Global trends in CBRN terrorism: I mplications for pathogen security

1. UNCLASSIFIED – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Global trends in CBRN terrorism:Implications for pathogen security Dr Robert Stagg Department of Defence

2. UNCLASSIFIED – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The CBRN terrorism threat in context… • Terrorism is likely to remain the preferred tactic of non-state actors to violently address grievances • Most terrorist groups have and will probably remain ‘tactically conservative’ • Explosives will continue to be the overwhelmingly preferred tactic • Some will continue to seek CBRN to achieve tactical and/or strategic goals • Most organisations don’t start with CBRN but escalate • Potential to increase fear, attention and scale • Requires a degree of organisational learning • Acquisition of expertise and material

3. WMD vs. CBRN • Mass casualties can be achieved without CBRN • 9/11 attacks killed 3000 people after hijacking four planes with box cutters • Most interest in CBRN is not for the purposes of causing mass casualties • Typically insurgents pursuing discreet and small-scale targets • But… CBRN attacks do represent one of the most viable ways for terrorists to inflict mass casualties

4. Who pursues CBRN? • Lone actors – with personal grievances and ready access to CBRN materials or expertise. eg 2001 ‘Amerithrax’ attacks • Insurgencies – where most CBRN activity is seen • A small proportion of insurgents invariably consider CBRN • Discreet targets, low scale, crude in nature • Religious cults - perpetrators of historical CB attacks • Terrorists with local grievances • Political, nationalist, religious, issue-motivated • Low-level interest in CBRN that is rarely put into practice • Violent global Jihadists (AQ and AQ-inspired) • Seek WMD-like CBRN capabilities • Prepared to invest time and resources in sophisticated effort Very few groups seek mass casualties

5. Crude vs. sophisticated Crude • Extension of conventional tactics and goals • Often improvised or requires little preparation • Requires minimal expertise and uses readily available materials • Purchase or theft of off-the-shelf toxic chemicals or radiological material • Dispersal by IEDs, food supplies, conventional munitions • Expect low scale casualties Sophisticated • Usually for the explicit purpose of causing mass casualties (civilian targets) • Requires access to specialised expertise – experienced scientists • Requires specialised materials – CW agents, BW agents, fissile material • Technical challenge of weaponisation (varying difficulty) • Time consuming and relatively heavy investment of resources • Potential to cause tens of thousands of casualties

6. UNCLASSIFIED – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Examples of crude CBR terrorism • Crude CBR devices incorporate readily available materials • Require little to no manipulation – cyanides, pesticides, chlorine… • Terrorists utilise existing expertise – recognition of additional fear factor, increased casualties & complication of the response process • Most cases use explosives to disseminate the CBR material • Chlorine IEDs in Iraq (AQI), acid IEDs in Thailand • Terrorists in Afghanistan continue to seek poisons Toxicity and dissemination both limiting factors

7. Comparative difficulty WMD-like weapons ‘Cliff face’ Will not be scaled by accident difficulty Poisons Improvised chemical or radiological dispersal Explosives impact

8. Sophisticated CBRN over time Rajneeshee cult Salmonella-attack (1984, USA) time Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack (1995, Japan) AQ WMD program (1999-2001, Afghanistan) Anthrax letters (2001, USA) Intent AQ inspired groups (current threat) Lone actors? cults?

9. Rajneeshees:The first sophisticated CBRN terrorists (1984) • Religious cult who sought to win County elections (USA) • Aimed to incapacitate opposition voters • Purchased and cultured a Salmonellaenterica strain • Used a freeze dryer • Infected 750 people via contamination of salad bars in 10 restaurants • 45 hospitalisations but no deaths • The only group to have conducted a successful large scale bioterrorist attack

10. Aum Shinrikyo:The most sophisticated CBRN effort • A Japanese-based apocalyptic cult • > 10 000 members including dozens of scientists with post-graduate qualifications • Hundreds of millions of dollars of assets • WMD development was the centrepiece of the group’s goals • Investigated acquisition of fissile material • 1993 – commenced program to manufacture VX and sarin • 1994 – Tested sarin and VX on sheep in Australia • 1994 – Used sarin in assassination attempts – 7 killed • 1995 – Tokyo subway attack – sarin kills 12, thousands injured • Attempted anthrax attacks – but used vaccine strain

11. UNCLASSIFIED – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Afghanistan: AQ’s WMD efforts(1999 – 2001) • Commenced about 1999 but went unnoticed • Recruited multiple scientists and established multiple labs • Concentrated on traditional agents • anthrax, plague, nerve & blister agents, nuclear devices • Outreach to Jemaah Islamiyah to acquire ‘appropriate’ expertise • Recruitment of Yazid Sufaat – a U.S. trained biochemist - to isolate and culture Bacillus anthracis in a laboratory near Kandahar • Isolation almost certainly failed • Considered weaponisation • Interest in crop dusters for dissemination of agent • Disrupted by Coalition invasion • Removal of safe haven and key operatives • Without disruption, WMD efforts may have been successful

12. AQ post 2001 • AQ have not realised WMD ambitions (yet) • Maintained intent (rhetoric), but what about in practice? • Have they had significant time/ space/ resources to achieve development of relatively sophisticated agents? • Possibility of ongoing highly compartmented projects • Increasingly difficult with CT efforts • AQ doctrine offers religious sanction, strategic preference and practical justification for using WMD and specifically CBRN • AQ has been able to influence elements of other groups with overlapping ideology • JI bombings against Western targets in Indonesia • Some groups susceptible to AQ’s influence have greater access to expertise and materials

13. Bioterrorism:The worst of a bad bunch • Bioterrorism probably represents a greater threat than chemical, radiological or nuclear terrorism • Compared to bioterrorism: • Radiological terrorism has lower potential to cause casualties • Nuclear terrorism is very unlikely to occur • Chemical terrorism has less potential to proliferate

14. What can bioterrorists achieve? • Disruption, annoyance, fear • White powder scares • Augment conventional attacks • Increase impact and complicate response to IED attack • Poisoning of food or water • Suitable for attacking a discreet group of people • But why not use chemicals? Incapacitate instead of kill? • Agricultural terrorism • Economically devastating • Mass casualties • Probably relies on inhalation of organism

15. UNCLASSIFIED – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Bioterrorism threat: a product of intent and capability… • ‘Low impact’ bioterrorism could meet the goals of many terrorist groups • Few groups have shown intent in the past • ‘High impact’ bioterrorism only meets the goals of very few groups • AQ and affiliates • ‘Lone scientist’ • Apocalyptic cults • Capability of terrorist group • Financial & logistical resources • Knowledge/skill acquisition • Materials & technology acquisition • Production, weaponisation and delivery Threat = intent x capability

16. Biological agents of concern • Agricultural diseases • eg Foot and Mouth Disease, wheat rust • Huge costs to a country’s economy • Human pathogens suitable for ‘low impact’ bioterrorism • Salmonella, Shigella, E. coli, influenza and other respiratory viruses, malaria, TB, HIV etc • Relatively low fatality rate • The Rajneeshee Salmonella attacks • Human pathogens suitable for ‘high impact’ bioterrorism • Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum… • Suitable for weaponisation (inhaled, environmentally hardy) • High fatality rate • No terrorist group has ever obtained a suitable strain

17. UNCLASSIFIED – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Terrorist interest in biological agents • Predominantly traditional biological warfare agents • Recognition of state development as weapons • Volume of reporting and experimental data on internet • Media coverage of agents eg AQIM & plague • Preparation by governments to respond to the threat • Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum, toxins including botulinum toxin, ricin, etc. • List of potential agents is almost endless • Particularly if mass casualties are not a priority • Selected agent will be influenced by availability & expertise

18. The science fiction side • Artificial manufacture of BW agents • Synthesis of smallpox virus • Genetically modified ‘super germs’ • Interleukin or toxin expressing viruses • Theoretically possible and increasingly within the capabilities of states or elite researchers • Non-state actors have shown little to no interest • Non-state actors do not have the expertise or resources to attempt such efforts • Exception of ‘lone scientist’?

19. UNCLASSIFIED – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Successful tactics proliferate • Driven by media exposure and ease of information sharing • Chlorine IEDs in Iraq • Idea proliferated on the internet and in extremists circles • Has not resulted in proliferation of chlorine attacks • Consider bioterrorism • No ‘trigger’ since the rise of AQ • Ease of proliferating material • Expect that once acquired, a BW-suitable agent would proliferate • Highlights the importance of preventing initial acquisition (pathogen security)

20. Importance of biosecurity The most likely scenario for terrorists to develop WMD is by weaponisation of a suitable biological strain obtained from a legitimate facility Obtaining a suitable pathogen has been the key stumbling block for would-be bioterrorists The key step for reducing the threat of a high impact CBRN terrorism attack is to better secure pathogen stocks • Significant burden of infectious disease in Asia and increasing microbiology sector • Increasing amount of infectious material housed in laboratories, collection venues, veterinarian clinics, etc.

21. Some thoughts on biosecurity • Traditionally, biosecurity has focused on containing the pathogen rather than securing the facility. • Some biosafety practices contribute to biosecurity • Biosecurity requires multiple different security layers that, when combined, dramatically reduce terrorist access to pathogens • Vetting of staff • Culture of responsibility • Controlled access to material • Improved facility security • Inventory control • Management of infectious material • Understanding where pathogens are housed • Importance of considering ‘small’ facilities

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