THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

2. READING • Smith, Democracy, chs. 11-12 • Claudio Lomnitz, “Latin America’s Rebellion” (Course Reader #4) • Hagopian and Mainwaring, Third Wave, chs. 10-11

4. 9/11, THE WAR ON TERROR, AND RULES OF THE GAME • Nations can respond however they choose—including the use of indiscriminate force. • Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable. • There is no need to adhere to international treaties or conventions. • Alliances are formed around one central issue—the anti-terror campaign. Democracy and human rights are secondary issues. • Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

5. GWB AND LATIN AMERICA • Lack of high-level attention • Abandonment of negotiations with Mexico for immigration reform • Overriding concern with support for anti-terrorist campaign (not democracy) • Hubs, spokes, and FTAs • Politicization of drug war • Awaiting Fidel’s demise • Opposition to Chávez and the Pink Tide

6. RECENT TRENDSIN LATIN AMERICA • Surge of leftist movements • Left = social justice, Right = individual freedom • Electoral victories, despite institutional obstacles • Result: democracy as a protective shield

7. THE PINK TIDE: ORIGINS • Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus • Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption • International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

8. THE PINK TIDE: MEMBERSHIP • Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006) • Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) • Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007) • Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005) • Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006) • Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006) Near-Misses: • Ollanta Humala, Peru (2006) • Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

9. CLARIFICATIONS #1 • Differentiation: right/center/left • Contending leaders in/for Latin America: • Vicente Fox (Mexico) • Lula (Brazil) • Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

10. CLARIFICATIONS #2 • Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠ • Voters for pink tide candidates ≠ • Leftist candidates for office ≠ • Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠ • Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠ • Hugo Chávez • Notes: • Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized • Rivalries and defections

11. THE PINK TIDE: GOALS • Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction • Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony • Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

12. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS • The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy • The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena • Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield • The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

13. GWB AND THE PINK TIDE • Strategy of “inoculation” • Circumvention through FTAs • Cultivation (and cooptation?) of Lula • The presidential tour (March 8-14): • Carefully selected sites—Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico • Rhetoric of social concern • Only deliverable: ethanol agreement • The Chávez “counter-tour”

15. RISE OF HUGO CHÁVEZ • 1989: Caracazo • 1992: Failed military coup (amnesty 1994) • 1998: Wins presidential election • 1999: Installs new constitution • 2002: Survives attempted coup • 2004: Attains support in referendum • 2006: Wins second presidential term • 2007: Declines renewal of RCTV license • 2007: Constitutional referendum fails • 2008: Oil climbs to >$100 per barrel

16. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO • Uses language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech • Sits atop petroleum (now >$100 per barrel) • Puts money where his mouth is • Breaks established rules of the game • Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power • Challenges Washington Consensus and FTAA • Goes for high stakes • Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

18. THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION • Domestic agenda: • Strengthening state • Redistributing wealth • Monopolizing power • Global agenda: • Opposing U.S. hegemony • Building continental solidarity • Becoming leader of developing world • Consolidating oil-producing alliances

19. INTERNAL WEAKNESSES • Judiciary, rule of law and “due process” • Absence of representative institutions—e.g., courts, legislature, unions • Concentration of presidential power • Chávez’s own charisma • Economic inefficiencies • NB: defeat in November ’07 referendum

20. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA:GWB AND USA • Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right • Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States • Unified—under U.S. leadership • Peaceful—in view of unanimity • Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

21. REALITY CHECK • Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” • Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA • Ideology = diversity rather than unity • Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong and growing among large share of population • Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game