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Simple Models at HQ 1(UK) Div Op TELIC

Simple Models at HQ 1(UK) Div Op TELIC. John G Owen Principal Operational Analyst Directorate of Land Warfare 21 st ISMOR 3 September 2004. Background. Two UK Operational Analysts deployed to HQ 1(UK) Armd Div in Kuwait 29 Jan 2003

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Simple Models at HQ 1(UK) Div Op TELIC

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  1. Simple Models at HQ 1(UK) Div Op TELIC John G Owen Principal Operational Analyst Directorate of Land Warfare 21st ISMOR 3 September 2004

  2. Background • Two UK Operational Analysts deployed to HQ 1(UK) Armd Div in Kuwait 29 Jan 2003 • Presence of 2 – 4 analysts maintained at UK-led HQ ever since • Roulement every 3 – 4 months • Initial team: John Owen and Jarrod Cornforth • Overview presentation given at 20th ISMOR

  3. Subjects • OA in support of warfighting planning • Narrower scope but greater depth than last year • Interaction with Commanders and Staffs • Combat-related questions and tools (Other work – POW numbers, ammo consumption, logistic reach, campaign duration, Helo risk from AD, building staff tools and databases – will not be covered)

  4. HQs and Locations • OA Team attached to 1(UK)Armd Div Main throughout • Initial location Camp RHINO: DSG, 3 Cdo Bde, 7 Bde, 16 Bde, JHF HQs adjacent • Attached to G3(Plans) – but also tasked by other Div HQ cells and other HQs • Tasking from other HQs declined after deployment from Camp RHINO – comms difficult

  5. Getting Started • J Cornforth had worked with Div staff, especially DSG, in recent past • Relationships and trust existed • Use of OA seen as normal • J Owen substituted for designated Analyst • ‘Unknown quantity’ to HQ • Unfamiliar with the routines of this particular HQ • HQ extremely busy – difficult conditions to introduce self and OA • Analysts should exercise with the HQs they might be supporting operationally • this includes ‘reserve’ analysts

  6. Tasking Cycle • Question posed to OA by staff officer • Often derived from Commander’s tasking of staff • Not tasked directly by Commanders • Any HQ cell (Div and Bdes) could ask for OA support • Timescale: ‘by xx:00 today’, ‘before next Div update’, ‘by this time tomorrow’ • 2 – 24 hours • (Applies to combat modelling tasks only – some logs and software tool tasks had longer timescales) • Working to staff, not Commander • Questions fairly specific and limited

  7. Interactions • Initial brief from officer posing question • Analyst needed general situational awareness to understand context and clarify question • Some follow up meetings with other staff • To gather information (e.g. Intelligence data) • Staff time generally very limited • Did not conduct wargaming with military ‘players’ • Some Bde HQs conducting their own wargaming – but no OA support, no quantification of combat • Generally working ‘for’ rather than ‘with’ • Insufficient perceived added value from closer collaboration • Analyst time also limited – prioritisation of tasking

  8. Reporting • 5-minute verbal brief to staff officer • Main results and assumptions • Written response also prepared • Question, Headline answer, Assumptions, then more detailed method and results • Usually accepted – sometimes read and passed on • Important for Analysts as a record of work • Some briefing to larger groups • Including Comd Gp – GOC, Bde Comd, principal staff • Always at request of staff officer who had already seen results • Verbal brief – HQ very short of projectors for slide shows! • Analysts must be able to brief concisely • Identify the critical assumptions and limitations that the audience must be told

  9. Combat Questions • What is the correlation of forces in this area? • What is the OA assessment of this proposed/possible plan? • Usually at Bde level • Risk? • Casualties and equipment losses? • Impact of changing ORBAT • Update previous assessments given different assumptions/intelligence • Very ‘traditional’ military OA • Conventional warfare

  10. Scenarios • UK force Bde or a part of • Except for 7 Bde, a ‘light’ force • Iraqi force: • Up to nominal Div strength • Mostly old equipment – T-55 generation • Below TOE strength because of poor maintenance • Attrited by air before ground battle (but how much?) • Largely infantry force in some sectors • How hard, and how coherently, will they fight? • Much of the Div and Bde planning – and hence OA – for contingencies in which Iraqi formations did fight as such • Worst case for potential (short-term) losses • Even if unlikely, has to be considered

  11. Tools Used • Balance Analysis Modelling System (BAMS) • Static Scoring • Wartime Planning Tool (WPT) • Deterministic heterogeneous Lanchester model • Simple Model of Infantry Close Combat (SMICC) • Duration and outcome distribution of Sect – Coy battle • Data from historical analysis • For each tool: • Is it a simple model? • Was it used or abused?

  12. BAMS Force Value = (Number of Equipments) x (Equipment Score) • Compare total scores for correlation of forces • A quick ‘first cut’ method • Very quick and simple to use • Equipments not previously scored can be added if there are close equivalents • Equipment Scores are for ‘contribution to the all-arms battle’ • Based on old NATO Central Front • Heavy, mechanised forces, Bde and above • On borderline of validity with TELIC scenarios • size and composition of forces

  13. WPT (1) • Deterministic heterogeneous Lanchester model • 10 weapon categories, depth fire, AH and FW • Attrition rate adjustments for terrain, posture, barriers • Data set derived from more detailed modelling • BG/Bde battles – with sequencing of units • MS Excel implementation • Added personnel casualties calculation • Added unit defeat levels and participation levels • Risk and variability by sensitivity testing • Adjustment to tank attrition rates for T-55

  14. WPT (2) • A simple model? • Simple to use • Simple to add facilities around basic model • Re-calibration a big task • Represents a complex situation – complexity inherent in the aggregations • Use and abuse? • Battles generally ‘lighter’ than calibration • Size and force composition at low end • Was T-55 adjustment correct?

  15. SMICC (1) • Section – Company infantry engagements with armour and artillery support • Select values for conditions of battle • Terrain, level of support, defence posture • Distribution of battle outcomes, durations, losses • Based on historical analysis • Implemented in Visual Basic • Used for some questions relating to 3 Cdo Bde • Would have been used if ‘proper’ wargaming with Bde undertaken

  16. SMICC (2) • A simple model? • Very quick and simple to use • Equations and coefficient values complex • ‘Black box’ unless substantial additional HA available • Use and Abuse? • HA based; human factors implicit in equations • Used in its intended domain

  17. General (1) • Op TELIC was at the borders of validity of the tools • Not a comfortable place • Saving grace: • UK casualties heavy and battles lost only if Iraqi determination and cohesion at highest level

  18. General (2) • Models for rapid use in operational HQs must be simple to use • Not necessarily simple in structure • Analyst must understand the tools thoroughly to avoid abuse • Still a need for combat modelling • Combat models cannot be improvised • Data sets are required • Need for scoring systems, model calibrations for high-tech vs lower-tech forces and for light, not armoured forces

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