COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT THROUGH NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS NCO

1. COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT THROUGH  NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS (NCO) 1

2. In other word the objective is to provide seamless access to timely information to all war fighters and decision makers at every echelon in the military hierarchy. This enables all elements, including individual infantry soldiers, ground vehicles, command centers, aircraft and naval vessels, to share information collected to be combined into a coherent, accurate picture of the battlefield. Having a rapid access to reliable situational awareness and relevant operational picture results in faster strategic planning and more effective tactical decisions. Targets can be more rapidly detected and intercepted and tragic friendly fire events can be more successfully avoided. In other word the objective is to provide seamless access to timely information to all war fighters and decision makers at every echelon in the military hierarchy. This enables all elements, including individual infantry soldiers, ground vehicles, command centers, aircraft and naval vessels, to share information collected to be combined into a coherent, accurate picture of the battlefield. Having a rapid access to reliable situational awareness and relevant operational picture results in faster strategic planning and more effective tactical decisions. Targets can be more rapidly detected and intercepted and tragic friendly fire events can be more successfully avoided.

3. The concept of a Network Centric Operations (NCO) will contribute significantly to MAF�s transformation and mission effectiveness 3 In order to make this work In order to make this work

4. SCOPE Key NCO based Concept of operations Implementation of MAF program to provide a secure , real time collaborative environment. Challenges and Way Forward. 4

5. NCO Defined An information superiority enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers and shooters to achieved shared situational awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability and a degree of self-synchronization. 5

6. Net - Centric Journey: Driving Factors 6 The shift to NCO is driven by many factors most important is the evolving threat which are different from the normal traditional warfare of tank to tank fights. Terrorism and assymmetrical threats requires security and defence force to be more alert and aware on all fronts and speedy actions and this needs networking within various elements and resources available. More multinational coalition like us we have to work with other agencies besides the military services thereby need the interoperability within the systems and procedures. In OP PASIR eg in coastal maritime security operations we work with other maritime agencies so we need the compatibility and interoperability. The tools and tactics of how we fight have always evolved along with technology. Major advances in IT are being driven primarily by the demands of the commercial sector. IT is being applied in ways that are transforming the way the military and adversaries organise and operate today coevolving their organization and processes to increased competitiveness. Lastly developing and leveraging Information Superiority with the emergence of Cyber warfare and IW and translated this into real operational capability by making the shift to NCO.The shift to NCO is driven by many factors most important is the evolving threat which are different from the normal traditional warfare of tank to tank fights. Terrorism and assymmetrical threats requires security and defence force to be more alert and aware on all fronts and speedy actions and this needs networking within various elements and resources available. More multinational coalition like us we have to work with other agencies besides the military services thereby need the interoperability within the systems and procedures. In OP PASIR eg in coastal maritime security operations we work with other maritime agencies so we need the compatibility and interoperability. The tools and tactics of how we fight have always evolved along with technology. Major advances in IT are being driven primarily by the demands of the commercial sector. IT is being applied in ways that are transforming the way the military and adversaries organise and operate today coevolving their organization and processes to increased competitiveness. Lastly developing and leveraging Information Superiority with the emergence of Cyber warfare and IW and translated this into real operational capability by making the shift to NCO.

8. 8

9. Evolution of Operations & Shift to Network Centric Operations 9 The trajectory of innovation associated with creating competitive advantage (war fighting advantage) as protrayed on the slide the Coevolution and the shift to NCO. This highlights the imperative to simultaneously pursue the changes in organization, process and technology to avoid changed efforts that focus on only a single dimension of the solution space.The trajectory of innovation associated with creating competitive advantage (war fighting advantage) as protrayed on the slide the Coevolution and the shift to NCO. This highlights the imperative to simultaneously pursue the changes in organization, process and technology to avoid changed efforts that focus on only a single dimension of the solution space.

10. NCO Tenets

11. 11 Let�s look more closely at how military translates the desired attributes into tangible action. To start, there is the hypothesis that networking can improve information sharing. Given this hyphothesis, NCO has four basic tenets: A B C D May be we can take these tenets by US Armed Forces to start to develop the Malaysian Armed Forces NCO framework and blueprint.Let�s look more closely at how military translates the desired attributes into tangible action. To start, there is the hypothesis that networking can improve information sharing. Given this hyphothesis, NCO has four basic tenets: A B C D May be we can take these tenets by US Armed Forces to start to develop the Malaysian Armed Forces NCO framework and blueprint.

12. OODA LOOP � Identified during the 1970s atrributed to former US Air Force Colonel John Boyd. In a more technical sense, networking improves operational tempo (optempo) by accelerating the Observation-Orientation phases of Boyd's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop. The OODA is an abstraction which describes the sequence of events which must take place in any military engagement. The opponent must be observed to gather information, the attacker must orient himself to the situation or context, then decide and act accordingly. The OODA loop is thus fundamental to all military operations, from strategic down to individual combat. At a philosophical and practical level what confers a key advantage in engagements is the ability to stay ahead of an opponent and dictate the tempo of the engagement - to maintain the initiative and keep an opponent off balance. In effect, the attacker forces his opponent into a reactive posture and denies the opponent any opportunity to drive the engagement to an advantage. The player with the faster OODA loop, all else being equal, will defeat the opponent with the slower OODA loop by blocking or pre-empting any move the opponent with the slower OODA loop attempts to make. The four components of the OODA loop can be split into three which are associated with processing information, and one which is associated with movement and application of firepower. Observation-Orientation-Decision are information centric while Action is kinematic or centred in movement, position and firepower. If we aim to accelerate our OODA loops to achieve higher operational tempo than an enemy, we have to accelerate all four components of the loop. Much of twentieth century warfighting technique and technology dealt with accelerating the kinetic portion of the OODA loop. Mobility, precision and firepower increases were the result of this evolution. There are practical limits as to how far we can push the kinetic aspect of the OODA loop - more destructive weapons produce collateral damage, faster platforms and weapons incur ever increasing costs. The four components of the OODA loop can be split into three which are associated with processing information, and one which is associated with movement and application of firepower. Observation-Orientation-Decision are information centric while Action is kinematic or centred in movement, position and firepower. If we aim to accelerate our OODA loops to achieve higher operational tempo than an enemy, we have to accelerate all four components of the loop. Observation-Orientation-Decision are all about gathering information, distributing information, analysing information, understanding information and deciding how to act upon this information. The faster we can gather, distribute, analyse, understand information, the faster we can decide, and arguably the better we can decide how and when to act in combat. Networking is a mechanism via which the Observation-Orientation phases of the loop can be accelerated, and the Decision phase facilitated. At the most fundamental level networking aims to accelerate engagement cycles and operational tempo at all levels of a warfighting system. This is achieved by providing a mechanism to rapidly gather and distribute targeting information, rapidly issue directives. OODA LOOP � Identified during the 1970s atrributed to former US Air Force Colonel John Boyd. In a more technical sense, networking improves operational tempo (optempo) by accelerating the Observation-Orientation phases of Boyd's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop. The OODA is an abstraction which describes the sequence of events which must take place in any military engagement. The opponent must be observed to gather information, the attacker must orient himself to the situation or context, then decide and act accordingly. The OODA loop is thus fundamental to all military operations, from strategic down to individual combat. At a philosophical and practical level what confers a key advantage in engagements is the ability to stay ahead of an opponent and dictate the tempo of the engagement - to maintain the initiative and keep an opponent off balance. In effect, the attacker forces his opponent into a reactive posture and denies the opponent any opportunity to drive the engagement to an advantage. The player with the faster OODA loop, all else being equal, will defeat the opponent with the slower OODA loop by blocking or pre-empting any move the opponent with the slower OODA loop attempts to make. The four components of the OODA loop can be split into three which are associated with processing information, and one which is associated with movement and application of firepower. Observation-Orientation-Decision are information centric while Action is kinematic or centred in movement, position and firepower. If we aim to accelerate our OODA loops to achieve higher operational tempo than an enemy, we have to accelerate all four components of the loop. Much of twentieth century warfighting technique and technology dealt with accelerating the kinetic portion of the OODA loop. Mobility, precision and firepower increases were the result of this evolution. There are practical limits as to how far we can push the kinetic aspect of the OODA loop - more destructive weapons produce collateral damage, faster platforms and weapons incur ever increasing costs. The four components of the OODA loop can be split into three which are associated with processing information, and one which is associated with movement and application of firepower. Observation-Orientation-Decision are information centric while Action is kinematic or centred in movement, position and firepower. If we aim to accelerate our OODA loops to achieve higher operational tempo than an enemy, we have to accelerate all four components of the loop. Observation-Orientation-Decision are all about gathering information, distributing information, analysing information, understanding information and deciding how to act upon this information. The faster we can gather, distribute, analyse, understand information, the faster we can decide, and arguably the better we can decide how and when to act in combat. Networking is a mechanism via which the Observation-Orientation phases of the loop can be accelerated, and the Decision phase facilitated. At the most fundamental level networking aims to accelerate engagement cycles and operational tempo at all levels of a warfighting system. This is achieved by providing a mechanism to rapidly gather and distribute targeting information, rapidly issue directives.

13. 13 This is an approach to the concept of NCO as discussed earlier, based on the Australian and US. This is an approach to the concept of NCO as discussed earlier, based on the Australian and US.

14. 14 The entry fee for NCO is an infostructure that provides all elements of the warfighting enterprise with access to high quality information services. At a high level of abstraction, we can view the infostructure as an integrated network of communications and the computational capabilities. The computational nodes and the communications links convey the seamless integration of computing and communications into a single backplane. The warfighting backplane will employ multi-mode data transport capabilities, including military and commercial satellites communications capabilities, multiple types of data links and radios and commercial information services. These data transport transport capabilities will both provide users with access to appropriate elements of a distributed computing environment as well as providing the interconnecting fabric for a wide range of computational and storage capabilities. The backplane supporting the infostructure will employ a multi-tiered architecture for information transport and processesing to increase capacity and improve interoperability. By exploiting emerging technology for providing quality of service across Internet Protocol IP based networks, the architecture of infostructure will enable multiple stand alone networks to be integrated into an adaptive and reconfigurable network-of-networks. This operational flexibility will enable commanders to plug and play sensors, shooters, command and control and support capabilities into tasks-organised combat packages, including appropriate collections of sensors and weapons. What separates the future from the present will be the provision of nearly ubiquitous information services to all elements, the increase in the speed and tempo of operations. The entry fee for NCO is an infostructure that provides all elements of the warfighting enterprise with access to high quality information services. At a high level of abstraction, we can view the infostructure as an integrated network of communications and the computational capabilities. The computational nodes and the communications links convey the seamless integration of computing and communications into a single backplane. The warfighting backplane will employ multi-mode data transport capabilities, including military and commercial satellites communications capabilities, multiple types of data links and radios and commercial information services. These data transport transport capabilities will both provide users with access to appropriate elements of a distributed computing environment as well as providing the interconnecting fabric for a wide range of computational and storage capabilities. The backplane supporting the infostructure will employ a multi-tiered architecture for information transport and processesing to increase capacity and improve interoperability. By exploiting emerging technology for providing quality of service across Internet Protocol IP based networks, the architecture of infostructure will enable multiple stand alone networks to be integrated into an adaptive and reconfigurable network-of-networks. This operational flexibility will enable commanders to plug and play sensors, shooters, command and control and support capabilities into tasks-organised combat packages, including appropriate collections of sensors and weapons. What separates the future from the present will be the provision of nearly ubiquitous information services to all elements, the increase in the speed and tempo of operations.

15. MAF NCO Dimensions 15

16. Network Dimension 16

17. Information Dimension 17

18. Human Dimension 18

19. Security Dimension � Holistic Approach 19 4. Security refer to SSPN4. Security refer to SSPN

20. The NCO Capability Development Plan for MAF is a long term undertaking that will be implemented at an incremental pace based on MAF�s organizational clusters and prioritized according to MAF�s requirements 20 why we do it in phases due to Dynamic environment of MAF Dev Plan and the need to integrate with other MAF new assets & capabilities -why we do it in phases due to Dynamic environment of MAF Dev Plan and the need to integrate with other MAF new assets & capabilities -

21. MAF NCO System Design Approach  MAF NCO system is methodically designed to put the NCO Tenets into practice The NCO Framework is created by mapping the attributes of the 4 NCO Domains (physical, information, cognition and social) to the concepts of the NCO tenets in order to understand their relationship and qualify the process required to achieve mission effectiveness. The MAF NCO System Terms of Reference (TOR) is a synthesis of the User Requirements and NCO Framework that forms the basis of MAF NCO Functional Dimensions and their associated system deliverables. The capabilities attained from the system deliverables assure MAF�s objective to achieve mission effectiveness are met. 21

22. Challenges associated with the design, acquisition, integration and support of the complex socio-technical systems

23. Challenges 

24. Challenges of Human Dimension Organizational Structure New evolving system requires new organizational structure Organizational culture - social learning Knowledge management and mobilization people�s willingness to share and receive information Cooperation and collaboration Training to deal with different kinds of information Trust trust is necessary to make human action and interaction possible Teamwork Teamwork is essential to the success of any organization and it is more so in a network centric environment. The person-machine interface and information filtering tools will need to evolve to reduce the problem of �information overload�. Networked forces will need new tools that make information available in useful ways 24

25. WAY FORWARD Establish leadership to embrace the challenges. Education/Training/Change Management Plan Investment Strategy. Understand your military culture and command philosophy � I think these are unique. Be sure there is an agreed vision or design end state. Conduct a robust gap analysis Design your roadmap in two parts � the co-ordination plan and the end to end architecture. We are embarking upon a journey of discovery. The end state of our warfighting force in future will emerge through a process of experimentation. There will be failures along the way. We will find that ideas that seemed promising could not be translated into combat power. Our success will depend upon our collective will, the preparations we make, and how we are provisioned. But � some things to consider: Firstly understand your military culture and command philosophy � I think these are unique. Secondly be sure there is an agreed vision or design end state. Thirdly conduct a robust gap analysis Lastly design your roadmap in two parts � the co-ordination plan and the end to end architecture. Investment Strategy Individual services and agencies currently acquire material and systems one by one. This approach needs to change. Instead, MAF needs to develop investment strategies and make acquisition decisions based upon portfolios. Two kinds of portfolios need to be considered. The first is a portfolio or package of investments that mirrors an MCP. The second is an infrastructure portfolio consisting of a set of capabilities necessary to support multiple MCPs in a specific area such as communications. The tradeoffs that need to be made include: 1) the overall mix of MCPs to be deployed; 2) which alternate MCP configurations should be adopted for a particular mission; and 3) the components of a federation of supporting systems (including combat support, personnel, finance, etc.). In order to satisfy the needs of NCW, jointness needs to be more than skin-deep. It needs to be built-in from the bottom up, so that the best way to accomplish a mission or task, given the available information and assets, can be employed. There are significant institutional barriers to achieve born joint MCPs. To maximize our chances of success, we need to foster true jointness in the process of coevolution, investment strategy, and education and training efforts. We are embarking upon a journey of discovery. The end state of our warfighting force in future will emerge through a process of experimentation. There will be failures along the way. We will find that ideas that seemed promising could not be translated into combat power. Our success will depend upon our collective will, the preparations we make, and how we are provisioned. But � some things to consider: Firstly understand your military culture and command philosophy � I think these are unique. Secondly be sure there is an agreed vision or design end state. Thirdly conduct a robust gap analysis Lastly design your roadmap in two parts � the co-ordination plan and the end to end architecture. Investment Strategy Individual services and agencies currently acquire material and systems one by one. This approach needs to change. Instead, MAF needs to develop investment strategies and make acquisition decisions based upon portfolios. Two kinds of portfolios need to be considered. The first is a portfolio or package of investments that mirrors an MCP. The second is an infrastructure portfolio consisting of a set of capabilities necessary to support multiple MCPs in a specific area such as communications. The tradeoffs that need to be made include: 1) the overall mix of MCPs to be deployed; 2) which alternate MCP configurations should be adopted for a particular mission; and 3) the components of a federation of supporting systems (including combat support, personnel, finance, etc.). In order to satisfy the needs of NCW, jointness needs to be more than skin-deep. It needs to be built-in from the bottom up, so that the best way to accomplish a mission or task, given the available information and assets, can be employed. There are significant institutional barriers to achieve born joint MCPs. To maximize our chances of success, we need to foster true jointness in the process of coevolution, investment strategy, and education and training efforts.

26. THANK YOU 26