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SPECIFIC DETERRENCE

Individuals who are caught and sanctioned by the criminal justice system will be less likely to re-offend Does prison reduce recidivism? Do “deterrence based” programs reduce recidivism? BOOT CAMPS INTENSIVE PROBATION. SPECIFIC DETERRENCE. Nature of Boot Camp (BC)

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SPECIFIC DETERRENCE

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  1. Individuals who are caught and sanctioned by the criminal justice system will be less likely to re-offend • Does prison reduce recidivism? • Do “deterrence based” programs reduce recidivism? • BOOT CAMPS • INTENSIVE PROBATION SPECIFIC DETERRENCE

  2. Nature of Boot Camp (BC) • Relation to Deterrence Theory • Other vague theories tied into (BC) • Evidence • Over 35 experiments of reasonable quality conducted • Most find no difference, the few that find differences go both ways • Some evidence that BC with strong rehab component and good “aftercare” reduces crime Boot Camps

  3. The nature of ISP • Make probation meaner • Tie to deterrence • Pain + Reduced opportunity to offend • RAND experiment • 10 sites across country with random assignment • No difference in arrest for new crimes • ISP groups much more likely to get technical violations Intensive Supervision Probation

  4. Randomly assign d.v. strategies to police officers • Arrest, Counsel, or Separate for 8 hours • Arrest as painful “deterrent” • Findings: Arrest = 10% re-arrested after 3 months Counseling = 19% Separate = 24% • BUT: Replications not supportive • May work better with people who are tied to community Minneapolis domestic violence study (Larry Sherman)

  5. What about JOE?

  6. University of Arizona • Money from Joe to see whether his jails reduced crime • Comparison of cohorts of inmates pre-Joe and during-Joe • There was no difference in recidivism rates Joe’s Study

  7. Weak empirical support • If anything, the certainty of punishment may have marginal effects on crime • Clearance rate, focused deterrence, etc. • WHY SO WEAK? • Based on “weak” theory—weak assumptions • Limits of deterrence in a democratic society • MARGINAL vs. ABSOLUTE Conclusions Regarding Empirical Support

  8. Policy Implication = If the theory is correct, what can be done to reduce crime? • Rehabilitation, (unless painful) won’t work, and may “send the wrong message” • Raising the certainty, swiftness or severity of criminal penalties will work • If system cannot be swift, severe and certain enough, then reduce opportunities for offending • Incapacitation Policy Implications of Deterrence

  9. A thug in prison can’t shoot your sister • Easy (thought expensive) to do—we have the technology • Common sense/logic dictates that some crime reduction will be achieved Incapacitation

  10. How well does it work? • Comparing states to each other • Projecting crime savings from surveys of people entering jails • Examining states that are forced to release inmates • Works best for high rate offenses (burglary, robbery, theft)—not at all for homicide • Doubling prison population from 400K to 800K reduced robbery by 18% Incapacitation II

  11. Downsides • Least effective for crimes that most scare Americans (rape, homicide) • EXPENSIVE • Marginal effects—the more you do it the less it works. • Fighting the “age crime curve” • May be counter productive over long term (nothing positive happening in prison) Incapacitation III

  12. Fear of Informal Sanctions is not “Deterrence theory.” • Informal social control theory (Hirschi, others) • However, formal sanctions may “kick in” informal sanctions. • Arrest may disappoint parents • Prison may alienate family/friends What About Informal Sanctions?

  13. Neo Classical Theory Part IIRational Choice TheoryRoutine Activities TheorySituational Crime Prevention

  14. Economics (language, theory) • “Expected Utility” = calculation of all risks and rewards • This is much broader than deterrence • Includes risks not associated with criminal justice • Same core assumption as deterrence theory • Human nature = rational, calculating, hedonistic • This is because “economic theory” (supply/demand, rational consumers) has the same “classical school” roots “Rational Choice Theory”

  15. How “RATIONAL” is the offender? • PURE RATIONALITY = only expected utility (rational calculation of risk/reward) matters • Few theories, if any, take this position • LIMITED RATIONALITY • Information/time limited (quick, “rough” decisions) • Other “things” matters • CORNISH AND CLARKE good example Rationality Assumption

  16. Crime as a Rational Choice • Criminal Involvement: the decision to engage in crime (versus other activity) • Criminal Event: factors that influence the decision to commit a specific crime Cornish and Clarke (1986)

  17. Choices to become involved in crime, to continue in crime, and to desist from crime • Each (involvement, continuance, desistence) need separate explanation • Involvement decisions are “multistage and multi-factor,” extending over long time periods • MOST PEOPLE WANT MONEY/STUFF, WHY DO SOME CHOOSE TO BURGAL (RATHER THAN WORK) TO GET IT? Criminal Involvement

  18. Background Factors • temperament, intelligence, cognitive style, sex, class, education, neighborhood, broken home… Previous experience • Direct and vicarious learning, moral attitudes, self-perception, foresight and planning Solutions evaluated • Degree of effort, amount/immediacy of reward, likelihood and severity of punishment, moral costs Example of factors that explain initial involvement:

  19. What happened to our “rational” offender guided by “free will?” • In their models, rational thinking and free will are very constrained/limited • Not much different from other theories of crime • Borrow liberally from learning theory, psychology, social control theory… • At what point does their theory cease to be a “rational choice” model and start to become a learning, social control, IQ theory of crime? Criticisms

  20. Focus on predictors of specific crimes, look at immediate (situational) factors • GIVEN THAT SOMEONE IS OK WITH BURGLING, WHAT LEADS THEM TO BURGAL A SPECIFIC HOUSE IN A SPECIFIC NEIGHBHOOD? • Area • Easily accessible, few police patrols, low security • Home • anyone home?, especially wealthy, detached, bushes/other cover, dog, security system... The Criminal Event

  21. Interviews with Federal Inmates involved in drug smuggling • How “rational” are they? • Shipping Insurance • Methods for evading detection (high end electronics, study of interdiction methods/patterns, etc.) • Still… • Tendency to overestimate rewards and minimize thinking about risks. The Criminal Event in Drug Smuggling

  22. Empirical Support? • Criminal Involvement • Ethnographic research suggests limited (if any) rational reasoning or weighing of costs/benefits. • Criminal Event • Ethnographic research somewhat supportive, but many crimes suggest limited/crude appraisals. • Attempt to evade detection • Parsimony and Scope? • Policy Implication? Evaluating Rational Choice

  23. Crime as the Convergence in Time and Space of Three Factors 1. Motivated Offenders 2. Suitable Targets 3. Lack of Capable Guardianship Scope: “Direct-Contact Predatory Crimes” Felson in 1990s extended to white collar crime, drug crime Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson)

  24. Assumption is that they are always present • Criticized for this (really a theory of crime?) • Mostly explains “victimization” or the “criminal event” • Similar to Cornish and Clarke in that respect Motivated offenders taken for granted

  25. Value ($, ability to fence) • Some universal ($) some dependent upon offenders environment • Visibility (sights and sounds) • Inertia (why autos are victimized, high tech movement) • Access (cul-de-sac vs open-ended street, garage parking vs. street parking) Suitable Targets

  26. Protection from police?? • Less emphasis in this over time • Informal social control • “…not usually someone who brandishes a gun or threatens an offender with quick punishment, but rather someone whose mere presence serves as a gentle reminder that someone is looking.” • Strength in numbers • Time spent at home Lack of Capable Guardianship

  27. Social indicators better, poverty declines…. • Changes in “Routine Activities” • Time spent away from home increases (Guardianship and suitability) • Women in workforce and college • More vacation, national park visits increase, • Cheaper, lighter goods (suitability) • Televisions in 1960s averaged 38 pounds, down to 15 pounds in 1970 Why did crime increase in the post WWII era?

  28. Empirical Support • WHY DOES PROPERTY CRIME INCREASE DURING ECONOMIC PROSPERTIY? • Household activity ratio related to crime • Criminal “Hotspots” within high crime areas • Prison Studies (% time outside of cell) • Victimization Studies • Criticism? Confirming common sense. Evaluating Routine Activities Theory

  29. In deterrence theory, if the CJS (e.g., threat of arrest/imprisonment) is not effective, the only other option is incapacitation(removing offender from society). • This has been the preferred U.S. strategy • Rational Choice and Routine Activities Theory suggest that we can remove or limit the opportunity to offend by changing the environment. • This has been the preferred strategy in the UK • Benefit of this approach over incapacitation?? Policy ImplicationsDeterrence vs. Environmental Crim

  30. Examples of Situational Crime Prevention (Ronald Clarke)

  31. Examples of Situational Crime Prevention II

  32. Study of police crackdowns and “catchment areas” • Crime displacement may be less prevalent than expected • There may be some diffusion of benefits from crime prevention efforts Does crime just go around the corner?

  33. Roots in classical school (1750-1850) • Commonality = humans as rational calculators • Renewed interest 1970s-present • Fit with conservative ideology • Main Flavors • Deterrence • Rational Choice • Routine Activities Review of Neoclassical Approach

  34. Formal punishment • Swift, Certain, Severe • Types • Specific vs. General • Absolute vs. Marginal • Focused deterrence • Evidence converges on importance of certainty over severity Deterrence Theory

  35. Much broader than deterrence • What factors to humans consider when choosing whether or not to commit crime? • Criminal event vs. Criminal Involvement • Most RCT integrate concepts from other theories • Common criticism: lots of things in the theory (sex, impulsivity, moral values) that limit free will Rational Choice Theory

  36. Very similar to “criminal event” decisions in rational choice theory • What immediate factors influence whether a criminal event will occur? • Target Suitability • Guardianship • Policy implication = situational crime prevention Routine Activities Theory

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