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THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT . CONTEXT. Rise of China Autonomy for Latin America Breakdown of ideological consensus Securitizing U.S.-Latin American relations Source: Domínguez, “Changes in the International System”. THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER. Unipolar? Multipolar? Flat? Pyramid?

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THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

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  1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

  2. CONTEXT • Rise of China • Autonomy for Latin America • Breakdown of ideological consensus • Securitizing U.S.-Latin American relations • Source: Domínguez, “Changes in the International System”

  3. THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER • Unipolar? • Multipolar? • Flat? • Pyramid? • Source: Smith, “Prisms of Power,” CR # 4

  4. THE PINK TIDE: ORIGINS • Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus • Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption • International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

  5. THE PINK TIDE: MEMBERSHIP • Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006) • Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) and Delma Rousseff (2010) • Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007) • Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005, 2009) • Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006) • Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006, 2010) • Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008) • Mauricio Funes, El Salvador (2009) Near-Misses: • Ollanta Humala, Peru (2006) • Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

  6. CLARIFICATION #1 • Differentiation: right/center/left • Contending leaders in/for Latin America: • Felipe Calderón (Mexico) • Lula (Brazil) • Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

  7. CLARIFICATION #2 • Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠ • Voters for pink tide candidates ≠ • Leftist candidates for office ≠ • Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠ • Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠ • Hugo Chávez • Notes: • Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized • Rivalries and defections

  8. THE PINK TIDE: GOALS • Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction • Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony • Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

  9. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO • Uses language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech • Sits atop petroleum • Puts money where his mouth is • Breaks established rules of the game • Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power • Challenges Washington Consensus and FTAA • Goes for high stakes • Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

  10. THE ODD COUPLE: HUGO AND JORGE • George’s “gifts” to Hugo: • discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural) • caricature of “ugly American” • unpopularity of foreign policies • inattention to Latin America • And Hugo’s reciprocation: • exaggerated rhetoric • potential threats to neighboring countries • authoritarian tendencies • Q1: What would Hugo do without George? • Q2: What about oil?

  11. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS • The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy • The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena • Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield • The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

  12. GWB AND THE PINK TIDE • Strategy of “inoculation” • Circumvention through FTAs • Cultivation (and cooptation?) of Lula

  13. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA:GWB AND USA • Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right • Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States • Unified—under U.S. leadership • Peaceful—in view of unanimity • Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

  14. REALITY CHECK #1 • Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” • Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA • Ideology = diversity rather than unity • Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong and growing among large share of population • Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game

  15. REALITY CHECK #2 Not everyone wants the same thing…!

  16. GWB and Latin America: Comparative and Historical Perspective _________Latin America as Priority___________ ______ Low _______ _______ High _____ Operational Mode for U.S. ____ Unilateral Ad hoc Systematic imposition intervention (Bush 2001-04) (Reagan 1981-89) _______ _________________ __________________ Intermittent, Consistent, Multilateral low-level high-level diplomacy engagement (Clinton 1993-2000) (Kennedy 1961-63) ____________________________________________________________

  17. Rank-Order Preferences for U.S. Policy ___Partners___ __Targets___ U.S. Policy (Mexico, (Cuba, __Rivals___ ___Bystanders__ __Configuration__ _Bush II__ __Colombia)__ __Venezuela)__ __(Brazil?)__ ___(Others)____ Low priority 1 4 2 1 4 + Unilateral Low priority 2 3 1 2 2 + Multilateral High priority 3 1 4 4 3 + Unilateral High priority 4 2 3 3 1 + Multilateral Note: As presented here, ordinal rankings mean that 1 stands for the first-place (most preferable) choice, 2 for the second-place choice, 3 for the third-place choice, and 4 for the fourth-place (least preferable) choice.

  18. The End.

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