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Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant

Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. Safety Issues Involved PMANE Presentation to the Honorable CM, Tamil Nadu 29 February 2012. Safety Issues. Volcanism and Crustal Thinning – Subsidence and Fire Accidents Tsunami : Near Field Sea Regression – Dry Intake

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Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant

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  1. Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues Involved PMANE Presentation to the Honorable CM, Tamil Nadu 29 February 2012

  2. Safety Issues • Volcanism and Crustal Thinning – Subsidence and Fire Accidents • Tsunami : • Near Field • Sea Regression – Dry Intake • Paleo Tsunami • Karst - Subsidence • Shoreline Stability - Erosion • Water Supply Issues

  3. IAEA on Volcanism “Volcanic activity or igneous intrusions, such as dykes,may change groundwater flow patterns and cause fluctuations in the depth of the water table… Magma intrusions also can trigger explosions in the hydrothermal system. Changes in the groundwater system may cause subsidence in karst terrains.” IAEA, “Volcanic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations” , May 2011 (DS 405 Rev 11), p-74

  4. Volcanism at the Site • Volcanic Rocks identified in 1987, 1991 and 1995 at the present Reactor site by Dr.R.Ramaswamy of Tamil Nadu Geological Survey;papers published in Journal of Geological Soc., of India • Carbonatite Dykes and Dyke Swarms identified at Kudankulam region and described in detail by R.Ramaswamy; paper published in Journ.Geol.Soc., India, 1996 • R.Ramaswamy’s paper quoted by researchers like John Armstrong Altrin Sam in 1998. (contd.,)

  5. Volcanism at the Site • Detailed Survey of Kudankulam Area undertaken for Carbonatite Dykes and Dyke Swarms – 2000 AD – by Prof.RamaSarma, Dr.BijuLonghinos and M.G.Shahin of University of Trivandrum. Paper and Dissertation published in 2001.

  6. Volcanic Rocks at Kudankulam1991

  7. Carbonatite Dykes and Swarms – Kudankulam - 2001

  8. Undersea Volcanoes near the Kudankulam site • 1975 – GlebB.Udintsev of erstwhile Soviet Union identifies two undersea volcanoes in Gulf of Mannar – publishes them in the Geological and Geophysical Atlas of the Indian Ocean – Volcanoes are located at about 100 km from KKNPP site • 1981 - V.V.Sastri et al., of ONGC identify a Volcanic Vent in GoM – within 200 km of KKNPP site • 1994 – GRK Murty et al., confirm the above findings.

  9. Thinning of the Crust – First Findings at GoM- 1994 • GRK Murty et al.,’s Magnetic and Bathymetric Survey of a 200 km stretch in south GoM reveal crustal thinning for the first time. Study area lies 100 km south east of KKNPP site. Crust at places is just 4 km thick instead of 40 km. This is due to sub volcanic basaltic intrusions.

  10. Extreme Thinning of the Crust at Kudankulam Area • Studies conducted by Biju et al., in 2010 reveal sub volcanic basaltic intrusions that manifest as dykes and swarms in the Kudankulam area. • Ground Magnetic Survey conducted by them in 2010 in the area indicate extreme crustal thinning. In some places crust is barely 200 meters thick when in fact it should be 40,000 meters thick. • This research paper was presented at an International Science Conference held at Utah, USA in 2010 September. • These findings are preliminary; However, they point out that a larger study is a must. In such circumstances, IAEA (May 2011) recommends a detailed Volcanic Hazard Study for such a site.

  11. Small Volume Volcanic Eruptions (earlier known as Rock Melt Extrusions) at the Regional Level • 1998 • 5 August - Abhishekapatty, Tirunelveli(56 Km NW of KKNPP) • 6 August – Anikulam-Pondicheri-Parapadi ( 26 km NW of KKNPP) • 1999 • 29 September – Thiruppanikarisalkulam ( 56 km NW of KKNPP) • 2001 • 24 November, Surandai (76 Km NW of KKNPP) • 2005 • July First week – SukkaliNatham (156 km NW of KKNPP)

  12. High Tension Line leakage? Lightning? Or Volcanic Eruption? • Studies by G.VictorRajamanickam et al., R.Ramaswamy appeared in 2001; Studies by Manimaran et al., appeared in 2002. All the papers were published in the Journal of Geol.Soc.,India. • All the three papers have indicated that these events were due to a volcanic cause rather than the other two. • Presence of Obsedian ( a glass) and high concentration of Nickel and Chromium in the erupted material were the reasons to arrive at this conclusion. • All the researchers had recommended further studies; However, such studies were not taken up. (Contd.,)

  13. Small Volume Eruption at Tor Zawar, Pakistan confirms the Volcanic Hypothesis • A small volume eruption had occurred near a high tension electric line at Tor Zawar in Pakistan in 2010 January. • Studies conducted by an international research team dismisses the high tension electricity line leakage and lightning hypotheses; they give the confirmatory evidence for the volcanic nature of the eruption.

  14. Negligence by NPCIL • NPCIL had neglected these small volume volcanic eruption events. They had also neglected the studies that were published on these events. The results of these studies were not factored into the design of the reactors. • It is only after the 12 December 2011 PMANE expert group report, NPCIL had formed a team of experts to look in the issue – 14 years after the first event. (contd.,)

  15. Negligence by NPCIL • The NPCIL expert team had travelled to these sites, collected the extruded materials still to be found at the sites, and had interviewed the local people. • They, unlike the other researchers of these events, did not undertake the mandatory microscopic, spectroscopic and chemical studies of the samples. They had not even conducted a detailed review of the published literature. However, they had declared without these studies that the eruptions were due to high tension electricity line leakage.

  16. AERB Stipulation - 1989 “Site related design considerations such as seismic aspects etc., are to be established before submission of Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). Design should be engineered to meet site related design basis events.” It also states : “Bore-hole investigations are to be carried out at the proposed location of various buildings and structures. The report should be forwarded to design group for taking into account at the time of actual design.”

  17. IAEA (May 2011) Stipulation • IAEA (May 2011) states that in sites where Holocene volcanic eruptions (volcanic eruptions that have occurred within the last 10,000 years) have been noted, a detailed volcanic hazard analysis of the site should be undertaken.

  18. KKNPP needs a detailed volcanic hazard study as recommended by IAEA for such sites The reasons: • Presence of Carbonatite and Basaltic Dykes and Dyke Swarms • Presence of volcanic vents in Gulf of Mannar; its crust has been thinned out by basaltic sub volcanic intrusions; Studies conducted by independent researchers have indicated extreme thinning of the crust at the KKNPP site itself. • Holocene small volume eruptions have occurred near the KKNPP site; the closest site is located just 26 kilometers from the site. • Highest sub crustal heat flow in South India found at Nagarcoil (29 Km from KKNPP) indicates the mantle upwelling present in the area. • Presence of mantle upwelling in areas south of the Achankovil Shear Zone has been noted by researchers like by LaxmidharBehra of NGRI, Hyderabad (2010).

  19. What if KKNPP is commissioned without such studies? • Problems of subsidence at the site, the possibility of small volume eruptions causing fire accidents in the reactor can not be ruled out. • It was because NPCIL was not aware of the possibility of crustal thinning at the site and the region, and the possibility of subsidence at the site, it had allowed lime stone mining in the area by India Cements till recently. • Hence, if safety of the reactor is to be ensured, a volcanic hazard study of the site, as recommended by IAEA (May 2011) is a must.

  20. Tsunami • AEC, NPCIL and AERB are of the opinion that near field tsunami is not possible for the Indian coast. • However, a detailed search into the published literature available has revealed two near filed tsunamigenic sources – namely two rotational slumps of 100 and 50 km lengths – present at a distance of 100 km from KKNPP in Gulf of Mannar. • NPCIL was not aware of these sources (revealed by a 1982 study) till they were cited by the 12 December PMANE EG report. (Contd)

  21. Tsunami Hazard Study • IAEA has published a manual for conducting tsunami hazard study to be followed by all the coastal reactors. • It warrants the coastal reactors to study: • Paleo tsunamis for the region • All the near and far field Tsunamigenic sources – namely tsunamigenic faults, structures that can cause sub marine landslides and undersea volcanoes need to be studied • Issue of Dry intake need to be studied. During tsunami sea recedes; making the sea water intake pipes to suck in air instead of water thus creating a serious threat to the reactor.

  22. Tsunami Hazard Study for KKNPP • A preliminary Tsunami Hazard Study has been attempted by A.K.Ghosh for the Kalpakkam site in 2008. However, even such a study has not been undertaken by NPCIL for KKNPP. • The Second EG GoI Report admits the presence of slumps in GoM but dismisses that they will not be able to generate a tsunami. However, such statements made without an in depth study makes one worrisome. International norms followed to study the tsunamigenic potential of rotational slumps require complicated field and theoretical exercises, that have not been taken up by NPCIL. • Also, NPCIL is not aware of the factors that might cause a landslide in these slumps (namely earthquakes, cyclones, subsidence in the thinned out crust of GoM, subsidence at the volcanic crators etc.,) (Contd)

  23. Tsunami Hazard Study for KKNPP • During the 26 December 2004 Tsunami, sea had regressed to about 2-4 km distance from the shoreline. • Such events occur at about 3 times a year since then. • The issue of Dry Intake is a real threat to KKNPP, even without a tsunami. • NPCIL is not aware of this serious issue. • It is because of all these issues, an indepth Tsunami Hazard Study as required by IAEA regulation is a must for KKNPP.

  24. Karst • Karst terrain is a geological formation shaped by the dissolution of a layer or layers of soluble bedrock, usually limestone. • AERB requires NPCIL to study whether a site falls in a Karst terrain or not. If it has been found that the site falls in a Karst terrain, and no engineering solution can rectify this issue, AERB requires the site to be abandoned.

  25. Karst and KKNPP • Events have occurred thrice since 1998 giving indications that KKNPP might actually be located in a Karst terrain. • However, NPCIL has ignored all these events. Sill hole formation, one of the signatures of Karst terrain, had occurred at Maruthankulam (1998, 24 Km from KKNPP), at Radhapuram (2008. 12 km from KKNPP) and at Pannayarkulam (26 December 2011, 11 Km from KKNPP).

  26. Karst and KKNPP PannayarkulamSillhole ( 11 km from KKNPP ) 26 December 2011

  27. Shoreline Stability • The shore is subjected to increasing erosion. It is compounded by the beach sand mining of the area. • This is the conclusion of a decade long study by N.Chandrasekaran, G.VictorRajamanickam and Mujabar. • NPCIL denies this. • This is a point of contention that need to be scrutinized by an independent scientific panel.

  28. Water Needs • KKNPP depends on a single artificial source of water ( 4 MVC desalination plants) for its primary cooling. No alternative arrangements are in place excepting a few days of reserve water in times of emergencies. • Issue of damage to these intake structures not considered. • Issue of Dry intake not considered during sea regression. Alternative arrangements for condenser cooling not planned.

  29. Thank You

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