Pollution Prevention and Homeland Security

1. Pollution Prevention and Homeland Security Michael J. EllenbeckerKwangseog Ahn

2. Homeland Security & Preventing Pollution from Attack on Critical Waterside InfrastructurePresented byEd Badolato, Executive VP, Homeland Security The Shaw Group New Hampshire Pollution Prevention Conference University of New Hampshire September 21, 2004

3. Vulnerability: How to Audit Your Facility Presented by Ed Badolato Executive Vice President for Homeland Security The Shaw Group University of New Hampshire September 21, 2004

4. The New Environmental Paradigm • Certain parts of the infrastructure are attractive targets for terrorists • Mass casualties • Property damage • Economic losses • Environmental impact • We must reduce risk from indirect releases into the environment

5. Osama bin Laden’s Targeting Philosophy “Inflict maximum damage to human, economic and physical infrastructures” “Attack symbolic, high prestige, economic, and strategic targets”

6. Pollution as a Terrorist Weapon--Kuwait, 1991

7. Staten Island Fuel Storage Fire

8. Four Bad Things That Can Happen from a Terrorist Attack on Your Facility • Loss of containment • Theft or misuse with intent to cause harm • Worker internal or public harm offsite • Degradation of assets, business functions, or company value

9. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES • Chemicals and Hazardous Materials • Energy • Transportation • Water • Telecommunications • Agriculture & Food • Banking and Finance • Public Health • Emergency Services • Defense Industrial Base • Postal and Express Shipping

10. This book was co-authored by Ed Badolato It covers: Industrial disasters Process related incidents The terrorist threat to populated areas Sabotage of chem facilities and RR tank cars The cost factor Vulnerability of Petro-Chem Facilities

11. Plug the security gaps noted in industry “Lessons Learned” & “Best Practices” Work across the full spectrum of Homeland Security incidents—preparation, response, recovery Adopt and adapt technology fixes Organize a layered, integrated security system Terrorism and the Chemical Transportation Industry

12. What We Can Expect in the Future • More mass casualty attacks-- “few attacks in the US, but they will be closer to the Madrid rail scenario than the WTC 9/11” • Terrorist conventional bombings along with WMD attempts-- “bombs will be the most predominant form of attack” • More terrorist cells and operatives will be uncovered in the US

13. Laws & Regulations that Impact Facility Preparedness • Clean Air Act • Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 • Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 • Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 • Occupational Safety and Health Act • Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act

14. Chemical/Environmental Security Players • Key Agencies & Organizations • Department of Homeland Security (DHS) • Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) • Department of Justice • Department of Defense • State & Local Emergency Response • Industry Associations—ACC, SOCMA, and state industry organizations • American Institute of Chemical Engineers • Secondary Agencies & Organizations • DOT • OSHA • DOE

15. DHS and the National HS Strategy The three objectives of the national strategy: 1. Prevent terrorist attacks within the US 2. Reduce Americas vulnerability to terrorists 3. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur

16. DHS Infrastructure Protective Measures Plan • Technical Applications • WMD Prevention • Protection Measures • Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) • 1700 sites this year • Target selection • Surveillance Ops • Planning Ops • Rehearsals • Training

17. Industry Safety Management Capabilities • Process Safety Management Systems • Hazard Evaluation Procedures • Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis • Release Mitigation • Safe Storage & Handling of High Toxic Hazard Materials • Layer of Protection Analysis

18. We Must Work Across the Full Spectrum of Homeland Security Situations

19. Suggestions for Industry • The new industry security strategy should: • Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure facilities. • Specify security roles and responsibilities. • Describe appropriate threat/alert information flows. • Set the standards for actionable security plans

20. Suggestions for Your Facility • Assume you are a target • Extend your perimeter—”mutual support” • Barriers • Surveillance • Planning • Inform & engage employees

21. The Security Vulnerability Assessment Process Project Planning Meeting--Setting the right course with the company/client Facility Characterization and Critical Asset Identification--A thorough characterization of site asset characteristics and hazards Identify and Prioritize the Threat--Complete evaluation of threats; internal, external, internally-assisted Vulnerability Analysis--Prioritized evaluation of threats against assets Risk Assessment —defining the potential for damage to or loss of an asset Countermeasures Identification and Effectiveness Measurement--Prioritized validation and justification of costs for improved security, highlighting process/operations benefits Preparing the Report Implementation

22. Step 3. Identify and Prioritize the Threat-

23. Threat Methodology • Understand how terrorists target facilities • Build a detailed, focused assessment • Initial screening of sources of threat info • Contact with local, state, & federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies • Interviews with facility security managers

24. Step 4. Vulnerability Assessment

25. Vulnerability Assessment “Identification of the extent of susceptibility to exploitation, relative to the existence of any countermeasures.”

26. Two Approaches to Vulnerability Analysis • Asset-based analysis: assess potential targets (any attack scenarios) • Scenario-based analysis: assess attack scenarios (any asset)

27. VA Asset-Based Approach • Where used: • “Basic” sites, i.e. no complex security challenges • Key Elements • Assess and categorize consequences • Assess target attractiveness • Identify and assess key assets • Based on consequence and attractiveness • Identify areas needing further protection

28. VA Scenario-Based Approach • Where Used: • Complex security challenges • High inherent threat • Key Elements • Identify key assets/targets • Identify applicable threats • Identify potential scenarios • Drives countermeasures for selected scenarios

29. Step 5. Risk Assessment

30. RISK • Risk assessment—”a qualitative and/or quantitative determination of the probability of occurrence of an adverse event and the impact of its consequences.”

31. Step 6. Countermeasures Identification and Effectiveness Measurement-

32. Physical Security Systems • Perimeter Protection • Fences • Lights • Gates & Access Controls • Entrance/equipment locks • Protection Force • Electronic security systems--motion detectors • Video surveillance systems, • Building alarm systems

33. Other Countermeasures • Loss prevention & material control • Control room security • Distributed Control Systems • Crisis management and emergency response • Policies & procedures • IT/Cyber security • Intelligence

34. SUMMARY • SVAs Perform Important Functions • Defines roles & relationships • Identifies necessary resources • Ensures comprehensive security effort • Sets plan for implementation

35. MODULE 2: Introduction to theToxics Use Reduction Act Todd_MacFadden@uml.edu Toxics Use Reduction Institute 978.934.3391

36. Measure Success Pre-Plan Process Characterization Implement Plan Responsibilities of a TUR Planner Identify TUR Options Certify Plan Screen & Evaluate TUR Options Develop or Update Plan The TUR Planning Cycle

37. Measure Success Pre-Plan Process Characterization Implement Plan Identify TUR Options Certify Plan Screen & Evaluate TUR Options Develop or Update Plan Similarities in the Security and TUR Assessment Processes The TUR Planning Cycle The Security Vulnerability Assessment Process • Project Planning Meeting • Facility Characterization and Critical Asset Identification • Identify and Prioritize the Threat • Vulnerability Analysis • Risk Assessment • Countermeasures Identification and Effectiveness Measurement • Preparing the Report • Implementation

38. Importance of TUR in HS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES • Chemicals and Hazardous Materials • Energy • Transportation…

39. Pollution Prevention and Homeland Security • Can use similar assessment methods • PP personnel may be qualified to perform HS assessment, particularly in industry using hazardous chemicals • PP itself reduces risks in HS • Lower toxicity • Lower volatility/explosion potential • Lower volumes store on site

40. Opportunities for TURI • Appears there is lack of interaction between TUR/PP and HS • TURI already has the expertise and resources for TUR/PP that can be applied directly to HS

41. What TURI Can Do? • Advocate TUR to reduce HS risks • Extend TURP program to TUR-HSP program • Identify and prioritize the HS risks from hazardous chemicals • Use TURA data and TRI data including use amounts, locations of plants, etc. • Use chemical info including explosiveness, flammability, toxicity, etc. • Use other information about presence of symbolic, high prestige, economic, and strategic targets • Combine all the information to prioritize the HS risks • Use the planning process to reduce HS risks

42. Funding Sources? • DHS • EPA • OSHA • NSF • MA?