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THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT: WHY?

THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT: WHY?. WHY VENEZUELA?. An apparently stable two-party democracy Rómulo Betancourt and Generation of 1928 Pact of Punto Fijo (1958) No military threat Awash in petroleum (“Venezuela Saudita”) OPEC (1960) PdVSA Positive international profile

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THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT: WHY?

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  1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT: WHY?

  2. WHY VENEZUELA? • An apparently stable two-party democracy • Rómulo Betancourt and Generation of 1928 • Pact of Punto Fijo (1958) • No military threat • Awash in petroleum (“Venezuela Saudita”) • OPEC (1960) • PdVSA • Positive international profile • Socialist International • Diplomacy in Central America/1980s

  3. SEEDS OF RESENTMENT • Socioeconomic inequality • Reliance on state patronage • Petroleum as “devil’s excrement” • Concentration of power and wealth • Rural-to-urban migration • Partidocracia: • Absence of clear programs • Closed-list slates • Ageing leadership

  4. POLITICAL DECAY • Carlos Andrés Pérez (CAP) • Neoliberal reforms and caracazo • Attempted coups 1992 • Impeachment 1993 • Voter disenchantment • Turnout: 96% (1973) to 60% (1990s) • AD + COPEI vote share: 90% (1970s-80s) to 45% (1993) to 11% (1998) • Rafael Caldera wins as independent in 1993

  5. RISE OF HUGO CHÁVEZ • 1989: Caracazo • 1992: Failed military coup (amnesty 1994) • 1998: Wins presidential election • 1999: Installs new constitution • 2002: Survives attempted coup • 2004: Attains support in referendum • 2006: Wins second presidential term • 2007: Declines renewal of RCTV license • 2007: Constitutional referendum fails • 2008: Oil climbs to >$100 per barrel • 2008: Referendum succeeds

  6. THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION • Domestic agenda: • Strengthening state • Redistributing wealth • Monopolizing power • Global agenda: • Opposing U.S. hegemony • Building continental solidarity • Becoming leader of developing world • Consolidating oil-producing alliances

  7. INTERNAL WEAKNESSES • Judiciary, rule of law and “due process” • Absence of representative institutions—e.g., courts, legislature, unions • Concentration of presidential power • Chávez’s own charisma • Economic inefficiencies • NB: defeat in November ’07 referendum, victory the following year

  8. CURRENT ISSUES • Leadership: • Tightening circle of advisers • Accusations of corruption • Economic performance: • Rationing of water and electricity • Attempted price controls • Foreign policy: • Threats of war with Colombia • Rise of Lula and Brazil • Curtailing opposition: • Redistricting for elections of National Assembly • Shutdown of RCTV International

  9. WHY ELSEWHERE? • Juxtaposition of inequality and wealth • Organizational basis for mass mobilization • Timing (why ca. 2005?): • Changing approach to electoral politics (rejection of revolutionary option) • Constraints and moderation resulting from “pacts” • International incentives: • Respect for democracy • Neoliberal economics and regional integration • “… the same factors that prevent the left from pursuing more radical economic policies are also responsible for the ability of the left to remain in power without provoking antisystemic behavior on the part of opposing political forces.”

  10. AND THE FUTURE…? • “… the left is back, and it will remain competitive in much of Latin America well into the future” • Threats and challenges: • Corruption scandals • Concerns with public safety • Break with policy moderation • Politicization of military • “The future of the left in Latin America will largely depend on its ability to strike a balance between the pragmatic need for moderation and the moral imperative to pursue strategies for poverty reduction, redistribution, and development.”

  11. UPDATE: POVERTY LEVELS N __%__ __(millions)__ • 40.5 136 • 48.3 200 • 44.0 221 2010 32.1 180

  12. CHANGES IN INEQUALITY • 1980-2000 = rising • increasing lower-higher skilled gap • uneven effects of international trade • absence of public policies • 2000-2006 = declining (slightly) • reduced lower-higher skilled gap (due to education) • government programs (including remittances) • 2007-09 unclear impact of global crash • still high by world standards

  13. QUESTIONS 1. Do these developments mean that radical policies are unnecessary? 2. Or might they provide more opportunity for radical policy (e.g., land reform)? 3. Does moderation mean survival of the “left”—or the extinction of the left? 4. What impact might come from political change in Cuba—or Venezuela?

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