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North Korea

North Korea. National Critical Intelligence Estimate Presented by Team 5 O’Clock Somewhere For Approval by, Prof. Randall Nichols. Team 5 O’Clock. Sub-Team 1 XO: TJ Shakti Ramdass Political & Economy Jacob Smaczniak Tanya Jeffers Timothy Greiner William Pagan . Sub-Team 2

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North Korea

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  1. North Korea National Critical Intelligence Estimate Presented by Team 5 O’Clock Somewhere For Approval by, Prof. Randall Nichols

  2. Team 5 O’Clock Sub-Team 1 XO: TJ Shakti Ramdass Political & Economy Jacob Smaczniak Tanya Jeffers Timothy Greiner William Pagan Sub-Team 2 XO: Leia Scime’-Stickles Military/WMD & Cyber Intel Alina Stechyshyn Henry Cline John Stechyshyn Michael Vedete Team Leader: Virginia Regester

  3. Agenda • Executive Summary • North Korean Overview • U.S. Interests and Goals • North Korean Interests and Goals • Political Estimate • Economic Estimate • Military/WMD Estimate • Cyber & Intelligence Estimate • Conclusions • References

  4. Executive Summary (1 of 2) • North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is recognized as a totalitarian state • It functions as a single-party military dictating “Juche” (self-reliant) republic • Death of Kim Jong IL and his young son Kim Jong Un’s appointed as North Korea’s Supreme Leader, have developed many unknowns about the political climate • As a centrally directed and least open economy that faces many chronic problems, impacts of recent changes pose several questions about the country’s future and stability

  5. Executive Summary (2 of 2) • North Korea’s nuclear, missile and other asymmetric military capabilities is a concern to the U.S. and presents challenges to regional security and stability • Recent nuclear tests and overt threats by the new leader required a full analysis to determine North Korea’s intentions and capabilities • Using the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) diagnostic technique, critical questions were analyzed against several hypothesis.

  6. Executive Summary Political and Leadership Hypothesis Will North Korea collapse under the Kim Jong Un regime? • H1. North Korea will continue to survive as it always has; the situation will remain status quo. China will continue to support yet disagree with North Korea’s nuclear program • H2. North Korea will not collapse under Kim Jong Un. Kim's replacement of senior officials in reality makes room for change and growth. China will remain an ally. • H3. North Korea will collapse. China will have reached it's limit and despite remaining an ally will be forced to use a strong arm

  7. Executive Summary Economic Hypothesis Will N. Korean economic reforms stabilize the country’s economy? • H1: The new economic reforms are legitimate means being pursued to improve N. Korea’s economy and standard of living. Kim Jong Un will make good on his economic reform and the economy will stabilize. Foreign aid will be necessary in the beginning but this need will die as the country gains financial independence. • H2: The economic reforms are only rhetoric used to bolster Kim Jong Un’s position and regime hold on the country. Kim Jong Un sees the black market as a source of revenue and method of barter. However, like a double edged sword the black market will also continue to undermine any economic reform

  8. Executive Summary Conventional Military Hypothesis Does North Korea have a credible conventional military force? • H1. North Korea has a strong conventional military, capable of engaging in total War with S. Korea and the U.S. • H2. North Korea’s has a weak conventional military that is no threat to South Korea. • H3. North Korea has a capable military that could engage South Korea with the correct strategy

  9. Executive Summary Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Hypothesis Does North Korea have the capability of launching a nuclear or chemical missile at the U.S.? • H1. North Korea currently had a formidable WMD program with the capability of launching an armed missile on the U.S. • H2. North Korea has a credible WMD program but does not possess the capability launching an armed missile on the U.S. • H3. North Korea’s WMD program is all a ruse and does not possess credible capabilities.

  10. Executive Summary Cyber and Intelligence Hypothesis Has the DPRK developed a sufficient cyber force to really threaten the ROK or the US? • H1: NK has a formidable cyber force capable of launching significant attacks against the ROK or the US. • H2: NK’s cyber warfare program is not technically sophisticated to attack the ROK or the US.

  11. Executive Summary Political Indicators (1 of 2 ) • Despite China’s condemnation of North Korea’s recent nuclear test, they will remain a strong ally • De-emphasizing the role of the military and placing KWP in control of the government • Key leadership changes that advocate commercial/economic changes and support Kim Jong Un • Regime survival through the pre- establishment of key advisors and supporters by Kim Jong IL before his death • Shaping public image of Kim Jong Un in line as role of Supreme Leader • North Korea does not want war but wants to be recognized as a world power

  12. Executive Summary Political Indicators (2 of 2) • History of failed diplomacy to denuclearize North Korea • North Korea’s defiance of UN sanctions and pull out of Six Party Talks • China’s condemnation and renewed interest in the Six Party process when its security was jeopardized by North Korea’s third nuclear test

  13. Executive Summary Economic Indicators • North Korea is in need of hard currency, bringing close or more to $1 Billion a year in revenue. • The trading system is almost shut down do to illegal activities in the black market where everything is cheaper. • North Korea started to deal with other countries and now the demand is so high that is hard to stop. • North Korea haven’t being able to venture further with this industry do to his restricted market • They lack reliable energy to continue their projects • North Korea relies on other countries especially China for help in their mining industry do to the lack of machinery • In the long - run there will be change

  14. Executive Summary Military Indicators • Multiple conflicts resulting in death of both North Korean and South Korean personnel have resulted in threats but no increase in military action • North Korean and South Korean conflicts highlights lack of military technological advantage • Fuel shortages and replacement and maintenance of aged equipment have reduced number of sorties and military maneuver • Known Special Forces operations shows that they have already infiltrated South Korea multiple times • North Korean military continues to have live drills to examine war fighting capabilities • Historically China has assisted NK in past wars • China’s admonition of North Korea’s brazen threats of war has them reaching out diplomatically towards the US

  15. Executive Summary WMD Indicators (1 of 3) • No evidence exists that suggests NK has tested ICBM technology • Stanford's Siegfried Hecker says the 2013 nuclear test takes NK 1 step closer to miniaturizing a missile ready weapon. • December 2012 missile satellite launch aligned with commemoration of 1st year death anniversary of Kim Jong-IL • US research community deems the satellite tumbling, dead and likely not communicating. • Rocket portion of the launch seemed successful • US policy is to execute “strategic patience” calls to increase pressure on NK sanctions to encourage the state to follow through on commitments to end its nuclear weapons development. • Six Party talks broke down 2009 when NK indicated it would no longer participate

  16. Executive Summary WMD Indicators (2 of 3) • Key to understand NK intention to nuclear weapons program • If NK nuclear weapons program is to act as a deterrent to ROK & US invasion then hope remains for diplomacy. • If NK wants to threaten US and other targets with ICBM the other acts of deterrence are necessary • US policy toward NK has failed to reduce threat to the region • US withdrew tactical Nuclear Weapons in 1991 • With recent February NK test and ROK belief that NK is not likely to give up on nuclear weapons most believe either US returns tactical missiles or ROK develops its own arsenal. • Further sanctions coming • NK already faces a wide range of sanctions to inhibit nuclear production • Susan Rice (US ambassador to the United Nations) Security counsel will likely look to further sanctions

  17. Executive Summary WMD Indicators (3 of 3) • China may be encouraged to more strongly enforce existing NK sanctions if they believe ROK & Japan plan to develop their own Nuclear arsenal

  18. Executive Summary Cyber Indicators (1 of 2) • Increasing North Korean interest in gathering foreign intelligence on weapons and nuclear systems • Primary cyber attack targets are South Korean government, commerce and military • China provides means for cyber connectivity such as fiber, servers and key network hardware • North Korea continues to launch most attacks from outside its country • Russian teachers brought in to teach cyber and/or students are sent to China or Russia for training • China is increasingly suspected of using North Korean hackers to attack South Korean targets giving China plausible deniability

  19. Executive Summary Cyber Indicators (2 of 2) • Computer experts are trained as hackers, denying most attacks • North Korea is said to have between 3,000 and 4,000 cyber warriors while South Korea only has 400 • The target of 2013’s attack -Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. - is concerning

  20. Executive Summary Key Judgments and Possible Outcomes (1 of 2) Political Estimate • High confidence that the Kim Jong Un Regime will not collapse and will maintain control over the country • Focus of country is to maintain nuclear capabilities as a defense and resuscitate its failing economy • Renewal of six Party talks with North Korea is not likely Economic Estimate • Fundamental changes are likely to occur in North Korean economy but it will be slow • Economic reforms and black-market activities will be central towards resuscitating North Korea’s economy • Openness of country will continuously grow with continued advancement of available technology and expansion of tourism • China will do what is necessary to ensure North Korea’s stability

  21. Executive Summary Key Judgments and Possible Outcomes (2 of 2) Military and WMD Estimate • Despite the threats made, North Korea will not be the one to strike first to start a war • Military capabilities will focus on pursuing and improving asymmetrical capabilities • Nuclear program and capabilities is the center of maintaining North Korea’s philosophy of “Juche” • Despite UN Sanctions, North Korea will continue with weapons trade and development of WMD. • Likely that North Korea has developed a nuclear warhead capable of being delivered by their Nodong missile Cyber Estimate • North Korea will emerge as a country with formidable cyber warfare capabilities

  22. Executive Summary Final Analysis (1 of 2) • Kim Jong Un’s Regime will not follow the same tactics of using nuclear threats to negotiate and get US-SK concessions. • The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will not gamble everything in launching a surprise attack on South Korea unless provoked • Kim Jong Un’s Regime will continue to pursue the DPRK’s nuclear program and focus on a new strategy with the potential to fundamentally change the country.

  23. Executive Summary Final Analysis (2 of 2) • DPRK’s New Strategy: • Continue to build and expand DPRK’s nuclear program and resuscitate a failing economic • Nuclear program provides a means to improve the country’s economy through weapons and technological trade • Nuclear program provides a deterrence and security umbrella to the country’s sovereignty - “Juche” • Successful test of nuclear weapon will give North Korea national equality with the major nuclear powers • Focus on economic reforms to rebuild the country’s economy

  24. Overview of North Korea State Snapshot

  25. North Korean Overview (1 of 5) Location • East Asia • Northern part of Korean peninsula Borders • Russia, China and South Korea • Sea of Japan, Korea Bay & Yellow Sea Size: • 120,538 sq km (~ 74,898 sq miles) Government • Communist • Kim Jung Un • No US Embassy • 9 Provinces • 2 Municipalities Capital PYONGYANG Language Korean Population 24,720,407

  26. North Korean Overview (2 of 5) Military • North Korean People’s Army • Ground Forces • Navy • Air Force • Civil Securities Forces • 22 active divisions Economy • Centrally directed and closed market • Revenue: $3.2 Billion • Expenditure: $3.3 Billion • Debt. $12.5 Billion (2001) Natural Resources • Core, lead, tungsten, zinc graphite, magnesium, zinc, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salts, fluorspar, hydropower

  27. North Korean Overview (3 of 5) Agriculture • rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, cattle, pigs, pork and eggs Industries • Military products, machine building, electrical power, mining, tourism, food processing, metallurgy and chemicals Broadcast Media • No independent media outlets • Only 4, all are government owned and pre-tuned to Korean government approved channels Dependency Ratio • 45.2 %

  28. North Korean Overview (4 of 5) Ethnic Groups • small population of Chinese • few Japanese • mostly homogenous Religion • Buddhist and Confucianist, some Christians Education • 100% of the population above the age of 15 are literate Profession • not allowed to chose • cannot change easily

  29. North Korean Overview (5 of 5) Allies • Russia and China (Both very perturbed by NK 3rd nuclear test) • Diplomatic relations with 165 states • No diplomatic relations between US & NK Refugees • Thousands fleeing to China due to grave economic state of NK • Political oppression and starvation • South Korea not recognized as legitimate state Disputes • Islands in Yalu and Tumen rivers with China • Military demarcation line between North & South Korea Criminal Activity • Human trafficking • Drug trade • Cybercrime

  30. National Interests and Goals

  31. U.S. National Interests • Prevent, deter and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons attacks on the U.S. and its military forces abroad • Prevent the regional proliferation of WMD and delivery systems • Promote the well-being of US allies and friends and protect them from external aggression • South Korea • Taiwan • Japan • Prevent, manage & if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflict in important geographical regions

  32. U.S. Strategic Goals with North Korea • Prevent DPRK from building, using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or neighboring countries • Stop DPRK from stockpiling, using and distributing WMD, specifically chemical and biological munitions • Reduce the development and sale of sophisticated ballistic missiles to other nations or terrorists • Reduce the likelihood of conventional military conflict between North and South Korea • Neutralize China’s effects on North Korea

  33. North Korean Interests and Goals • The reunification of the Korean Peninsula on North Korean terms • North Korea’s goal is to take the strategic lead in inter-Korean relations • Views the entire peninsula as its sovereign territory • Defending against further encroachment by US imperialists • Regime survival • Self-sufficient “Juche” economy without giving up its nuclear arms

  34. Political Estimate

  35. Political Estimate - Agenda • Overview • Hypothesis • Indicators and Evidence/Arguments • ACH Matrix • ACH Analysis • Key Judgments & Outcomes • Conclusions

  36. Political Overview • North Korea functions as a single-party state under a totalitarian dictatorship • National ideology “Juche” meaning self-reliance or self-dependence • An application of Marxism-Leninism. • Adopted by Kim Jong IL in the 1970’s • Retitled Kim II Sungism • In December 2011 Kim Jong Un appointed supreme ruler after presiding ruler and his father, Kim Jong IL passed away • Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) had died during Kim Jong IL is now on the uprise with the new supreme ruler Kim Jong Un • All government officials belong to this KWP • A few minor political parties are allowed to exist in name only

  37. North Korean Supreme Leader • Kim Jong Un, declared Supreme Leader December 2011 • complete power for every domain • Law • Administration • Regulations • Age: 30s, creates lack of • experience • knowledge • training • Father, Kim Jong IL created unique decision model • more formal • institution based • Youngest of three

  38. Enjoys high end luxury goods perfume bathroom fittings alcohol electronics watches Is Kim Jong Un ready? • No political or military experience before taking putative control of military • Became leader in his 30’s vs his father at 53 • Likes to party • luxury yacht • private island • celebrities

  39. Regents Closest to Supreme Leader • Regents act as advisors and assist in decision making • Were put in place by Kim Jong IL • Primary purpose to ensure Kim Regime control • Kim Kyong Hui (Aunt) • only person allowed to verbally discuss policy • has veto power, except Kim Jung Un • protect Kim family equities • provide Kim Jong-un leadership training • Jang Song Taek (Uncle) • considered ‘control tower’ • prioritizes leaders paperwork, cannot alter it • maintains control of economic & internal security portfolios • was Kim Jong IL’s closest and trusted advisor • speculation that he was the one in control • Choe Ryong Hae (VMAR) • ensures loyalty to military • does not report through Jang Song Taek

  40. Government Structure Overview (1 of 2) • Key entities that control the government of the DPRK • The Cabinet, formerly known as the State Administration Council (SAC) • administers the ministries • has a significant role in implementing policy • headed by the premier and is the dominant administrative and executive agency • The NDC • responsible for external and internal security • assumed a significant role in influencing policy under Kim Jong IL • The Politburo of the Central People’s Committee • The top policy making body of the KWP • the dominant social institution in North Korea.

  41. Government Structure Overview (2 of 2) • The Supreme People’s Assembly • Officially, the DPRK’s legislature • Is the highest organ of state power • members are elected every 4 years • usually holds only two meetings annually, each lasting a few days • A standing committee elected by the SPA performs legislative functions and appoints judges to highest court • serves only to ratify decisions made by the ruling KWP • North Korea's judiciary is "accountable" to the SPA and the president. • Administratively, North Korea is divided into nine provinces and two provincial-level municipalities • Pyongyang and Nasun (also known as Najin-Sonbong) • North Korea is also divided into nine military districts.

  42. Central Committee Department Consists of 4 Departments • Political Bureau • Full members reduced to 17 • 5 military/security fractions • 12 party/government fractions • Secretariat is Similar to US Secret Service & White House Office • Central Inspection Commission Regulates membership within Korean Workers Party (KWP) • Central Military Commission • development & implementation of KWP military policies • Coordinates with National Defense Commission (NDC) to command and control military/military industries

  43. National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK NDC)

  44. Committee Department Responsibilities • Formulate & implement KWPs • political • economic • internal security • military policies • Regulate personnel appointments within • party • government • Military • Regulate DPRKs • press • media • cultural institutions

  45. Current Situation • China is perturbed by North Korea’s recent nuclear testing. • North Korea wants to be recognized as a global nuclear power • Current Laws are merely to protect regimes rule • Kim Jong Un has promised economic reform • Kim Jong Un needs to develop relationships with others to effectively rule • Relies on groups of regents and advisors for policy making although he is supreme leader • Improving ties between North & South • South Korea setting aside special tax to help one day reunify the two provinces • Both countries set up lottery reunification days for families split by the Korean War • Reunification is done both in person and online (Sang-Hun, 2013)

  46. Political and Leadership Hypothesis Will North Korea collapse under the Kim Jong Un regime? • H1. North Korea will continue to survive as it always has; the situation will remain status quo. China will continue to support yet disagree with North Korea’s nuclear program • H2. North Korea will not collapse under Kim Jong Un. Kim's replacement of senior officials in reality makes room for change and growth. China will remain an ally. • H3. North Korea will collapse. China will have reached it's limit and despite remaining an ally will be forced to use a strong arm

  47. World Governance Indicators (1 of 2) • World Governance Indicators (WGI) indicates North Korea's political stability has improved over the past couple of years following its power transition • WGI data reflect perceptions of the likelihood that a government will be destabilized or overthrown • by unconstitutional or violent means • by politically motivated violence and terrorism • WGI covers six categories: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruptio

  48. World Governance Indicators (2 of 2) • North Korea’s aggregate indicator of "political stability and absence of violence" came to 0.01 in 2012, up from minus 0.32 a year earlier. • North Korea stood in the middle among 215 countries surveyed in terms of political stability in 2012 • WGI data in context for North Korea • 1996- expectation of collapse in stability reached -0.51 upon founder Kim IL Sung’s death • 2008- the figure rose to 0.54 under son Kim Jong IL leadership • 2010- the figure plunged to -0.38 after Kim Jong IL health deteriorated • 2011- there was minimal increase to -0.32 • 2012-rose again to 0.01 due to “political stability and absence of violence”

  49. WGI: Aggregate Indicator Chart

  50. WGI: Aggregate Indicator Data • North Korea ranked low in the remaining categories: • level of voice and accountability (reflects freedom of expression and citizen participation in selecting their government) -2.17 • government effectiveness -1.93 • rule of law -1.25 • Little change from previous year

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