The International Response to Japanese Aggression

The International Response to Japanese Aggression 1931-1941

Context Mukden incident was the first challenge to the post-WWI international system Washington Conference, and Kellogg-Briand Pact were attempts at that collective security

Reviewing the LON’s Structure • Consisted of the Assembly and the Councily • Assembly • One representative from all member states • Met yearly and had one vote • Council • Britain, France, Italy, Japan and four other members elected from the Assembly • Made the key decisions, could take action against a member

League’s Response to Mukden • China appealed to League, hoping to invoke Article 16 • League acted cautiously, meetings attended by Japan, China, U.S* • Japanese government cooperated while the army continued its expansion, defying immediately request for withdrawal to the railway zone • League sends a fact-finding commission under Lord Lytton to Manchuria • Took several months to arrive, several months to complete a report • Before a report was filed, Japan had already established Manchukuo and claimed the Manchurians were a free people

Lytton Report • One year after the Mukden incident: • Acknowledged Japanese special interests in Manchuria, but said its use of force was unacceptable • Should give up territory and withdraw • Manchukuo was not independent of Chinese administration • Should become independent but under Chinese sovereignty • Wut • Recommended Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact • Did not consider Japanese resolve • Japan argued that the West was hypocritical, having secured its own territories through force • Left the League in March 1933

Why did the League not take stronger action against Japan? • France, with its own interests in Indo-China, had actually gained from a weakened China • Britain lacked the military means to resist Japan and its interests were not directly threatened • All nations were suffering as a result of the Great Depression • Japan was viewed as an ally in containing the Soviets • Meant that the Japanese would continue with expansion; encouraged Mussolini in 1935

Continued Failures of the League • China would appeal again in 1937, following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and bombing of Shanghai • League condemned Japan for breaking the Nine-Power Treaty, but it was not impotent • Pre-occupied by events in Europe, unwilling to act without the U.S. • Nine-Power Treaty Conference of 1937 condemned Japan, but produced no real measures

Response of China • Chiang Kai-Shek insisted on fighting the Communists, not the Japanese • Forced to suppress uprisings of his own troops • Kidnapped by Zhang Xue-liand in 1936 and forced into the Second United Front alliance with the CCP • Now fighting a “war of national resistance”

Chinese Resistance • 1937 saw the steepening of Chinese resolve • GMD and CCP seeking “total resistance by the whole nation” • War went very badly; by 1938 Shanghai, Ghangzhou and Nanjing had all fallen and the capital had been moved to Chongqing • But the resistance ultimately proved effective • The Japanese were drawn into a protracted war which they could not win • Forced to rely on Chinese puppet governments • Most famous under Wang Jingwei, who believed the GMD could never defeat the Japanese • Three governments in China during the Second World War • GMD central, CCP north, “New Government of China” east and north • Tensions remained high between the GMD and CCP

U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1930s • Following isolationism in the 1930s, reinforced by the Great Depression • Hoover took minimal action even after Open Door China was broken • Not the focus and lacked a strong navy in the early 30s • Had strong investments/trade in Japan it did not want to Jeopardize • Would only issue a non-recognition of Machukuo and the violation of Kellogg-Briand Pact • Roosevelt continued the same trend; increasing export of strategic materials to Japan after 1933

U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1937-38 • Japan now threatening American interests • Naval building of 1936 upset the balance of power • Attacks on Open Door China • Offered financial support to the GMD • Rejected British appeals to join mediation of Sino-Japanese conflict • Roosevelt limited by Neutrality Acts

U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1937-38 • U.S.S. Panay bombed on the Yangtze River • Quick apology and compensation from the Japanese • Public opinion for isolation • Always unwilling to go past verbal condemnation • FDR: “Quarantine Speech” • Did not impose sanction, actually played a key role as U.S was the major supplier of oil, scrap iron and automobile parts

Changes in 1938 • Roosevelt may have won out in a struggle with isolationists; used presidential powers to ignore the Neutrality Acts and provide further support to China • Japan’s “New Order in East Asia” may have been the turning point • U.S. feared Chiang would accept the “New Order” solidifying Japanese rule • Also concerned he would receive help from the U.S.S.R • Also the time of the Tripartite Pact

The Advance to War • January 1939, a moral embargo was placed on planes and aviation parts • February 1939, all credit to Japan suspended • July 1939, trade reciprocity suspended • July 1940, embargo on fuel and scrap metal • 1940 and 1941, U.S. sending economic and military aid to China • July 1941, Japan continue southward expansion, U.S. froze all assets

The Advance to War • Japan totally dependent on American oil • Thought Westerners were attempting an encirclement • Choices: Withdraw from Indo-China and consolidate power in China or begin a war of conquest • All negotiations demanded a full Japanese withdrawal from China

The International Response to Japanese Aggression