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Trust and deceit in the animal kingdom. Liesbeth Sterck Animal Ecology, UU Ethology Research, BPRC. Trust. Nature in tooth and claw. Monkey business Sly as a fox. Cooperation in theory. Evolution on level individual
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Trust and deceit in the animal kingdom Liesbeth Sterck Animal Ecology, UU Ethology Research, BPRC
Nature in tooth and claw • Monkey business • Sly as a fox
Cooperation in theory • Evolution on level individual • Altruism: benefit for other, costs for individual • Problem with cheaters
Cooperation in theory • Mutualism: simultaneous exchange of benefits • Altruism: donor incurs cost; recipient benefits • Kin selection • Reciprocal altruism
Kin selection (Hamilton 1964) • Altruism when: • C < r*B • Costs < relatedness * Benefits
Kin selection (Hamilton 1964) • C <r*B r=1/2 r=1/4 r=1/8
Kin selection (Hamilton 1964) • C <r*B
Animals can be nice to kin Cooperation with non-kin? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2B1AJ3ZaUA
Reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) • ‘If you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’ • Non-kin • Not simultaneous
Prisoners Dilemma • Cooperate or cheat (defect)
Reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) • ‘If you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’ • Non-kin • Not simultaneous • Repeated encounters • Individual recognition, e.g. in a group
Humans • Humans are a group-living species • Family / kin • Friends / acquaintances / colleagues -- Warfare
Groups are diverse • Size • From 2 - 100 - 10.000s individuals • Composition • Changing- fixed • Recognition group members • Anonymous –categories – individuals • Reproduction • One female (+ male) - everyone
Cooperation in practice 1 • Why do primates live in groups?
Group living: advantages • Warning against predators (van Schaik 1989)
Group living: disadvantages Males: • Matings • Competition (Wrangham 1980; Sterck et al. 1997} Females: • Food
Group living: advantages • Infanticide avoidance (Sugiyama 1965; 1966; Hrdy1977; Sterck et al. 1997)
Balance in costs and benefits Protection against predators and infanticide Competition Primate peculiarity: groups contain both females and males
Cooperation in practice 2 • How do primates live in groups?
How primates live in groups • How complex is living in a primate group • Do they take benefit others into account
Methods • From individual to group: • Observations • Behavioural experiments
Methods • From individual to group: • Observations • Behavioural experiments • Computer simulations
How primates live in groups • How complex is living in a primate group • Dominance • Good relationships
Bob (29) Relationships in group (Massen, Sterck &de Vos 2010) Timon (20) Sitting together 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30 31 32 33 34 35 Kin Dominance Friendship 29 20
Good relationships Advantages male – female relationships Advantages
Friendship and mating success (Massen, Sterck et al. 2012) * Mating No mating Grooming by males (sec/hour) Mating season
Friendship and paternity(Massen, Sterck et al. 2012) * Proximity of male (rank) other male father males
Friendship • Do they know their friends?
Computer simulation of behaviour(Hemelrijk 1998, 2000; Evers, Sterck et al. 2011, 2012, 2014)
Computer simulation of behaviour(Evers, Sterck et al. MS) Grooming= friendship Dominance Dominance
Computer simulation of behaviour(Evers, Sterck et al. MS) Grooming = friendship Dominance Dominance
Primate group living • Compete and cooperate in group • Relationships • Kinship • Dominance • Friendship = ‘trust’ • Friendships take time to build and last long
Primate cooperation in practice 2 • Do they take benefit others into account? • Other-regarding preferences • Inequity aversion • Yerkes 1930’s: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrv91Pa3jgs
Cooperation: pro-social behaviour • Do primates bestow other a favor? (Massen, vd Berg, Spruijt en Sterck 2010: PlosOne 5(3): e9734)
Cooperation: pro-social behaviour • To kin • To high-ranking animals Bestow (Massen, vd Berg, Spruijt en Sterck 2010: PlosOne 5(3): e9734) Neutral Withhold High rank Low rank
Inequity Aversion "Inequity exists for a person whenever his perceived job inputs and/or outcomes stand psychologically in an obverse relation to what he perceives are the inputs and/or outcomes of another"(Festinger 1957)
Inequity Aversion • Negative inequity aversion • React to getting less than other • Positive inequity aversion • React to getting more than other
Inequity Aversion (Brosnan & de Waal 2003) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-KSryJXDpZo capuchin monkey refuses food
Inequity Aversion (IA): critisism • Newer data: no IA
The Conditions O,5 kg O,5 kg 2,3 kg 2,3 kg No effort (provisioning) Equity No effort (provisioning) Inequity Small effort Equity Small effort Inequity Large effort Equity Large effort Inequity Large effort Reward & effort inequity
Proportion of acceptance/performanceof all equity conditions for all animals Significant drop in performance (for low value reward) with increasing workload Friedman test: n = 19, 2 = 15.84, df = 2, p = 0.001 Post-hoc Wilcoxon signed ranks tests: Provisioning vs. 0,5 kg: n = 19, T+=62.5, pexact= 0.115Provisioning vs. 2,3 kg: n = 19, T+= 152, pexact< 0.0010,5kg vs. 2,3 kg: n = 19, T+= 117.5, pexact= 0.008
Proportion of acceptance/performanceof dominant subjects Disadvantageous Inequity aversion in small effort test Wilcoxon signed ranks tests: Provisioning: n = 12, T+= 21, pexact= 0.719Small Effort: n = 12, T+= 34, pexact= 0.023Large Effort (reward): n = 12, T+= 8.5, pexact= 0.211Large Effort (reward & effort): n = 12, T+= 15.5, pexact= 0.250
AIA: Proportion of acceptance/performance of subordinate partners Performance for low value reward decreases when workload increases At high workload, performance for high value reward significantly better then for low value reward --> no advantageous inequity aversion Wilcoxon signed ranks tests: Provisioning: n = 9, T+= 3, pexact= 0.156Small Effort: n = 9, T+= 4, pexact= 0.219Large Effort (reward): n = 9, T+= 0, pexact= 0.008Large Effort (reward & effort): n = 9, T+= 4, pexact= 0.055
Nature in tooth and claw? • Monkey business • Sly as a fox
Care and friendship • C <r*B
Conclusion • Deceit kept in limits: otherwise no cooperation • Competition and cooperation in group • Dominance and friendship • Trust and friendship crucial for cooperation