NASA EEE Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG)

1. NASA EEE Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) Quality Leadership Forum July 19, 2001 Michael J. Sampson NEPAG Manager GSFC/Code 306 Systems Management Office

2. Overview • Organization - Partnerships/International Cooperation • EEE Parts Risk Assessment • Relationship between knowledge and risk • Inherent Risk • Risk Matrix • Part Level Stoplights • The MIL System • Advantages to NASA • Surprises • A Horror Story • EEE Parts Assurance • Why should NASA have guidelines?

3. NASA HQ Code Q Tom Whitmeyer AIAA ISO NASA Centers JPL NASA JSC Partners NASA ARC David Peters David Beverly Ron Chinnapongse ESA USAF/SMD John Kaëlberg Dave Davis Associates NEPAG NASA GRC NASA KSC Mike Sampson SAE DLA & DSCC Vince Lalli Eric Ernst NAVSEA Crane Darren Crum NASDA Sumio Matsuda NASA MSFC NASA GSFC NASA LaRc Charles Gamble Greg Rose Otis Riggins EIA NEMA USAF/SMD USAF/SMD Dave Davis Dave Davis NEPAG Organization

4. EEE Parts Risk Assessment - Risk versus Knowledge INHERENT RISK IS INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO KNOWLEDGE • If a part is KNOWN to be high risk, this knowledge can be used to avoid its use or take appropriate actions to move to medium or low risk • Lack of knowledge means good parts cannot be distinguished from bad • Obtaining reliable knowledge about COTS EEE Parts requires: • Expertise • Time • Vendor visits • Testing and Analysis • BIG BUCKS ONLY a LIMITED number of COTS part types can be reliably deployed in any one system

5. Inherent Risks - for EEE Parts • Manufacturing Factors • Spec • Vendor • Maturity/Qualification Status • Knowledge of Changes • Radiation Sensitivity • These are risks inherent to the part regardless of: • Redundancy • Derating • Mission Requirements • Mission Budget

6. Risk Levels - Inherent Factors Example

7. EEE Parts - Risk Management • FBC means acceptance of risk • This requires definition of an acceptable level of risk (ALOR) • Risk must be managed against the ALOR • Overall ALOR for mission translates to ALORs for systems • Low risk missions may include high risk systems and vice versa • Parts must be selected based on the ALOR of the application • Parts risk is combination of inherent risk and application factors: • Redundancy • Derating • Criticality • Parts engineers can provide inherent risk independently but can only modify for application factors with application details Parts Lists for Review Rarely Include Application Details • Engineers may be pressured to modify risk assessment based on “implied” but undefined mission factors

8. The MIL System - Advantages for NASA • Not “Dead” for EEE Parts Anyhow • Generally offers NASA most economical solution in terms of “true cost of ownership” • Typically, no additional qual or screening • Still provides majority of EEE parts used by Agency • NASA has Custodian status for most EEE parts specs we use: • Can make “Essential Comments” • Must be dispositioned to our satisfaction or can be escalated (eventually to OSD in theory) • Audit participation taken Seriously • Free specs and assistance • As Government privy to inside information

9. The MIL System - Surprises • During NASA’s “Nap” some “surprises” initiated: • Class T • Semiconductor Power Rating • Class T for microcircuits • Essentially COTS masquerading as MIL • Enacted for commercial interests • High risk due to lack of controls and knowledge • NEPAG eventually gets wording “Not for NASA use” added • Semiconductor Power Rating • Increased by 25% on product with 15+ years of experience • Change based on theoretical analysis not problem or need • No testing to validate change is not detrimental (continued spec compliance only) • Changes in place for ONE YEAR before NASA aware • Issue still unresolved DSCC is supported by $ from depot sales so their interest is to increase business

10. A Horror Story - Intro • Two Sources for MIL QPL Part - Orange and Blue • Orange in NE USA: QPL ~ 15yrs to date, significant NASA use • Orange sold to national corporation Y ~ 94 • Blue in SE USA: QPL • ~ 4 years until sold to Y in 96 • GIDEP Alert in 2000 • ~ 4 years until sold to T in 2000 (T has not made similar product in >10yrs) • T bought by Y in 2001!!!! • Y announces decision to shut Orange facility in March 02 except support to Blue line at T facility • Element fab (Orange design) • QPL test • NASA and USAF asked to support “streamlined qual”

11. A Horror Story - NASA Knows • “Streamlined qual” proposed based on: • Heritage element used • Established design ( but not with same element) • Danger of loss of critical single source (blackmail) • Pre-qual MIL audit (THIS WEEK) • NASA (NEPAG) participation • USAF/SMD, Aerospace Corp (NEPAG) participation • No others except DSCC • Audit team finds: • Y has just discovered that Orange element WILL NOT FIT in Blue design without redesign (loss of heritage)!!!! • T personnel poorly trained in process • Y and T were clearly not ready for audit • If NEPAG was not participant, would we know?????

12. EEE Parts Assurance - Should NASA have Guidelines? • Contractors have own systems • NASA cannot expect contractors to use our system instead of theirs • So why have guidelines? • To document what we think is needed • To capture our lessons learned • To document our core knowledge • To provide a consistent NASA perspective to the contractors • To preserve our Very Successful culture • To guide participants without systems (Academia etc) • High level documents can be VCSs but implementation guidelines should be NASA