Towards a comprehensive HPAI control program

1. Towards a comprehensive HPAI control program A multi-intervention pilot trial in Cipunagara, Subang Bogor, 2 November 2011

2. Introduction

3. HPAI control An effective program to control HPAI in Indonesia should have multiple components Surveillance / Outbreak investigations Vaccination Biosecurity Culling / Movement restrictions It should target all poultry sectors (I – IV)

4. Rationale for multi-intervention approach HPAI control measures in Indonesia are often used in isolation PDSR in sector IV Vaccination in sector IV Vaccination in commercial sectors Certification of sector I farms/Compartmentalization & zoning HPAI virus amplification and transmission occurs in all sectors and is dependent on many risk factors Therefore multiplecontrol measures need to be applied simultaneously in all sectors

5. Objectives To implement a multiple intervention strategy for the control of HPAI in a small, well-defined area To limit the circulation of HPAI and to reduce the chance of new introductions of HPAI To study the feasability and sustainability of specific intervention strategies To encourage participation of all relevant stakeholders To liase with other donors that may assist in the implementation of specific modules

6. Selection of study areaCipunagara, Subang Based upon profiling results of Purwakarta and Subang districts Large poultry industry with many breeder and broiler farms Important supplier of poultry to Jabodetabek Known history of HPAI outbreaks Good collaboration with local veterinary services Close to Provincial Laboratory

7. 8 Breeder farms • 6 PS • 2 GPS • 25 broiler farms • 7 Slaughterhouses / collectorhouses • 1 hatchery • ± 70 duck flocks

8. Proposed activities in Cipunagara Phase I – description of the actual situation Surveillance (Sector I – IV) Biosecurity surveys (Sector I – IV) Poultry health surveys (Sector III – IV) Contact structure survey (Sector I – III) Phase II - analysis of the data Phase III – design and implementation of intervention strategies, continued surveillance

9. Realized activities Surveys AI surveillance: sector I – III, nomadic ducks, poultry collecting facilities Biosecurity: sector III & IV Poultry health: sector III & IV Contact structure: sector III Only few interventions implemented Sector III: Biosecurity & poultry management improvement through biosecurity advisors Sector IV: Biosecurity improvement through village meetings, posters & booklets

10. AI Surveillance

11. AI surveillanceflocks/consignments sampled

12. Surveillance resultsNomadic duck flock prevalence

13. Surveillance results PCFs/PSHsPrevalence consignments & environment swabs

14. Surveillance resultsBroiler flock prevalence

15. January 12th, 2011. Positive farm May 18th, 2010. Positive farm 4.5 KM 5.7 KM May 22nd, 2010. Positive farm

16. Surveillance resultsPS/GPS seroprevalence Note: All collected tracheal swab samples were PCR negative

17. AI surveillanceConclusions (1) No evidence that ducks play an important role in HPAI transmission No HPAI H5 virus shedding detected Positive serology? Not determined whether this is HPAI (H5N1) Possibility of cross-reactions in HI test have not been excluded Evidence for other Influenza A viruses Need further characterization Analysis shows the presence of H3N4 and low pathogenic H5 virus

18. AI surveillanceConclusions (2) Three outbreaks on broiler farms show that the HPAI virus is present and circulating in sector 3 in Cipunagara No evidence for the presence of HPAI in collector- or slaughterhouses In contrast to the findings of PCF surveillance in DKI Jakarta (Civas, 2007-2010) Limited interaction with sector I Sampling was not under our control and non-random Validity of results is therefore limited

19. Biosecurity improvement in sector 3

20. Biosecurity on sector 3 farmsActivities Baseline survey on biosecurity and production 25 farms were assessed for the level of biosecurity present on the farm Production parameters (mortality, slaughter weight, FCR) were collected Biosecurity advisors Teams of trained DINAS staff visited farms weekly Advised farmers on biosecurity, poultry health & management Supervised syndromic surveillance Changes in biosecurity uptake and production parameters were monitored

21. Biosecurity on sector 3 farmsBiosecurity improvement (examples)

22. Biosecurity on sector 3 farmsPerformance Index

23. Biosecurity on sector 3 farmsConclusions Biosecurity advisors appeared to have positive effect on farm biosecurity and production Average number of biosecurity measures adopted on the farms increased from 14/32 to 23/32 Average performance index (IP) increased from 302 to 373 (not significant) Production parameters dependent on many factors (i.e. feed quality, DOC quality etc), therefore impossible to say if increased IP resulted from advisor program Farmers see poor financial returns of broiler farming as the biggest obstacle for increased implementation of biosecurity measures

24. Contact structure of sector 3 farms

25. Contact structure of broiler farmsActivities Over a 53 day period all movements on and off 20 broiler farms were recorded in a logbook Involvement of vehicles & equipment Contact with poultry before, during or after the visit Origin and destination of the visit Visits were classified as having low, medium or high risk of HPAI transmission

26. Contact structure of broiler farmsMain results A total of 2966 visits were recorded on 20 farms over a 53 day period Average of 143 visits per farm or 2.8 visits/farm/day 21% of visits were for social reasons 52% of visits involved a vehicle; 18% of visits involved equipment 76% of visits originated from the same village 55% of visits had contact with poultry on the farm 6% of visits were considered high risk for HPAI transmission, associated with movement of live poultry or poultry manure Farms received an average of 7 visits to collect poultry

27. Contact structure of broiler farmsConclusions Relatively high proportion of social visits which can and should be restricted Majority of contacts take place over relatively short distances → implications for disease spread Although a relatively low proportion of visits are “high risk”, these are mainly associated with poultry collection Poultry collection for slaughter takes place over many visits (average 7/farm) with increased risk for disease transmission Farmers should be encouraged to use all-in all-out

28. Biosecurity of village poultry

29. Village poultry biosecurityActivities Baseline survey to assess Biosecurity measures which are present Importance of village poultry keeping Socializations on biosecurity through village meetings, posters and booklets Follow-up survey to measure changes in knowledge, attitudes and practices

30. Village poultry biosecurityUptake of socialization tools

31. Village poultry biosecurityChanges in biosecurity practices

32. Village poultry biosecurityConclusions Use of posters and booklets as socialization tools should be re-evaluated Socializations by spoken word are probably more effective than using written socialization tools Effectiveness of the socialization campaign with regard to changed practices seems to have been limited

33. Conclusions Multi-intervention pilot

34. Multi-intervention pilotConclusions In this study there is no evidence for ducks as a spreader of H5N1 HPAI virus 3 outbreaks in broiler farms were observed from at least two different sources Farmers were willing to introduce low cost biosecurity measures Village socialization appears to have limited effect

35. Multi-intervention pilotLessons learned Multi intervention strategies can only be developed with the involvement of all stakeholders Incentives for Sector 1 need to be developed to participate in developing intervention strategies Clear mandates for Dinas Peternakan for disease control in commercial poultry are lacking

36. Acknowledgements Farmers, village poultry keepers and village cadres in Cipunagara DINAS Peternakan of Subang Balai Pengujian Kesehatan Hewan dan Kesmavet, Cikole Laboratory of Virology, FKH IPB ACIAR USDA