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The Nuclear Test Ban: Technical Opportunities for the Trump Administration

The Nuclear Test Ban: Technical Opportunities for the Trump Administration. Stephen Herzog, Yale University stephen.herzog@yale.edu United States Strategic Command March 16, 2017. Introduction. Not a policy case for or against Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

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The Nuclear Test Ban: Technical Opportunities for the Trump Administration

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  1. The Nuclear Test Ban: Technical Opportunities for the Trump Administration Stephen Herzog, Yale Universitystephen.herzog@yale.edu United States Strategic Command March 16, 2017

  2. Introduction • Not a policy case for or against Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) • There is a persuasive technical case for effectively verifiable nature of CTBT, but still ways to improve explosion monitoring • Presentation highlights technical initiatives Trump administration should promote to enhance appeal of norm against nuclear explosive testing and strength of global nuclear explosion monitoring community

  3. Improving Data Collection • Policy 1: Completing the International Monitoring System (IMS)

  4. Improving Data Collection • Policy 2: Concluding a Facility Agreement • Integral to long-term success of the IMS • 49 of 89 IMS host countries have signed, 40 have entered into force • Policy 3: Breaking Ground on Cooperating National Facilities (CNFs) • Extremely difficult to increase or alter IMS station locations specified in Annex 1 to CTBT Protocol • Treaty provision could create de facto auxiliary IMS stations, particularly in areas of concern

  5. Expanding Data Analysis • Policy 1: Increasing National Data Centers (NDCs) • Backbone of national capabilities to technically assess IMS and national network data • Informs policy decisions about testing occurrence • 129 of 183 States Signatories established NDC • Policy 2: Broadening the International Data Center (IDC) Secure Web Portal User Base • Allows States Signatories to access IMS data and compiled IDC data products • 137 of 183 States Signatories have users

  6. Civil and Scientific Outreach • Policy 1: Recognizing Non-Universal Interest in Nuclear Explosion Monitoring • CTBT monitoring not always a priority for states • Other IMS data uses: seismic hazard mapping, tsunami warning, volcanic activity monitoring, etc. • Policy 2: Engaging Academic and Industry Collaborators • IMS data access generally excludes non-states • Archived (not real-time) data on a time-lag could be useful for range of civil and scientific activities

  7. Policy Implications • Focus on CTBT ratification and entry into force should not completely overshadow ways to improve already strong global monitoring • Bottom-up scientific initiatives discussed here will familiarize Annex 2 holdouts and other non-parties with the CTBT and its broad benefits • Deciding that a nuclear explosive test has occurred is a political decision, but should be informed by the best science and involved states

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