The Evolution of Deterrence

1. The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years

2. Robert S. McNamara • Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968

3. A new approach at DoD • McNamara applied techniques from the private sector to manage, analyze, and evaluate defense programs. • planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) • systems analysis

4. The “Whiz Kids” • McNamara brings in a new civilian team to apply his more centralized, quantitative approach. • Cyrus Vance • William Bundy • Paul Nitze

5. John F. Kennedy • President, 1961-63. • Critical of Eisenhower policies. • Under McNamara’s guidance, his administration develops the policy of “Flexible Response.”

6. Flexible Response • The U.S. would develop the capacity to meet Communist encroachments with an appropriate level of force. • Included a more optimistic assessment of the U.S. economy. • Greater defense spending could actually stimulate the economy.

7. Appropriate levels of force? • Nuclear • Conventional • Assistance to allies • Counter-insurgency

8. McNamara and Nuclear Weapons:Two Issues • Modernize U.S. strategic nuclear forces. • Limit damage to civilians (should war occur). • Initial development of counterforce strategy for U.S. nuclear forces.

9. McNamara rejects defense options • Included civil defense and anti-ballistic missiles (ABM’s) • Arguments against them: • Soviets could overwhelm ABM systems by building more missiles/warheads. • Such systems very expensive (about $40 billion each) • Soviets might interpret such programs as a sign U.S. thought it could survive nuclear war.

10. The problems of counterforce doctrine • If U.S. targeted Soviet military targets after U.S.S.R. had launched a first strike, the number of such targets was exceedingly high. • The about of damage would invariably kill millions of Soviet civilians. • Developing such an ability would appear as if the U.S. was building a first strike capability.

11. Assured Destruction • McNamara seeks to avoid programs that could be considered provocative. • Bolsters stability by emphasizing survivability of U.S. nuclear arsenal and capacity to retaliation. • Becomes known as assured destruction, also mutually assured destruction, or MAD.

12. Such policy sought: “…the ability to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor… even after absorbing a surprise first attack.”

13. Bolstering the U.S. nuclear arsenal • The strategic “triad”: • ICBM’s • submarines with SLBM’s/FBM’s • manned bombers • Multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV’s)

14. Another means to address nuclear weapons • Arms control: • The U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty in October, 1963. • Agreed only conduct future nuclear tests underground. • Currently 113 signatories.

15. The conventional side ofFlexible Response • By developing conventional forces, U.S. would be better able to deter or fight conflicts without escalation to nuclear war. • McNamara proposes a “two-and-a-half war” capability. • Of the increased funds devoted to defense, 80% goes to developing conventional forces.

16. Conventional force development • Navy: maintains 24 carriers, updates aviation. • Army: develops air cavalry/air mobility forces (helicopters), reorganizes ground divisions.

17. Counterinsurgency • JFK gives attention to having the Army develop its Special Forces. • Directs other agencies to enhance counterinsurgency (CI) capabilities: • CIA • U.S. Agency for International Development • U.S. Information Agency

18. Flexible Response and NATO • U.S. pushes to develop alliance’s conventional capability • DoD analyses determine actual Soviet threat to Western Europe only 46 divisions, much lower than “New Look” estimates. • NATO forces increase from 21 to 27 divisions, up to 3,500 aircraft.

19. Fissures in the alliance • Flexible response gave the impression that the U.S. was backing away from a commitment to use nuclear weapons in Europe’s defense. • Said impression reinforced by other U.S policies. • Cancellation of a missile program to modernize British bomber force. • Refusal to assist French development of nucealr weapons.

20. France leaves NATO’s military organization, 1966 • Pursues independent development of atomic bomb. • Argues French nuclear forces enhance credibility of deterrence (whereas Flexible Response undermines it).

21. Tests of Flexible Response • January 1961: Nikita Khrushchev states U.S.S.R. will support “wars of national liberation” and support socialist governments in the Third World.

22. Bay of Pigs • April 1961: CIA arranges a landing of anti-Castro exiles, in anticipation of provoking an uprising against the Cuban regime. • Invasion botched, embarrasses Kennedy Administration.

23. Berlin • Communists build the Berlin Wall.

24. South Vietnam • Special Forces introduced in November 1961

25. October 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis