Conflict, Bargaining, Deterrence, and Escalation

1. Conflict, Bargaining, Deterrence, and Escalation

2. Bargaining is direct and indirect communication of words or signals to reach agreement. • Negotiations is only one form of bargaining • War is a severe form of bargaining that continues toward some sort of outcome, as long as one side is notcompletely annihilated.

3. Agreement may not be reached, resulting in war or other worst-case outcomes. • Carl von Clausewitz of 19th century Germany once said: “War is politics by other means.” • To some, war is another means of settling conflicts. Also, negotiations may continue even while states are fighting.

4. Rational Bargaining requires: • Rationality – known goal and ordered preferences, maximize interest. • Information about opponents capabilities and resolve. • Opponent must be able to read/ understand signals and vice versa.

5. More on Bargaining • Bargaining is interactive, often sequential • The Prisoners’ Dilemma Game is a form of game theory but is static unless iterated. Game theory demonstrates situations more dynamic than Prisoners’ Dilemma game. • Game Theory allows us to see how counter-intuitive behavior is rational: Brinksmanship, MAD, etc.

6. Deterrence • To deter means to prevent another state from taking a certain action. • Compellence means to reverse the actions of other states if deterrence fails. • First Gulf War: Iraq was not deterred from attacking Kuwait and was compelled to leave by the coalition.

7. Brinksmanship: Pushing a state to the brink of war – putting your country in a dangerous situation from which war might be difficult to stop. “Binding one’s hands.” Essentially, power can be manipulated by tricking the opponent that you are crazy enough to commit to a drastic decision – Mutual Assured Destruction

8. Context of bargaining • Domestic political actors can strengthen or undermine bargaining position. • Two level games – convince domestic actors of lack of room for negotiation, use domestic constraints as limits on concessions. Counterintuitive finding: more constrained state may win more! • Implications – democracies cannot easily bluff, but this allows democracies to send clear signals, which may lower risk of war.

9. Discussion: Who can be deterred? • Iraq? • North Korea? • Cuba? • Al Qaeda?