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Commitment and Monogamy. Philosophy of Love and Sex. Weaver and Woollard: The Norm of Monogamy. Restrict sex to relationships with feature F Restrict the number of relationships with feature F to one F = “erotic love”. Weaver and Woollard: A Puzzle.
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Commitment and Monogamy Philosophy of Love and Sex
Weaver and Woollard:The Norm of Monogamy • Restrict sex to relationships with feature F • Restrict the number of relationships with feature F to one • F = “erotic love”
Weaver and Woollard:A Puzzle • It is bad to restrict access to things of value. • Sex is of value. • Monogamy restricts access to sex. • Therefore, monogamy is bad.
Weaver and Woollard:Their Solution • The norm makes sense when all of the following conditions are satisfied: • “The couple responds to the value of sex within the marriage by seeing all sexual activity as having a special significance; • “the spouses' needs for erotic love are fulfilled by the relationship; and • “the relationship is sufficiently important to justify accepting restrictions to protect it.”
Other solutions • Suggestion 1: Restricting one’s access to things of value is an exercise of self-control, a humanizing of animal urges. • Suggestion 2: The value of sex is largely dependent on monogamy. So, (2) is false. • It is not bad to restrict eating dessert to tasty desserts. (A very moderate diet.) Why? Because the value of dessert is largely dependent on its taste.
The three senses of “I will do A” • Prediction • If I don’t do A, then “I made a mistake.” The problem was with the prediction. • My prediction that I will do A gives me little or no reason to do A if I don’t want to. • Intention • If I don’t do A, then “I changed my mind.” There need have been no problem. • My intention to do A gives me little or no reason to do A if I don’t want to. • Commitment • If I don’t do A, then “I am sorry—I failed to fulfill my commitment.” The problem was with the failure to do A. • My commitment to do A gives me reason to do A whether I want to or not.
Two kinds of commitment (Scruton) • Contract or promise • Can be dissolved by the other party’s or mutual agreement • Often, but not always, without much ceremony • Covenant or sacrament • Involves something beyond the parties to the commitment • Not dissolved by mutual agreement • Often, but not always, with ceremony
Martin • Arguments against life-long commitment: • Cannot promise feelings • Ought implies can • Changing identities • Love is open-ended and incompatible with duty • The power of love is such that commitment is unnecessary • Imprudent to close options • Arguments can be answered • Faithfulness requires adaptation • Marital obligations are not absolute. Gaugain. [I have a completely different view here. It seems obvious Gaugain did wrong. –ARP]
De Rougemont • Marriage is a decision, not a calculation. • In marriage, one undertakes a commitment, instead of trying to figure out how to make oneself happiest. The problem is the how, not the why. Likewise, the problem with God is how to obey. • Decisions are only really serious if they are irrevocable. This is the possibility of dignity in life—the possibility of committing oneself completely. • In marriage, the couple creates something new (especially, but not only, if they have children)—this is a godlike role. • Being in love is a feeling and cannot be commanded, but love is commanded. Love at first sight is not really serious. • Must remember the Christian message. (Obedience, grace, Incarnation, providence, finitude. Also the fact that marital love is an image of God’s love for his people. Husbands should love their wives as Christ loved the Church—and what applies to husbands applies to wives, here.) • Love is not a god, not an irresistible passion. In marriage, passion is contained by love.