The outcomes of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission implications for emergency services Catherine Dunlop Part

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3. Nine days after the fires of 7 February 2009, the�Victorian Government established the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. The Commission's terms of reference were extremely broad: to investigate 'the causes of, preparation for, responses to, and the impact on infrastructure' of the fires. Nine days after the fires of 7 February 2009, the�Victorian Government established the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. The Commission's terms of reference were extremely broad: to investigate 'the causes of, preparation for, responses to, and the impact on infrastructure' of the fires.

4. Commission Overview Scale Fifteen months of hearings | 15 fires | numerous �systemic� issues | 155 hearing days | 434 witnesses Two interim reports | 51 interim recommendations | 67 final recommendations Final report details the circumstances of each of the 173 fatalities Nine days after the fires of 7 February 2009, the�Victorian Government established the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. The Commission's terms of reference were extremely broad: to investigate 'the causes of, preparation for, responses to, and the impact on infrastructure' of the fires. Nine days after the fires of 7 February 2009, the�Victorian Government established the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. The Commission's terms of reference were extremely broad: to investigate 'the causes of, preparation for, responses to, and the impact on infrastructure' of the fires.

5. Overview Approach of the Commission Went to extraordinary lengths to �recreate the events of the day� Media savvy Community focus throughout the hearings, within the report and the recommendations A high level of tolerance for personal stories, regardless of evidentiary value Unusual, in that it ran �on time�, and the time pressures continued throughout, regardless of external factors (for example, the next fire season). Approach of Counsel Assisting was not necessarily targeted � extremely limited experience with the subject matter, leads to the problem that �you don�t know what you don�t know�, took a significant period for them to understand and categorise/prioritise what they wanted/needed to hear. Result was huge pressure to provide enormous quantities of information, very limited timeframes, requests for information, witness statements and witness appearances with insufficient notice, and requests often not clearly defined. Rules of litigation which would ordinarily enable you to streamline the process and protect your client from unnecessarily burdensome/onerous processes did not apply (but maybe a note for us that we enabled CFA to be separately represented where others all had to �muck in�). Added to this the media / political pressure creating a reluctance to �push back� even where the process was clearly �unfair�. High tolerance for the Community and low tolerance for the State (generally) � conducted community consultation, public submissions, personal testimony from 100 lay witnesses (who generally took priority over other witnesses). Unusual, in that it ran �on time�, and the time pressures continued throughout, regardless of external factors (for example, the next fire season). Approach of Counsel Assisting was not necessarily targeted � extremely limited experience with the subject matter, leads to the problem that �you don�t know what you don�t know�, took a significant period for them to understand and categorise/prioritise what they wanted/needed to hear. Result was huge pressure to provide enormous quantities of information, very limited timeframes, requests for information, witness statements and witness appearances with insufficient notice, and requests often not clearly defined. Rules of litigation which would ordinarily enable you to streamline the process and protect your client from unnecessarily burdensome/onerous processes did not apply (but maybe a note for us that we enabled CFA to be separately represented where others all had to �muck in�). Added to this the media / political pressure creating a reluctance to �push back� even where the process was clearly �unfair�. High tolerance for the Community and low tolerance for the State (generally) � conducted community consultation, public submissions, personal testimony from 100 lay witnesses (who generally took priority over other witnesses).

6. Overview Approach of the Commission As much as possible those most directly impacted by the fires were given a voice and their stories and views were heard...For many in the emergency services it was often an uncomfortable and difficult experience to be questioned about their actions on the day. But their input was invaluable... 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal CommissionMedia Release, 31 July 2010 Unusual, in that it ran �on time�, and the time pressures continued throughout, regardless of external factors (for example, the next fire season). Approach of Counsel Assisting was not necessarily targeted � extremely limited experience with the subject matter, leads to the problem that �you don�t know what you don�t know�, took a significant period for them to understand and categorise/prioritise what they wanted/needed to hear. Result was huge pressure to provide enormous quantities of information, very limited timeframes, requests for information, witness statements and witness appearances with insufficient notice, and requests often not clearly defined. Rules of litigation which would ordinarily enable you to streamline the process and protect your client from unnecessarily burdensome/onerous processes did not apply (but maybe a note for us that we enabled CFA to be separately represented where others all had to �muck in�). Added to this the media / political pressure creating a reluctance to �push back� even where the process was clearly �unfair�.Unusual, in that it ran �on time�, and the time pressures continued throughout, regardless of external factors (for example, the next fire season). Approach of Counsel Assisting was not necessarily targeted � extremely limited experience with the subject matter, leads to the problem that �you don�t know what you don�t know�, took a significant period for them to understand and categorise/prioritise what they wanted/needed to hear. Result was huge pressure to provide enormous quantities of information, very limited timeframes, requests for information, witness statements and witness appearances with insufficient notice, and requests often not clearly defined. Rules of litigation which would ordinarily enable you to streamline the process and protect your client from unnecessarily burdensome/onerous processes did not apply (but maybe a note for us that we enabled CFA to be separately represented where others all had to �muck in�). Added to this the media / political pressure creating a reluctance to �push back� even where the process was clearly �unfair�.

7. Approach of the Commission Themes Primacy of life is absolute Commission did not accept ongoing tolerance of any level of risk � this should �never happen again� Responsibility and cost devolved to the community / government rather than the individual Two overarching principles which guided the Commission in its inquiries and when formulating its recommendations. Protection of Human Life: placed at the forefront of its deliberations, and paramount in all its recommendations. Compromises will need to be made � eg freedom to choose where to live or whether environmental values are such that prohibitions on dwellings should be applied. The trade-off effects areas including planning and building, fuel management. Shared resp �� Individuals to be well informed, prepared etc. Agencies should educate, prepare and help protect individuals by ensuring they have access to information needed to make sounds decisions � also provide accurate and prompt warnings that are easy to understand. Government to create the legislative foundation, fund the fire services, facilitate community education and support and provide essential infrastructure and local support to 'help communities stay safe'.  CED Two overarching principles which guided the Commission in its inquiries and when formulating its recommendations. Protection of Human Life: placed at the forefront of its deliberations, and paramount in all its recommendations. Compromises will need to be made � eg freedom to choose where to live or whether environmental values are such that prohibitions on dwellings should be applied. The trade-off effects areas including planning and building, fuel management. Shared resp �� Individuals to be well informed, prepared etc. Agencies should educate, prepare and help protect individuals by ensuring they have access to information needed to make sounds decisions � also provide accurate and prompt warnings that are easy to understand. Government to create the legislative foundation, fund the fire services, facilitate community education and support and provide essential infrastructure and local support to 'help communities stay safe'.  These are the principles which the Commission kept foremost in its thinking. These are the principles which the Commission kept foremost in its thinking. Two overarching principles which guided the Commission in its inquiries and when formulating its recommendations. Protection of Human Life: placed at the forefront of its deliberations, and paramount in all its recommendations. Compromises will need to be made � eg freedom to choose where to live or whether environmental values are such that prohibitions on dwellings should be applied. The trade-off effects areas including planning and building, fuel management. Shared resp �� Individuals to be well informed, prepared etc. Agencies should educate, prepare and help protect individuals by ensuring they have access to information needed to make sounds decisions � also provide accurate and prompt warnings that are easy to understand. Government to create the legislative foundation, fund the fire services, facilitate community education and support and provide essential infrastructure and local support to 'help communities stay safe'. CED Two overarching principles which guided the Commission in its inquiries and when formulating its recommendations. Protection of Human Life: placed at the forefront of its deliberations, and paramount in all its recommendations. Compromises will need to be made � eg freedom to choose where to live or whether environmental values are such that prohibitions on dwellings should be applied. The trade-off effects areas including planning and building, fuel management. Shared resp �� Individuals to be well informed, prepared etc. Agencies should educate, prepare and help protect individuals by ensuring they have access to information needed to make sounds decisions � also provide accurate and prompt warnings that are easy to understand. Government to create the legislative foundation, fund the fire services, facilitate community education and support and provide essential infrastructure and local support to 'help communities stay safe'. These are the principles which the Commission kept foremost in its thinking. These are the principles which the Commission kept foremost in its thinking.

8. The environment in which emergency services operate � t�Hart Emergencies have always been with us, but it appears their character is changing. In fact, it is often argued that the crises of the near future will be increasingly frequent and generate higher impact �The societal and political climate in which political leaders and public agencies must operate today has made it harder to deal with emergencies. Politicians and citizens display low tolerance for even minor disturbances, but at the same time they show little interest in efforts to improve emergency management.

13. Operational Issues - information flow / information sharing The link between effective information flows and safety also warrants emphasis: in general, those fires where the IMTs were unsuccessful in managing information flows were also the fires that resulted in fatalities and exposed firefighters to greater danger. 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report  Focussed on , for example, the Redesdale fire, versus M�dindi and Kilmore. Inadequate recognition of the differences between these fires. Consider the IAP a �trigger� to ensure things aren�t forgotten. The Alexandra IMT (M�dindi) lacked information on which to base planning and decision making for the Murrindindi fire: information that should have been provided was not; information that should have been sought was not sought; and information that was available was not analysed or used effectively. The IMTs that functioned well on 7 February were able to use and interpret incoming information, convert information into �intelligence� in order to develop a strategy, and document the information in summary form so that it was understood up and down the chain of command. In contrast, IMTs that were characterised by poor preparation, inadequate numbers of level 3�trained officers and under-qualified Incident Controllers generally demonstrated poor information flows to and from both the field and the integrated Emergency Coordination Centre. The link between effective information flows and safety also warrants emphasis: in general, those fires where the IMTs were unsuccessful in managing information flows were also the fires that resulted in fatalities and exposed firefighters to greater danger. NB Cause and effect The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment: �� amend their procedures to require that an incident action plan summary be completed within the first four hours of an incident being reported and be provided to the State Control Centre and, where established, to the relevant Area of Operations Control Centre �� adopt DSE�s incident action plan summary as the template to be used by all incident management teams and ensure that the template is included in the online IMT Tool Box �� provide regular training to IMT staff, highlighting the importance of information and reinforcing the support available from specialists within the State Control Centre.Focussed on , for example, the Redesdale fire, versus M�dindi and Kilmore. Inadequate recognition of the differences between these fires. Consider the IAP a �trigger� to ensure things aren�t forgotten. The Alexandra IMT (M�dindi) lacked information on which to base planning and decision making for the Murrindindi fire: information that should have been provided was not; information that should have been sought was not sought; and information that was available was not analysed or used effectively. The IMTs that functioned well on 7 February were able to use and interpret incoming information, convert information into �intelligence� in order to develop a strategy, and document the information in summary form so that it was understood up and down the chain of command. In contrast, IMTs that were characterised by poor preparation, inadequate numbers of level 3�trained officers and under-qualified Incident Controllers generally demonstrated poor information flows to and from both the field and the integrated Emergency Coordination Centre. The link between effective information flows and safety also warrants emphasis: in general, those fires where the IMTs were unsuccessful in managing information flows were also the fires that resulted in fatalities and exposed firefighters to greater danger. NB Cause and effect The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment: �� amend their procedures to require that an incident action plan summary be completed within the first four hours of an incident being reported and be provided to the State Control Centre and, where established, to the relevant Area of Operations Control Centre �� adopt DSE�s incident action plan summary as the template to be used by all incident management teams and ensure that the template is included in the online IMT Tool Box �� provide regular training to IMT staff, highlighting the importance of information and reinforcing the support available from specialists within the State Control Centre.

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16. What does this mean? Can an event ever be extreme or unpredicted? Is it ever acceptable to be overwhelmed? An extreme event is not the time for the wheels to fall off If it isn�t possible to do, don�t promise to do it or qualify the possibility

20. Leadership & emergency management Role of the Chief Officers Counsel Assisting The Chief Fire of CFA failed to take the following actions adequately supervise the management of the Kilmore East fire by the IMT responsible for it, the shortcomings of which would have readily been ascertainable had Mr Rees required the provision to him of Incident Action Plans for the fire, required the provision to him of predictive maps for the fire and undertaken a check of the warnings issued to the public for such fires as against the predictive maps.

24. Leadership & emergency management Implied criticism of Level 2 ICs on 7 February Q � any analysis of what else could have been done?

28. Shared responsibility would create a situation in which the State, municipal councils, individuals, household members and the broader community all contribute to mitigating bushfire risk. Shared responsibility would create a situation in which the State, municipal councils, individuals, household members and the broader community all contribute to mitigating bushfire risk.

29. Asked whether they would stay to defend a house, given what they now know, Mr McLeod said: ''How many people want to wager on their life? Because that's what it really is, if one accepts that there's a certain randomness in the way a bushfire can move over the landscape. In my view, it's a fairly forlorn wager to hope that randomness will save you in a fire.'' But Mr Teague thought differently: ''You've got to allow for the age factor, apart from any others, but I think perhaps if I had a swimming pool and wet blanket alongside, I might stay longer.''Asked whether they would stay to defend a house, given what they now know, Mr McLeod said: ''How many people want to wager on their life? Because that's what it really is, if one accepts that there's a certain randomness in the way a bushfire can move over the landscape. In my view, it's a fairly forlorn wager to hope that randomness will save you in a fire.'' But Mr Teague thought differently: ''You've got to allow for the age factor, apart from any others, but I think perhaps if I had a swimming pool and wet blanket alongside, I might stay longer.''

32. Move from research conducted in late 90�s Move of the CFA, MFB and DSE in the 2004-2007 Fire ready campaign � to move towards increased awareness, empowered to make decisions individually. The stay and defend option drew on two main conclusions from that research: Most houses are damaged or destroyed by embers, rather than by direct flame contact or radiant heat.��9 The presence of people able to put out spot fires greatly increases the likelihood of a building surviving.��10 Move from research conducted in late 90�s Move of the CFA, MFB and DSE in the 2004-2007 Fire ready campaign � to move towards increased awareness, empowered to make decisions individually. The stay and defend option drew on two main conclusions from that research: Most houses are damaged or destroyed by embers, rather than by direct flame contact or radiant heat.��9 The presence of people able to put out spot fires greatly increases the likelihood of a building surviving.��10

33. Didn�t say it �failed� but rather the day exposed the weaknesses, some of which were apparent before the day. Inadequate consideration of human behaviour. The areas affected by the two most devastating fires, Kilmore East and Murrindindi, were home to about 14,000 residents in about 6,000 homes: 159 people died in the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires and 1,780 homes were destroyed Professor John Handmer, Innovation Professor in Risk and Sustainability at RMIT University � vulnerable due to age or ill health. Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre mail survey of 1,350 households affected by the Kilmore East, ��Murrindindi, Churchill, Beechworth�Mudgegonga, Bendigo, Bunyip and Horsham fires Compiled research indicated the following common results: Over two-thirds of all households have fire plans. Three-quarters of households want to be better prepared, There appears to be a gender distinction in individuals� intentions. Women are more likely than men to intend to leave as opposed to staying and defending. Many people intend to wait for official advice or direct danger before taking action. Understanding and good intentions do not necessarily equate to, and are not good predictors of, appropriate action. Flattering evidence re deceased relatives.Didn�t say it �failed� but rather the day exposed the weaknesses, some of which were apparent before the day. Inadequate consideration of human behaviour. The areas affected by the two most devastating fires, Kilmore East and Murrindindi, were home to about 14,000 residents in about 6,000 homes: 159 people died in the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires and 1,780 homes were destroyed Professor John Handmer, Innovation Professor in Risk and Sustainability at RMIT University � vulnerable due to age or ill health. Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre mail survey of 1,350 households affected by the Kilmore East, ��Murrindindi, Churchill, Beechworth�Mudgegonga, Bendigo, Bunyip and Horsham fires Compiled research indicated the following common results: Over two-thirds of all households have fire plans. Three-quarters of households want to be better prepared, There appears to be a gender distinction in individuals� intentions. Women are more likely than men to intend to leave as opposed to staying and defending. Many people intend to wait for official advice or direct danger before taking action. Understanding and good intentions do not necessarily equate to, and are not good predictors of, appropriate action. Flattering evidence re deceased relatives.

34. Third, the approach and the accompanying educational materials and advice were deficient in important areas. Inadequate information was provided about fire behaviour, the difficulty of making a property defendable, and the risks inherent in defending a house. Frank and direct advice is needed in a number of areas: Many houses are close to or even surrounded by heavily forested land with high fuel loads that seriously ��compromise defendability. Among the risks of staying to defend are death and serious injury. Normally, two able-bodied people are needed to defend a home. Both must be physically and mentally strong and be prepared for a long, arduous task. Vulnerable people, including children, should not be present. Firefighting equipment such as pumps, generators and hoses needs to be fire resistant to withstand a bushfire. Failure of any of this equipment can have lethal consequences. Many houses in bushfire-prone areas are not built to withstand bushfire. Even modern building standards are designed merely to increase a building�s chance of survival during the passage of a firefront and do not make houses completely ember proof.Third, the approach and the accompanying educational materials and advice were deficient in important areas. Inadequate information was provided about fire behaviour, the difficulty of making a property defendable, and the risks inherent in defending a house. Frank and direct advice is needed in a number of areas: Many houses are close to or even surrounded by heavily forested land with high fuel loads that seriously ��compromise defendability. Among the risks of staying to defend are death and serious injury. Normally, two able-bodied people are needed to defend a home. Both must be physically and mentally strong and be prepared for a long, arduous task. Vulnerable people, including children, should not be present. Firefighting equipment such as pumps, generators and hoses needs to be fire resistant to withstand a bushfire. Failure of any of this equipment can have lethal consequences. Many houses in bushfire-prone areas are not built to withstand bushfire. Even modern building standards are designed merely to increase a building�s chance of survival during the passage of a firefront and do not make houses completely ember proof.

35. The following effective elements of the existing policy should be retained: the principle of shared responsibility�that there are legitimate and crucial roles for individuals and the State �� leaving early is the safest option�� advice to stay and defend in the case of less severe fires, providing those who do stay are physically and mentally ��able, understand the risks involved, and take specific precautions an emphasis on preparation, regardless of the preferred bushfire safety plan�� providing a mix of specific and general advice to individuals and communities�including media campaigns, community education, community engagement and community fireguard groups. The policy should, however, be extended beyond these elements to do the following: cover the full range of fire types�with particular recognition of the heightened risk that accompanies the most ferocious fires on the worst days give added weight to the role of warnings and improve their timeliness, content and methods of dissemination provide more practical and realistic options that are tailored to local needs�for example, community refuges, bushfire shelters, emergency evacuation, and assisted evacuation of vulnerable people improve the quality and availability of advice on fire behaviour and house defendability.The following effective elements of the existing policy should be retained: the principle of shared responsibility�that there are legitimate and crucial roles for individuals and the State �� leaving early is the safest option�� advice to stay and defend in the case of less severe fires, providing those who do stay are physically and mentally ��able, understand the risks involved, and take specific precautions an emphasis on preparation, regardless of the preferred bushfire safety plan�� providing a mix of specific and general advice to individuals and communities�including media campaigns, community education, community engagement and community fireguard groups. The policy should, however, be extended beyond these elements to do the following: cover the full range of fire types�with particular recognition of the heightened risk that accompanies the most ferocious fires on the worst days give added weight to the role of warnings and improve their timeliness, content and methods of dissemination provide more practical and realistic options that are tailored to local needs�for example, community refuges, bushfire shelters, emergency evacuation, and assisted evacuation of vulnerable people improve the quality and availability of advice on fire behaviour and house defendability.

36. cover the full range of fire types�with particular recognition of the heightened risk that accompanies the most ferocious fires on the worst days give added weight to the role of warnings and improve their timeliness, content and methods of dissemination provide more practical and realistic options that are tailored to local needs�for example, community refuges, bushfire shelters, emergency evacuation, and assisted evacuation of vulnerable people improve the quality and availability of advice on fire behaviour and house defendability. Impact on the role of the IC Not dealt with � cry wolf syndrome re warnings, also more options, take less responsibility, encourage wait and see, complicate => and only you know your best option. Where do you go � escape routes issues? NSPs/refuges/shelters etc. Among other important achievements by the State, the Commonwealth Government and fire agencies to improve information and warnings are the following: clarifying fire agencies� responsibility for issuing warnings, with greater emphasis on the obligation to warn the ��community147 elevating the Information Unit within the AIIMS structure and augmenting its role by creating the position of Public ��Information Officer148 developing new protocols for issuing warnings, to enable the Incident Controller and other personnel to issue ��warnings in the event of imminent danger, and adopting new technology for the creation and dissemination of warnings149 developing and implementing a single �One Source One Message� portal for CFA and DSE to upload bushfire ��warnings and information to the CFA and DSE websites, the Victorian Bushfire Information Line, and relevant radio and television broadcasters150 implementing the National Emergency Warnings System, which can distribute voice and text warnings and ��messages via landline and mobile phone151 negotiating new memoranda of understanding to broadcast emergency information (similar to that already in ��operation with the ABC) with commercial radio and television stations152 improving the content of warnings, including adoption of the Common Alerting Protocol��153 developing guidelines for the use and authorisation of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal, plus using the ��signal on three occasions during the 2009�10 bushfire season154 developing new guidelines for using fire sirens as a community warning method��155 developing a new nationally agreed fire danger rating scale that includes the new category of �code red�, which ��applies to days where the fire danger index is predicted to be above 100156 incorporating fire danger ratings in Bureau of Meteorology forecasts and warnings��157 commissioning expert research into the development of a new fire severity scale��158 upgrading the Victorian Bushfire Information Line with extra trained staff, extra office space and telephone lines, ��improved IT infrastructure, faster access to warning information and access to more overflow staff on �spike� days amending the ��Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to clarify the Chief Officer�s responsibility for issuing warningscover the full range of fire types�with particular recognition of the heightened risk that accompanies the most ferocious fires on the worst days give added weight to the role of warnings and improve their timeliness, content and methods of dissemination provide more practical and realistic options that are tailored to local needs�for example, community refuges, bushfire shelters, emergency evacuation, and assisted evacuation of vulnerable people improve the quality and availability of advice on fire behaviour and house defendability. Impact on the role of the IC Not dealt with � cry wolf syndrome re warnings, also more options, take less responsibility, encourage wait and see, complicate => and only you know your best option. Where do you go � escape routes issues? NSPs/refuges/shelters etc. Among other important achievements by the State, the Commonwealth Government and fire agencies to improve information and warnings are the following: clarifying fire agencies� responsibility for issuing warnings, with greater emphasis on the obligation to warn the ��community147 elevating the Information Unit within the AIIMS structure and augmenting its role by creating the position of Public ��Information Officer148 developing new protocols for issuing warnings, to enable the Incident Controller and other personnel to issue ��warnings in the event of imminent danger, and adopting new technology for the creation and dissemination of warnings149 developing and implementing a single �One Source One Message� portal for CFA and DSE to upload bushfire ��warnings and information to the CFA and DSE websites, the Victorian Bushfire Information Line, and relevant radio and television broadcasters150 implementing the National Emergency Warnings System, which can distribute voice and text warnings and ��messages via landline and mobile phone151 negotiating new memoranda of understanding to broadcast emergency information (similar to that already in ��operation with the ABC) with commercial radio and television stations152 improving the content of warnings, including adoption of the Common Alerting Protocol��153 developing guidelines for the use and authorisation of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal, plus using the ��signal on three occasions during the 2009�10 bushfire season154 developing new guidelines for using fire sirens as a community warning method��155 developing a new nationally agreed fire danger rating scale that includes the new category of �code red�, which ��applies to days where the fire danger index is predicted to be above 100156 incorporating fire danger ratings in Bureau of Meteorology forecasts and warnings��157 commissioning expert research into the development of a new fire severity scale��158 upgrading the Victorian Bushfire Information Line with extra trained staff, extra office space and telephone lines, ��improved IT infrastructure, faster access to warning information and access to more overflow staff on �spike� days amending the ��Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to clarify the Chief Officer�s responsibility for issuing warnings

37. Among other important achievements by the State, the Commonwealth Government and fire agencies to improve information and warnings are the following: clarifying fire agencies� responsibility for issuing warnings, with greater emphasis on the obligation to warn the ��community147 elevating the Information Unit within the AIIMS structure and augmenting its role by creating the position of Public ��Information Officer148 developing new protocols for issuing warnings, to enable the Incident Controller and other personnel to issue ��warnings in the event of imminent danger, and adopting new technology for the creation and dissemination of warnings149 developing and implementing a single �One Source One Message� portal for CFA and DSE to upload bushfire ��warnings and information to the CFA and DSE websites, the Victorian Bushfire Information Line, and relevant radio and television broadcasters150 implementing the National Emergency Warnings System, which can distribute voice and text warnings and ��messages via landline and mobile phone151 negotiating new memoranda of understanding to broadcast emergency information (similar to that already in ��operation with the ABC) with commercial radio and television stations152 improving the content of warnings, including adoption of the Common Alerting Protocol��153 developing guidelines for the use and authorisation of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal, plus using the ��signal on three occasions during the 2009�10 bushfire season154 developing new guidelines for using fire sirens as a community warning method��155 developing a new nationally agreed fire danger rating scale that includes the new category of �code red�, which ��applies to days where the fire danger index is predicted to be above 100156 incorporating fire danger ratings in Bureau of Meteorology forecasts and warnings��157 commissioning expert research into the development of a new fire severity scale��158 upgrading the Victorian Bushfire Information Line with extra trained staff, extra office space and telephone lines, ��improved IT infrastructure, faster access to warning information and access to more overflow staff on �spike� days amending the ��Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to clarify the Chief Officer�s responsibility for issuing warningsAmong other important achievements by the State, the Commonwealth Government and fire agencies to improve information and warnings are the following: clarifying fire agencies� responsibility for issuing warnings, with greater emphasis on the obligation to warn the ��community147 elevating the Information Unit within the AIIMS structure and augmenting its role by creating the position of Public ��Information Officer148 developing new protocols for issuing warnings, to enable the Incident Controller and other personnel to issue ��warnings in the event of imminent danger, and adopting new technology for the creation and dissemination of warnings149 developing and implementing a single �One Source One Message� portal for CFA and DSE to upload bushfire ��warnings and information to the CFA and DSE websites, the Victorian Bushfire Information Line, and relevant radio and television broadcasters150 implementing the National Emergency Warnings System, which can distribute voice and text warnings and ��messages via landline and mobile phone151 negotiating new memoranda of understanding to broadcast emergency information (similar to that already in ��operation with the ABC) with commercial radio and television stations152 improving the content of warnings, including adoption of the Common Alerting Protocol��153 developing guidelines for the use and authorisation of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal, plus using the ��signal on three occasions during the 2009�10 bushfire season154 developing new guidelines for using fire sirens as a community warning method��155 developing a new nationally agreed fire danger rating scale that includes the new category of �code red�, which ��applies to days where the fire danger index is predicted to be above 100156 incorporating fire danger ratings in Bureau of Meteorology forecasts and warnings��157 commissioning expert research into the development of a new fire severity scale��158 upgrading the Victorian Bushfire Information Line with extra trained staff, extra office space and telephone lines, ��improved IT infrastructure, faster access to warning information and access to more overflow staff on �spike� days amending the ��Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to clarify the Chief Officer�s responsibility for issuing warnings

38. Heard evidence from Alan Rhodes Manager Community Safety Evaluation and Research � almost exclusively CA views got a lot of attention, including media attention Could lead to confusion about what you need to do. Education � turn around re children Debate process. Holiday makers. Heard evidence from Alan Rhodes Manager Community Safety Evaluation and Research � almost exclusively CA views got a lot of attention, including media attention Could lead to confusion about what you need to do. Education � turn around re children Debate process. Holiday makers.