1 / 43

Causal relations, constitutive relations, and interlevel experiments

Causal relations, constitutive relations, and interlevel experiments. Bert Leuridan Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science Ghent University Bert.Leuridan @ UGent.Be MaCitS 2009 Canterbury. Craver C.F. (2007), Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of

anoki
Download Presentation

Causal relations, constitutive relations, and interlevel experiments

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Causal relations, constitutive relations, and interlevelexperiments Bert Leuridan Centre forLogic and Philosophy of Science GhentUniversity Bert.Leuridan@UGent.Be MaCitS 2009 Canterbury

  2. Craver C.F. (2007), Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford: Clarendon Press. CLAIM 1: Mutual manipulability is not a sufficientconditionforconstitutiverelevance CLAIM 2: Thisgivesrise to furtherinferentialchallenges for(interlevel/intralevel) experimentalpractice (problem of underdetermination)

  3. Outline 1. Mechanisms 2. Intralevelcausal relations 3. Interlevelconstitutive relations 4. Mutual manipulabilitynotsufficientforconstitutiverelevance 4.1. parthood as spatialcontainment: virus and general 4.2. causalfeedback in biology 4.3. measuringsynchronicity 4.4. causal-constitutivepropagation

  4. 1. Mechanisms

  5. Mechanisms • A mechanism is a set of entities and activitiesorganized such that they exhibit the phenomenon to be explained.(Craver 2007, 5) • More precisely Entities are the components or parts in mechanisms. They have properties that allow them to engage in a variety of activities. [...] Activities are the causal components in mechanisms. [...] Finally, the entities and activities in mechanisms are organized together spatially, temporally, causally, and hierarchically [...] The behavior of the mechanism as a whole requires the organization of its components [...].(Craver 2007, 5-6) (Carl Craver (2007) Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford: Clarendon Press.)

  6. Mechanisms S-ing X22-ing X11-ing X44-ing X33-ing A phenomenon (top) and itsmechanism (bottom) (fromCraver 2007, p. 7)

  7. 2. Intralevelcausal relations

  8. Mechanisms • Question: How should activities be characterized? • Answer: Woodward’s manipulationist theory of causation (Craver 2007, chapter 3)

  9. Intralevelcausation • Manipulationism: The central idea is that causal relationships are distinctive in that they are potentially exploitable for the purposes of manipulation and control. More specifically, variable X is causally relevant to variable Y in conditions W if some ideal intervention of X in conditions W changes the value of Y (or the probability distribution over possible values of Y).(Craver 2007, 94)

  10. Ideal (etiological) interventions U (Craver 2007, p. 97) X S Y I C

  11. Ideal (etiological) interventions An ideal intervention I on X with respect to Y is a change in the value of X that changes Y, if at all, only via the change in X. More specifically, this requirement implies that: (I1) I does not change Y directly; (I2) I does not change the value of some causal intermediate S between X and Y except by changing the value of X; (I3) I is not correlated with some other variable M that is a cause of Y; and (I4) I acts as a ‘switch’ that controls the value of X irrespective of X’s other causes, U. (Craver 2007, 96; adapted from Woodward and Hitchcock 2003a)

  12. Mechanisms S-ing X22-ing X11-ing X44-ing X33-ing A phenomenon (top) and itsmechanism (bottom) (fromCraver 2007, p. 7)

  13. 3. Interlevelconstitutive relations

  14. Interlevelconstitutive relations • Question: howshouldconstitutive relations becharacterized? • Answer: • Negative: constitutive relations are notcausal! • Positive: constitutiverelevance as mutualmanipulability Craver (2007, chapter 4) Craver & Bechtel (2007) “Top-down causation without top-down causes,” Biology and Philosophy 22: 547-563.

  15. Constitutive relations Constitutive relations are notcausal: • Symmetry: All constitutive relations are symmetric; (most) causal relations are asymmetric • Synchronicity: All constitutive relations are synchronic; ifcauses must precedetheireffects, causal relations are diachronic • Logic: mechanisms and theircomponents are notdistinct; causal relations ought to involvedistictrelata

  16. Mutual manipulability Question: When is a part of S a component in the mechanism of S’s -ing? (Craver 2007, 140) • When is a part constitutively relevant? • Not all parts are components! Craver: Working Account (sufficientcondition) [A] component is relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole when one can wiggle the behavior of the whole by wiggling the behavior of the component and one can wiggle the behavior of the component by wiggling the behavior as a whole. The two are related as part to whole and they are mutually manipulable. (Craver 2007, 153)

  17. Mutual manipulability X is a component of the mechanism for S’s -ing if: • (i) X is part of S; • (ii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is some change to X’s -ing that changes S’s -ing; and • (iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is some change to S’s -ing that changes X’s -ing. (Craver 2007, 153)

  18. Mutual manipulability • (CR1) When is set to the value 1 in an ideal intervention, then  takes on the value f(1). (Craver 2007, 155) • [Moreover] there should be an ideal intervention on X's -ing that changes the value of S's -ing under the conditions (CR1a) that the intervention, I, leaves all of the other dependency relations in S’s -ing unchanged and (CR1b) that other interventions have removed the contributions of other redundant components. (Craver 2007, 156-157) • (CR2) [I]f is set to the value 1 in an ideal intervention, then  takes on the value f(1). (Craver 2007, 159)

  19. Ideal (interlevel) interventions An ideal intervention I on  with respect to  is a change in the value of  that changes , if at all, only via the change in . This implies that: (I1c) the intervention I does not change  directly; (I2c) I does not change the value of some other variable * that changes the value of  except via the change introduced into ; (I3c) that I is not correlated with some other variable M that is causally independent of I and also a cause of ; and (I4c) that I fixes the value of  in such a way as to screen off the contribution of ’s other causes to the value of . (Craver 2007, 154)

  20. Ideal (interlevel) interventions S-ing I X22-ing X11-ing X44-ing X33-ing

  21. Ideal (interlevel) interventions S-ing I (I4C) X22-ing X11-ing X44-ing X33-ing

  22. Ideal (interlevel) interventions S-ing M (I3C) I (I4C) X22-ing X11-ing X44-ing X33-ing

  23. Ideal (interlevel) interventions S-ing M (I3C) I (I2C) (I4C) X22-ing X11-ing X44-ing X33-ing

  24. Ideal (interlevel) interventions S-ing M (I3C) (I1C) I (I2C) (I4C) X22-ing X11-ing X44-ing X33-ing

  25. 4. Mutual Manipulabilitynotsufficient

  26. Constitutiverelevance (recap) X is a component of the mechanism for S’s -ing if: • (i) X is part of S; • (ii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is some ideal intervention to X’s -ing that changes S’s -ing; and • (iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is some ideal intervention to S’s -ing that changes X’s -ing. Claim: is this not a sufficient condition for componency start: when is X part of S?

  27. Parthood as spatio-temporalcontainment? Question: when is X part of S? (NOT “when is X a component of S?” Suggestion: when X is spatio-temporallycontainedin S

  28. Parthood as spatio-temporalcontainment? The virus and the general: When a virus kills a general, this seems to be an interlevel causal interaction. [...] However, the general and the virus are not at different mechanistic levels. The virus is not a component in any of the myriad mechanisms composing the general. This is simply a case where things of different sizes interact. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 556) In practice: virus seems constitutively relevant • token virus spatially contained in token general • virus’s presence/absence and general’s presence/absence are mutually manipulable virus  general : evident general  virus : cf. the mass extinction of stock to suppress epidemics in agriculture

  29. More than a toy-example • Virus & General: toy-example • However: • examples of causal feedback are legion in the biological, including neuroscience, and the social sciences: mutual manipulability • causal feedback is even considered one of the motors generating biological complexity and higher level phenomena – the very phenomena Carl Craver wants to explain (Mitchell forthcoming, 34-44). • (Note: causal feedback in figure 1.1, Craver 2007, 7)

  30. Tree of problems IF X part of S AND X and S mutuallymanipulable, THEN X component of S Parthood as spatialcontainment Virus a component of the general? Solution 2: Distinctnotion of parthood Solution 1: virus and generaldistinct Solution 3: Relation is diachronic Measuringsynchronicity Which? Begs the question Causal-constitutivepropagation

  31. Measuringsynchronicity Causal, Time-lag Causal, Time-lag Causal, Time-lag Causal, Time-lag Craver (2007, 146) Even ifconstitutive relations are synchronic, theymay look likediachronic relations in practice

  32. Causal-constitutivepropagation • Even ifconstitutive relations are synchronic, theymay look likediachronic relations in practice • Bottom up: do(i=i*)  =’: constitutive, synchronic do(i=i*)  j =g(i*): causal, diachronic j=g(i*)   =’’: constitutive, synchronic • Top down: analogously • This is not a case of redundancy/recovery! And it is notruled out by CR1a and CR1b

  33. Causal-constitutivepropagation S-ing =f(’1, ’2, ’3) X11-ing 1=’1 X22-ing 2=’2 X33-ing 3=’3

  34. Causal-constitutivepropagation S-ing =f(1*, ’2, ’3) X11-ing do(1=1*) X22-ing 2=’2 X33-ing 3=’3 t

  35. Causal-constitutivepropagation S-ing =f(1*, g(*1), ’3) X11-ing do(1=1*) X22-ing 2=g(1*) X33-ing 3=’3 t

  36. Causal-constitutivepropagation S-ing =f(1*, g(*1), g’(g(1*))) X11-ing do(1=1*) X22-ing 2=g(1*) X33-ing 3=g’(g(1*)) t

  37. Causal-constitutivepropagation • AninterventiononXi’si-inginduces, diachronically, a change in S’s -ing • AninterventiononS’s -inginduces, diachronically, a change in Xi’si-ing • Xi is spatiallycontained in S • Is Xi a component of S? • Or are Xi and S mutuallycausallyrelated?

  38. Conclusion • Mechanisms involveintralevelcausal relations and interlevelconstitutive relations • Both are characterizedbymeans of idealinterventions • Claim 1: mutualmanipulability (+ parthood) notsufficientforconstitutiverelevance • Claim 2: problem of underdetermination in experimentalpractice: supposethat • X is spatiallycontained in S • X and S are mutuallymanipulable • Question: • is X a component of S? • or are X and S mutuallycausallyrelated

  39. References • Craver (2007), Explaining the Brain : Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford: Clarendon Press. • Craver and Bechtel (2007), “Top-down causation without top-down causes,” Biology and Philosophy 22: 547-563. • Mitchell (forthcoming), Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity and Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. • Woodward (2003), Making Things Happen. A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. • Woodward and Hitchcock (2003), “Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: a Counterfactual Account,” Nous, 37: 1-24.

  40. Argument fromsymmetry • I endorse the claim that all constitutive relations are symmetric • ButsomeWoodward-causal relations are symmetric : • Ideal gas law • Causal feedback in biological/socialsciences • Therefore: • Argument fromsymmetry shows a distinction at the conceptual level • But provides noway to distinguishbetweensymmetriccausal relations and constitutive relations

  41. Argument fromsynchronicity • I endorse the claim that all constitutive relations are synchronic • ButsomeWoodward-causal relations are synchronic : • ideal gas law? • pendulum? • Problems: • Problem of measuringsynchronicity • Problem of causal-constitutivepropagation • Therefore: • Argument fromsynchronicity shows a distinction at the conceptual level • But provides noway to distinguishbetweensynchroniccausal relations and constitutive relations

  42. Argument fromnon-distinction • I endorse the claim that all causal relations must involvedistinctrelata • Therefore: • The argument provides a way to distinguishbetweencausal relations and constitutive relations: if X and Y are related as part and whole, none is a cause of the other • Problem: how do we knowthat X is part of Y?

  43. A noteonetiologicalinvariance • Ifinvarianceunderinterventions is to count as a sufficientconditionforcausalrelevance (Woodward) • Thenitshouldbecomplementedwith the addendum that the relata are notrelated as part and whole (notcurrently in Woodward) • Otherwise: constitutiverelevanceimpliescausalrelevance

More Related