The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor

1. The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler

2. Introduction • Distribution of power  Major War • Major War  Distribution of power?

3. Theoretical Propositions • Keynes • Short run: like an opening and closing of a pair of scissors • Losers would drag winners’ economic growth down, decreasing the gap between them • Normal Angell • All nations lose power after war, but the winners do not lose as much as the losers; the gap continues

4. Organski: the Phoenix Factor • Levels of power will eventually return to the pattern they would have followed in the absence of war. • Convergence of winners and losers • Phoenix factor: losers appear to rise from the ashes of their defeat

5. O&K Propositions Proposition 1: Belligerent countries that win major wars gain in power, and belligerent losers suffer substantial short term losses. Proposition 2: Belligerent winners retain antebellum levels of growth, and the gap between winners and losers is erased by the accelerated recovery of losers.

6. Empirical Measures • Power: measured by GNP • Wars: World Wars I & II • Base period used to project a growth trend; this trend is compared to actual economic performance • Problem: impact of non-war events such as the Great Depression • Sample of nations: Table 12-2

7. Summary of Results 1) Evidence of Phoenix factor for entire sample (Figure 12-2) 2) World War I: losers do recover, but the impact of the Great Depression makes the economic output much lower than that forecasted for all groups (Figure 12-4)

8. Summary of Results 3) World War II: both winners and losers experienced strong economic recovery; gap between losers and winners persists (Figure 12-6); however, major power losers catch up (Figure 12-7)

9. Conclusions • War has no profound impact on the distribution of power in the system. • The Phoenix factor cannot be explained by aid that winners provide to losers • What about the political consequences of war?