force

  15. CASE STUDY ”SERBIA” Global Situation T Objectives Tasks A Awareness Air & Space S K Control Force L Support E V E L A CRISIS N A L Y Force S Application I S Now Force Enhancement Plan Disrupt Delivery of POL Effect Destroy Bridge 4 Destroy Bridge 6 Tasks …desired behavioral outcomes. Bridge 4 Destroyed Indicators Bridge 6 Destroyed Physical effects that lead to…

  16. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 1 Expansion North Expansion North - - Dec 2003 Dec 2003 Expansion West Expansion West - - 2005 2005 Start Start - - Kabul Kabul - - Dec 2001 Dec 2001 Finish Finish - - Expansion East Expansion East - - Oct 2006 2006 ? Expansion South Expansion South - - Jul 2006 Jul 2006

  17. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 2 Source: CSIS Burke Chair, “Developments in NATO and ISAF” Forces available from:http://www.csis.org/images/stories/burke/090423_developments_nato-isaf_and_us_forces.pdf

  18. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 3 Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

  19. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 4 Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

  20. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 5 Expansion North Expansion North - - Dec 2003 Dec 2003 Expansion West Expansion West - - 2005 2005 Start Start - - Kabul Kabul - - Dec 2001 Dec 2001 Finish Finish - - Expansion East Expansion East - - Oct 2006 2006 ? Expansion South Expansion South - - Jul 2006 Jul 2006 2011 ???

  21. CASE STUDY ”IRAQ VS. AFGHANISTAN”

  22. ”…oooops”

  23. ”…now watz da plain?”

  24. SUGGESTIONS • Both military and non-military capabilities must be transformed • Definition of ”Engagement Space” • Lack of political will will kill both CA and EBAO • An effects based approach to the Comprehensive Approach is imperative • EBAO is part of CA • Understanding multinationality and sectorial differences (resources, cultures) in CA/EBAO • Overall integrated CA/EBAO is needed

  25. The End LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.)Chief Operations, DCOS 25th György Klapka Infantry BrigadeHungarian Home Defense ForcesTata, Hungary Email: babostibor@yahoo.comPhone: +36-34-589-111

  26. ”Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover, lost time never.”

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