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1967 - Middle East War. 1973 - 2nd Middle East War. 1988 - 1st Intifada ... Current Issues. Contested water rights (Mountain Aquifer, 600 Mcm, and ...
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Slide 1:Middle East Water Project:Water Allocation System (WAS) Model
ECI 155 Spring 2006
Jordan Syria Israel Egypt Palestine (West Bank) LebanonSlide 2:Outline
Background Economic principles WAS Model Results Take-home points Pal. (Gaza)
Slide 3:Rainfall i.e, 2 –35 in/year (EXACT, USGS, 1999) Water Resources
Hydrology
Surface Waters (approximately 1,324 Mcm per year) Foreground: Hisbani river headwaters, Lebanon, Background: Jebal Sheihk / Mount Hermon on the Syria, Lebanon, and Israeli border (2,800 meters above sea level)Slide 5:Geography
Middle ground: Outlet to the Dead Sea, Jordan (400 meters below sea level) Background: Jerusalem Hills, Israel (800 meters above sea level)Slide 7:Demographics
Top: Amman, Jordan (2.2 million) Left: Hebron, West Bank (0.8 million) Below: Haifa, Israel (0.8 million)
Infrastructure National water carrier (Israel, 300–400 Mcm) King Abdullah Canal (Jordan, 100-120 Mcm) Gallalee (Tiberias / Kinneret; 500 Mcm storage) King Talal Dam (75 Mcm) Karameh Dam (>50 Mcm) Some Water-Related History 1918 - Ottoman Empire falls & start of British Mandate 1948 - State of Israel 1952 - Johnson Mediations 1967 - Middle East War 1973 - 2nd Middle East War 1988 - 1st Intifada 1992 - Oslo Accords 1994 - Israel – Jordan Peace 2000 - 2nd Intifada Right: Hijazi railroad bridge across the Yarmuk River bombed during 1967 war Current Issues Contested water rights (Mountain Aquifer, 600 Mcm, and lower Jordan River). Water resources to support future population growth & environmental needs? Share resources or build desalination plants? Links to other disputes over land, security, partitioning Jerusalem, and right of return for Palestinian refugees.Slide 11:Economic Principles
“Water is a scarce resource. Scarce resources have value.” Gideon Fishelson Desalinating seawater (plus conveying from the seacoast) puts an upper bound on the value of water in dispute Think about water values not quantities Maximize this value (net social welfare = benefits - costs)
Slide 12:Maximize net welfare
Slide 13:Conserve Mass(Inputs = Outputs)
A. Freshwater B. Recycled water
Slide 14:Conserve Mass(Inputs = Outputs)
Use to meet demands Treated wastewater from i C. Treating recycled water Treatment loss
Slide 15:The WAS Model
Maximize net benefits In each district Urban, Ag., and Industrial water demands + costs of all sources Quantity of sources = quantity of demand Infrastructure (costs + capacities) Treatment plants Conveyance Desalination Environmental considerations Limit extraction Effluent charges Restrict recycled water use Set aside water Policy considerations Specify prices Reserve water Impose penalties
Slide 16:Model Use
It’s complicated User may not fully understand implications of his/her inputs Experiment with choices User interacts with model The model does not “make” water policy Rather User imposes policies Model respects these policies absolutely Model shows how to efficiently implement policies and their consequences
Regional Schematic 45 districts Conveyance capacity Freshwater Recycled water Left: Date palm farm near Arava, Israel warning not to drink the reclaimed waterSlide 18:Model Outputs
Demand served to each use in each district Water transfers Shadow value / scarcity rent for water in each district Benefits to add/expand infrastructure Gains from trading water & money
Slide 19:More on shadow values
Price buyers will pay (or producers will charge) for 1 more unit. Marginal cost. Model output. Associated with each model constraint. Shows how objective fxn. would increase if a binding constraint is relaxed by one unit. Shadow price Consumer Price Supply Cost. Depend on the policies input by user
Slide 20:Shadow values are spatially related
Interpretation: Build conveyance when difference in shadow values between districts is larger than conveyance cost Build a desalination plant when shadow value in district on a seacoast is greater than desal. cost
Slide 21:Sample Results
Desal. along Israeli Coast?
Slide 22:Sample Results
Desal. along Israeli Coast? With 30% supply drop?
Slide 23:Sample Results (continued)
Gains from cooper. and trading In the Mountain Aquifer
Slide 24:Conclusions
Separate water ownership from water usage The later allows transfers of water and money Monetize and de-emotionalize water conflicts The value of waters in dispute by Palestinians and Israelis is small Water should not be a cause for war
Slide 25:Postscript
10+ year collaboration by Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, American, and Dutch scientists Separate participation by each government Water not included in the Geneva Accord Continuing work to improve model Multi-year Capacity expansion through time
Slide 26:References
Fisher et al. (2002). “Optimal water management and conflict resolution: The Middle East Water Project” Water Resources Research 38(11), 1243, doi:10.1029/2001 Fisher et al. (2005). “Liquid Assets: An economic approach for water management and conflict resolution in the Middle East and beyond.” (Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.)