1 / 11

A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US-Japan Alliance

This article explores the vulnerabilities in space systems, potential threats like ASAT attacks, cyber warfare, and non-kinetic ASAT attacks, and the challenges in achieving deterrence. It discusses the role of the US-Japan Alliance in enhancing transparency, resilience, and deterrence in space.

awanda
Download Presentation

A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US-Japan Alliance

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US-Japan Alliance Kazuto Suzuki Hokkaido University kazutos@juris.hokudai.ac.jp

  2. Space systems are… • Critical for socio-economic welfare • Indispensable for modern military systems • Vulnerable to intentional and unintentional damage • Difficult to defend; difficult to deter attacks upon • Most effectively defended through use of non-space means to increase the costs of attack

  3. Vulnerabilities in Space • Domain constraints do not permit substantially meaningful physical protection • High velocity due to orbital speeds of approximately 28,000 kilometers per hour mean virtually any impact can kill a satellite • Space objects, human-origin debris, intentional attacks • Solar flares, electromagnetic pulsesalso threats

  4. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Attacks • Incentives to attack may be substantial: • Space assets are valuable, scarce, vulnerable • Attacks are non-lethal (hence possibly seen as less escalatory), difficult to attribute, and could accord big first-mover advantages • Attribution can be difficult due to blind spots • Kinetic ASATs: create large debris clouds • International condemnation of China after 2007 test

  5. Non-Kinetic ASAT Attacks: Cyber Attacks on Space Systems • Taking over satellites via hacking is possible • Command and control systems for commercial and civilian satellites are relatively vulnerable • Taking over a satellite can make it a space weapon • Radio-frequency problem: • Not enough bandwidth for encrypted transmission leads to use of open frequencies which are more vulnerable

  6. Non-Kinetic, Non-Cyber ASAT Attacks • Methods include: • Jamming: Interferes with up-link/down-link communications by overpowering the signals through radiofrequency interference so as to prevent transmissions from getting through • Spoofing: Intentionally feeds false information to devices or ground-based receivers by intercepting and overriding weak signals traveling between space and earth • Dazzling: Temporarily or permanently damages functions of reconnaissance satellites using directed energy (lasers) • Rendezvous and docking technology (also known as: killer satellites)

  7. Deterrence in Space is Very Difficult • Tit-for-tat is not an attractive option: • Different degree of dependency on space for various actors • Creation of space debris if kinetic attacks employed is also unappealing • Deterrence by denial is difficult: • Shooting down all the ground-based kinetic attacks—costly, hard • Protecting all radio transmissions—very hard • Protecting all sensors—very hard

  8. Deterrence in Space? • Life expectancy of satellites is long, posing challenges for modernizing space asset architectures • Space-based assets can be decades-old • Upgrading hardware to meet new challenges almost impossible • Software upgrades often limited by hardware capacity • Attribution problem: • Knowing the real motivations for actions in space extremely difficult • Satellite failure could be caused by malfunction, debris

  9. A Tallinn Manual for Space? • Tallinn Manual 1.0: • A non-binding set of rules drafted by experts from around the world for use in applying international laws of armed conflict to cyberspace • Tallinn Manual 2.0: • Updated version suggests military retaliation to cyber-attack is not legitimate unless authorized by United Nations • If attack perpetrated by non-state actor, victim requires consent of state where non-state actor is based to retaliate • MILAMOS: Tallinn Manual for space is now being drafted

  10. The Role of the U.S. – Japan Alliance in Space Deterrence • Increasing transparency and shaping norms: • Space Situational Awareness (SSA) • Information sharing with international community • International rule-making • Resilience/deterrence through (a measure of) denial: • Increasing interoperability for replacing and recovering assets • Deterrence through punishment: • Prepare and plan for military actions to convince adversaries not to take actions against our space assets

  11. Conclusions • Importance and vulnerability of space assets needs to be better understood • Especially in Japan • Alliance plays key roles for: • Transparency • Resilience • Deterrence through punishment • Space attacks cannot be deterred by space means alone • Deterrence in space requires cross-domain deterrence

More Related