10 Ships in the Nimitz Class CVN-68 Nimitz CVN-69 Dwight D. Eisenhower CVN-70 Carl Vinson CVN-71 Theodore Roosevelt C

2. TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

3. 10 Ships in the Nimitz Class CVN-68 Nimitz CVN-69 Dwight D. Eisenhower CVN-70 Carl Vinson CVN-71 Theodore Roosevelt CVN-72 Abraham Lincoln CVN-73 George Washington CVN-74 John C. Stennis CVN-75 Harry S. Truman CVN-76 Ronald Reagan (CVN-77 George H.W. Bush, 2009) TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

4. American Nuclear Society June 2, 2003 Nuclear Safety CulturePanel DiscussionUS Navy NSC PracticesModel: NIMITZ Precommissioning Unit1972 - 1975 Charles R. Jones Nuclear Safety Consultant TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

5. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Experience ENTERPRISE CVN65 NIMITZ CVN68 BAINBRIDGE CGN25 Nuclear Power Mobile Training Team 13 years 5 EOOWs (SROs) Chief Engineer Qualification Chief Engineer Instructor TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

6. DOE, NRC, Commercial Experience • Department of Energy, Defense Programs 5 years • Mix of Nuclear Safety Contracts for DOE, NRC, and Commercial Nuclear Power Plants17 years TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

7. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNewport News Shipbuilding1972-1975 • Special Problem: Only 2 reactors (wanted 4) • Concern for overall reliability and safety • Crew selection viewed as key to success • Result (hindsight): Optimal NSC TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

8. Navy NSC Basics • Goal: Optimal reactor systems control • Achieved using best proactive methods • No-fault policy for most situations TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

9. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNewport News Shipbuilding • Crew Selection • First Year: Crew training • Second Year: Construction support/testing • Third Year: Critical testing and acceptance TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

10. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • Officer (Manager) roles • Enlisted Personnel (Worker) roles • NSC-Related Policies • NSC-Related Practices TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

11. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • Officer (Manager) roles • Take charge/responsibility • Support enlisted personnel (workers) • Conduct training • No “problem filtering” (key point) • Continuous self-training/retraining TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

12. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • Enlisted Personnel (Worker) roles • Achieve technical expertise • Identify/report all technical problems • Push for problem resolution • Understand/control operations • Procedure verbatim compliance • Continuous self-training/retraining TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

13. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • NSC-Related Policies • No-Fault Problem Management • No “Problem Filtering” TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

14. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • NSC-Related Policies (2) • Upside-Down Organization • Managers support workers • Workers are the most important personnel TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

15. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • NSC-Related Practices • Daily self training • Weekly formal training • Monthly progress reports to CO from each manager and worker • Stop testing and fix it TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

16. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • NSC-Related Practices • Monthly progress reports from each manager and worker • All reports go to CO (CEO) • Each manager adds a summary report • Each report includes work completed, problems, obstacles, support needed, plans for next month • No filtering/no fault TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

17. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • NSC-Related Practices • Stop testing and fix it • Procedures (Verbatim Compliance) • No “interpretations” • Focus on “red flags” • Stop, correct (all), approve, proceed TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

18. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture • NSC-Related Practices • Stop testing and fix it • Equipment • Up-to-date technical manuals • System Expert: Factory visits • Access for maintenance • Proper tools for maintenance TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

19. NIMITZ PRECOMMUNITNuclear Safety Culture RESULTS • Ship commissioned on time • All equipment fully functional • No sea-trial problems with reactor or propulsion plants • NIMITZ Class aircraft carriers a key national asset TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

20. Three Key Points • Strong leadership • Workers first • Communicate all issues Good Nuclear Safety Culture requires strong leadership to establish policies and practices that put the workers first and that communicate all issues to the top manager. -Charles R. Jones TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

21. Going ForwardNuclear Safety Culture • Applications Today • Definition of Nuclear Safety Culture • Practical Implementation • Davis-Besse Perspectives • DOE Perspectives (Management) • NRC Perspectives (Risk Informed) • NSC Fundamentals Tutorial TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

22. Good Nuclear Safety CultureMy Definition Enabling framework Positive inquisitiveness The integrated body of specific characteristics and personnel attitudes of an established nuclear organizational environment consisting, in part, of design, operations, maintenance, inspection, and management policies and activities which together ensure that problems are aggressively sought out and that all concerns or issues raised are promptly addressed in a way that maximizes worker safety and public safety over the life of the nuclear plant. Safety over production TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

23. Practical Implementation • It is one thing to fix the general organizational and communication infrastructures. It is another to identify, implement, and sustain the needed upgrades to the supporting infrastructure. • We also need to look at more nuclear-specific concepts and articulate management’s policies and goals in those areas. TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

24. Practical Implementation (2) • From DB lessons-learned task force: • Acceptance of long standing hardware problems • Weaknesses with the Employee Concerns Program • Weak self-assessments • Multiple examples of procedural noncompliance • Lack of management involvement in safety significant work activities • Lack of engineering rigor in their approach to problem resolution • Strained engineering resources TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

25. Practical Implementation (3) • From DB lessons-learned task force - “Other contributors” : • Inspection guidance • ASME code requirements • Reactor coolant system leakage monitoring methods and requirements • Inspection staffing issues • Licensing processes • Quality of documentation TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

26. Practical Implementation (4) • From DB Safety Culture Report: • Davis-Besse Key Safety Culture Issues: • Safety integration needed: Industrial, Nuclear, Traffic • Inadequate alignment of managers and non-managers • Problem ownership weak TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

27. Practical Implementation (5) • From DB Safety Culture Report (continued): • Realistic schedules are needed • Minimal corrective actions due to production pressure • Top down approach is overbearing • Personnel low priority • Organization chart not updated • Training not a priority TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

28. Practical Implementation (6) • From DB Safety Culture Report: • Work coordination weak • Reactive work vice planning to avoid issues • Resource loading inadequate to solve problems • Self assessments are sporadic and ineffective • Professional development not provided TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

29. NSC Fundamentals • When do we apply “verbatim compliance” at this nuclear plant?  (When do we not?) • What do we mean by "configuration management" at this nuclear plant and how do we implement it?  (Do we have control?) TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

30. NSC Fundamentals (2) • What do we mean by "life cycle maintenance" at this plant and how do we implement it?  (Are we thinking long-term?) • What is our “nuclear safety margin” at this plant?  (What are we protecting?  Does it change?) • What plant barriers provide protection to reliably prevent fission products from reaching the environment?  (Do we include protecting the spent fuel?) TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

31. NSC Fundamentals (3) • What plant design features improve reliability and compensate for equipment failures?  (Are they repaired/maintained at a higher priority?) • What makes instrumentation at this plant accurate?  (Calibration and actual system testing?) • Can the fail-safe performance of equipment at this plant be improved?  (Is it checked and protected?) TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

32. Other Basic Concepts • What will be management's disciplinary response to an incident in which a worker made a mistake that caused this plant to shutdown?  (Management responsible too?) • When we at this plant encounter a procedural requirement that cannot be met as written, what course of action will we take?  (Reevaluate the entire procedure rather than just the one item? Skill-of-the-craft issues?) TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

33. Other Basic Concepts (2) • “Risk informed” methods provide a useful prioritization tool but are not standalone, definitive solutions. • “Risk informed” is too often skewed to imply that something does not have to be controlled or fixed at all. • Technical understanding and control are most useful in proactive environments. TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking

34. Concluding Perspective • A good Nuclear Safety Culture: • Important to the success of the nuclear industry. • Requires communications up and down the entire organization. TECHNIDIGM.ORG Common Sense, Technically Speaking