WAR on IRAQ A Diagnostic Evaluation

1. WAR on IRAQA Diagnostic Evaluation Drake Daughdrill Jared Silk Ron Mahabir

2. Briefing • On February 5th, 2003 Secretary Colin L. Powell briefs the United Nations Security Council on the present status of Iraq at the time. (GlobalSecurity 2003) • From evidence presented, his view was that enough was enough and that US and allied forces had no alternative but to go to war with Iraq. • On March 20th, 2003 war began in Iraq. • Was the war justified?

3. Introduction • Help analysts identify key assumptions, uncertainties, and intelligence gaps, and potential changes that would alter key assessments and predictions. • Help analysts discover “unknowns” Methods of Analysis Source: IAFIE 2009

4. Overview • Keys assumptions check • Quality of Information check • Indicators or signposts of change • Analysis of Competing Hypotheses • Conclusion

5. Key Assumptions Check • “List and review the key working assumptions on which fundamental judgement rest” (US Gov’t 2009) • Challenges mindsets by structured self-critique (Richards 2008)

6. Key Assumptions Check • Major Key Assumption • Iraq posses weapons of mass destruction and will do whatever it takes to deceive us from this.

7. Key Assumptions Check

8. Key Assumptions Check

9. Quality of Information Check • “Weighting the validity of sources is a key feature of any critical thinking. • Moreover, establishing how much confidence one puts in analytic judgements should ultimately rest in how accurate and reliable the information base is.” (US Gov’t 2009) • GIGO

10. Information sources • Audio tapes • Poor quality & does not explicitly state what is being hidden • Was the translation verified? (other meanings?) • Was the transmission analysed as a whole for more information? • Inspectors • Were the inspectors view of the situation truly taken into account? How much? • Video • 2000 liters of simulated anthrax? Maybe another used e.g. crop production...

11. Information sources • Human sources (Defectors/Captives) • Some evidence was corroborated e.g. Finding documents at scientists home. • Some sources corroborated e.g. Mobile production program • How much was not corroborated? • Can we really trust these persons? How much? • Under what conditions was information extracted? • Other countries • Friend or foe?  US and /or Iraq • Can we trust them?

12. Information sources • Satellite photos • Suggestive that something was moved. • However, we cannot see inside the buildings • E.g. “...inside the facility there are special guards...” • Are the stated vehicles are as annotated? • Exhaust vent for long range missiles: Is it really? • Interception of materials & Monitoring • E.g. Fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion • Alternative and valid uses

13. Indicators or Signposts of Change • “Periodically review a list of observable events or trends to track events, monitor targets, spot emerging trends, and warn of unanticipated change” (US Gov’t 2009) • The human mind tends to see what it expects to see and to overlook the unexpected. • Identification of indicators and signposts creates an awareness that prepares the mind to recognize change. (Richards 2008)

14. Fact patterns • Iraq had WMD capability in past • Chem/Bio use demonstrated in Iran-Iraq War 1980 • Uranium enrichment early stages before reactor destroyed by Israel strike 1981 • Iraq consistently failed to transparently cooperate with UN weapons inspectors • numerous breaches of UNSC resolutions since 1990 • Suspicious behavior observed just prior to UN inspections • trucks w/ cranes arrive and depart from missile & munitions sites • former scientists/lab techs hindered from UN interviews

15. Fact patterns • Concise accounting of WMDs and/or concrete evidence of disposal unavailable at time of UNSC 1441 • Shelf life of known WMD capabilities has expired if no new production • Sarin & Tabun ~ 5 yrs • VX slightly >5 yrs • Botulinum toxin & Anthrax ~ 3yrs • Saddam Hussein regime vilified by radical Islamists & terrorist groups • Iraqi intell. & SFs cracked down on anti-regime elements since 1970s

16. Competing Hypotheses • Hypothesis A: Iraq continues WMD program in secret • Hypothesis B: Iraq dismantles WMD program in secret • Hypothesis b: Iraq unloads WMDs to terrorists in secret • Hypothesis C: Iraq WMD programs defunct as of 1990-91 invasion

17. Indicators or signposts of change: Inspections reliability * Hypothesis supported via multiple simultaneous indicators

18. Indicators or signposts of change: National resources * Hypothesis supported via multiple simultaneous indicators

19. Indicators or signposts of change: Intelligence * Hypothesis supported via multiple simultaneous indicators

20. Final Conclusion • Both the Key Assumptions Test and Indicators or Signposts of Change Test support the decision to go to war with Iraq, however, this was not the case with the Quality of Information Check. • No one method is better and integration of methods is expected to bring about a more uncertain decision. • Groups are preferable rather than individualistic view for a more global perspective. • Therefore we find that the judgement to go to war with Iraq was premature. • Present information suggest more in depth investigation and does warrant a war on Iraq.

21. References • US Gov’t (2009) A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. US Government. • IAFIE (2009) Teaching Structured Analytic Techniques. Proceeding of the 5th Annual Conference for the International Association for Intelligence Education. Uni. Of Maryland, May 26-28, IAFIE. • Richards, H.J. (2008) Taxonomy of Structured Analytic Techniques. Proceedings of the International Studies Association Annual Convention, March 26 – 29, San Francisco, CA, ISA. • GlobalSecurity (2003) Weapons of Mass Destruction. Available online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.htm. (Last accessed on February 10, 2011)