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Learning outcomes. After this lecture you should be able to:Know the defining features of structural realism, especially the role of powerUnderstand the key differences between offensive and defensive realismDebate how various structural realists read the rise of ChinaKnow why proponents believe structural realism to be a better explanation of the dynamics of the contemporary system.
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1. Chapter 4: Structural RealismBy John J. Mearsheimer
2. Learning outcomes After this lecture you should be able to:
Know the defining features of structural realism, especially the role of power
Understand the key differences between offensive and defensive realism
Debate how various structural realists read the rise of China
Know why proponents believe structural realism to be a better explanation of the dynamics of the contemporary system
3. Realism and Power Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics. It is based on the material capabilities that a state controls
States compete for power, and do all they can to shift the balance of power in their favour
Classical realists believed conflict was hardwired into human nature
Structural realists believe the international system forces states to pursue power politics
4. Five Assumptions. Great powers are the main actors and they operate in an anarchic international system
All states possess offensive military capability this varies over time
States can never be certain about other states intentions. A defensive military doctrine espoused by one state can look like offensive threat to another
The main goal of states is survival
States are rational actors operating with imperfect information: they sometimes make serious mistakes
5. Offensive vs. Defensive Realism Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for opportunities to gain more power, with the ultimate prize being hegemony
Defensive realists argue that unrelenting expansion is imprudent conquest is often costly and troublesome
Defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz, argue that states should seek an appropriate amount of power (1989: 40)
6. Which is less war-prone:Bipolarity or Multipolarity? Bipolarity
there is less opportunity for great powers to fight each other in a bipolar world
equality between great powers tends to be more even, and balancing behaviour is easier
there is greater potential for miscalculation in multipolarity
Multipolarity
More great powers is better in part because deterrence is easier
In multipolarity, more states can join together to confront an aggressive state
There is less hostility among the great powers as their attention is more diffused
7. Is Unipolarity less war prone? With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, many realists argue that unipolarity has arrived
Such a world is likely to be more stable than either bipolarity or multipolarity
Logically, there can be no war or security competition among great powers; minor powers will not cause any trouble for fear of offending the unipolar power
The dangers of a unipolar world is that the absence of security competition encourages the great power to withdraw from outer regions
Or a hegemon uses its overwhelming power to engage in ideological engineering
8. Case study discussion
Can China Rise Peacefully?
& How Should the US Respond?
9. Offensive realist answer Predict that China and the USA will engage in security competition
A rising China will imitate the USA to become a regional hegemon in Asia
This means removing all local threats to its security and pushing American military forces out of Asia
This will be resisted by the USA as it does not tolerate peer competitors
10. Defensive Realist Answer Defensive realists argue that it would be smarter for China to consolidate its power rather than have a run at establishing regional hegemony
Nuclear weapons in the hands of rivals such as India ought to restrain China
The costs of a highly interventionist foreign policy are exorbitantly high
11. 9/11 and Realisms Return After 9/11, realism has made a stunning comeback.
Liberal optimism of the 1990s now deflated
Giddy predictions of globalizers about the end of the state have proved to be premature
War again appears to be a regular feature of the international system
Structural realists were right to predict that the 2003 Iraq War was a significant strategic error on the part of the US and its partners
Security competition in West, South and East Asia reminds us that the world remains a dangerous place