Beyond Lethal Firearms and Sub-National State Building in Mindanao

1. Beyond Lethal Firearms and Sub-National State Building in Mindanao EdQ 19 March 2012

2. The Puzzle • It is a fundamental interest of the state to control guns and maintain monopoly of coercion… but – why does the state tolerate accumulation and proliferation of firearms in the hands of civilians?; and, • Why do civilians participate in the shadow economy of firearms despite the iron hand of the state, threats of penalty and inducement of violence? • Does firearms accumulation and proliferation strengthen state formation at the sub-national level?

3. The Argument • Firearms accumulation and proliferation fulfills a schizophrenic function of supporting patronage-based sub-national state building founded on protection but weakening central authority to promote and ensure fundamentals of administrative, political, economic, social and environmental governance

4. Evidence (1) Weakened central authority: • ‘extra-bureaucracy’ in firearms regulation at central level coupled with corruption that weakens central authority • Porous licit and illicit trade in firearms • High incidence of illicit weapons use in gun related crimes • Unbridled accumulation and proliferation • Multi-functional demand system beyond the purview of state regulation • State complicity in the supply system and structure of loose firearms

5. Evidence (2) Sub-national state building: • Low trust on central state capacity to protect citizens • Selective horizontal violence as product of informal discourse between political actors and civilians and the latter’s rational approach to dealing with political actors • Using extreme-case comparison, gun-powered and state supported clan-dominated local governments fail in the economy, social services, environment, administration and governance fundamentals

6. Theoretical Lenses • Multi-sited ethnography and life history methodology (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Massey 2005; Falzon 2005) and network analysis (Law 1991)in analyzing the system and structure of the illicit trade in firearms • Kalyvas’ (2006) theory of selective violence within the main cleavages of civil conflict – to analyze the behavior and relationships of civilian gun holders and political actors; also argued by Friman (2009) and Andreas and Wallman (2009) as a tool for market regulation in illicit drugs • Scott (1972) and Hutchcroft’s (2000) institutional theory to analyze the behavior of the state in regard to firearms accumulation and proliferation; and Tilly’s (1985) formulation of state building as ‘organized crime’ that connects violence, sale of protection and revenue generation

7. Methodological Approach • Three steps: ethnographic examination, secondary research and micro extreme cases comparison • Use of multi-sited ethnography and “mediated conversations” - Storytellers: 4 illicit actors, 4 licit actors, 5 gun users in Talayan and 5 gun users in Naawan • Secondary research: firearms and socio-economic data • Extreme case comparison: Talayan (Maguindanao) and Naawan (Misamis Oriental)

8. The Global Market of Small Arms • 347 million small arms produced between 1945 and 2000 • Small arms producing companies have grown from 200 in 1980 to 600 in 2001 • Production takes place in 95 countries; illicit production takes place in 25 countries • Largest producers and exporters: USA, Germany, France, Russia and Britain with US$ 20 billion in global sales of all weapons (10% consisting of small arms)

9. USA: # 1 in export and import • In 2006: imports accounted for 59% of global export sales in hand guns and 42% of hunting shotguns • 270 million handguns in civilian hands; 88 guns per 100 people (in the Philippines: 3 per 100 people) • In 2006: 10,225 gun homicides out of 17,030 homicides; 5.75 firearms suicides per 100,000

10. Guns in the Philippines • Gun policy: American tradition, tolerant, highly centralized, secluded and weakly regulated • Licensed firearms: from 328,322 in 1993 to 929,034 by 2010; accumulation of around 50,000 per year • Loose firearms: from 130,042 in 1993 to 1.9 million by 2010 • Total firearms in the hands of civilians: 2.8 million; estimated value @ PHP 141 to PHP 283 billion • Other estimates: 3.9 million firearms with less than 20% registered

11. Registered/Licensed Firearms, 1990-2008PNEMO 6= Presidential National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 6 of 1990; PNEMO 6 cancelled licenses of all registered firearms. The 1994 Amnesty Program offered to legitimize all loose firearms.

12. Distribution of Loose and Licensed Firearms, Philippines, as of 2010 Total Firearms: 2,834,713 Loose Firearms: 1,905,679 (67.3%) Licensed Firearms: 929,034 (32.7%) 1.39 million (73%) (1.1 million or 80% in NCR) 2.06 million 675,269 72.6% ( 270,822 or 30% in NCR) 119,747 (12.8%) 148,900 (8%) 268,647 134,018 (14.4%) 492,268 358,250 (19%)

13. Licensed Purchases of Firearms, Philippines: 1990-2008

14. Guns and Civil Conflict:Guns Purchases (National), 2002-2008 - AFP-MILF Skirmishes (Mindanao) 2002-2010

15. Gun Crimes, Philippines 2008-2010

16. Guns in Mindanao • 492,268; 70% unlicensed • Largest concentrations: ARMM (32%) and central Mindanao (17%) • Lower concentrations in other regions like Region 10 (12% of Mindanao total)

17. Mindanao: Gun Crimes and Civil Conflict

18. Distribution of Loose and Licensed Firearms in Mindanao, as of 2010 Total: 492,268 Licensed: 134,018 (27%) Loose: 358,250 (73%) R10 Total: 68,745 42,231 Fas (61% of total in the region) 12% 26,514 FAs 13% 12% 32% 114,189 Fas (85% of total in the region) 20,203 FAs ARMM Total: 134,392 14% 62,718 Fas (74% of total in the region) 22, 210 FAs 17% R12 Total: 84,928 Philippines: 1 Loose Firearm per 49 persons 44.5% of all firearms in Mindanao are in ARMM and Central Mindanao

19. Distribution of Loose Firearms in Mindanao

20. Who has the guns and what for? • 20% as tools for the coercive power of the state • 1% in the hands of rebels as tools in challenging the state and proto-state formation • Unknown number in the hands of organized non-state actors • The bulk in the hands of civilians • 6,075 firearms (0.2% of total) used in 5,779 gun-related crimes in 2010; 99% illicit firearms • Inverse proportion of FA use in main cleavages and crime • Indicative high in gun purchases when the main cleavage is in the low

21. Security Agencies System of the Illegal Trade in Firearms(Gathered from Life Histories) CPP-NPA Conflict Fields MILF Legal and Illegal Structures of Protection Brokers Legal Inventory Black & Grey Markets Politicians Illegal Supply Illegal Inventory Business Elites Financial Incentives Crime Syndicates Profit Margins and Rents from Protection Private Individuals Multifunctional and Multi-directional Demand Structure

22. The Function-Based Incentive Structure in Illegal Firearms Trade(Gathered from Life Histories) Supply Side Black & Grey Markets • Rents from protection • Cash conversion of inventory • Recycling of recovered loose firearms • Force multiplier for state security functions • Strengthen power of local elites • Incremental price gains in transactions Demand Side • private protection • Power projection • Leverage in political bargaining • Enhancement of belligerency claim • Economic protection • Military (force) multiplier • Fill gaps in state protection

23. Case Study Areas: Talayan (Mag.) and Naawan (Mis. Or)

24. Extreme case comparison: Talayan and Naawan

25. Performance in Fundamentals of Governance: Naawan and Talayan

26. Performance in Administrative Governance: Naawan and Talayan

27. Performance in Economic Governance: Naawan and Talayan

28. Performance in Social Governance: Naawan and Talayan

29. Performance in Environmental Governance: Naawan and Talayan

30. Conclusions • Evidence suggests the schizophrenic function of firearms accumulation and proliferation in the hands of civilians • Where firearms support clan-based patronage, the element of protection tends to undermine other fundamentals of state • Extra-bureaucratic complicity in illegal firearms accumulation and proliferation weakens the coercive power of the state and creates incentives for sustained proliferation • Civilian gun holders selectively use violence for their own interest and protection including evasion of state authority

31. Possible Recommendations • GPH accession to the UN Program of Action on tracing, marking and reporting. • Public decommissioning of confiscated weapons to reduce leakage back to the black and grey markets. • Legislative oversight of the FED and promotion of transparency in firearms trading and registration. • Explicit inclusion of firearms regulation in the campaign against corruption. • Strengthening law enforcement and deterrence against crime

32. Thank You!