Adapting Warfare to Social and Technological Change

1. Adapting Warfare to Social and Technological Change Some Tentative Thoughts

2. Just as electrification did not dramatically raise productivity until the structure of factories changed from what was suitable for steam power to what was suitable for electric power, so too will the Information Revolution�s primary impact come only after other fundamental organizational changes. We have not yet used technology to change our essential relationship to machines, but only to perform more efficiently existing processes. In this sense, we are now in the same stage of the industrial revolution as when it had produced only more efficient horse drawn plows. Just as electrification did not dramatically raise productivity until the structure of factories changed from what was suitable for steam power to what was suitable for electric power, so too will the Information Revolution�s primary impact come only after other fundamental organizational changes. We have not yet used technology to change our essential relationship to machines, but only to perform more efficiently existing processes. In this sense, we are now in the same stage of the industrial revolution as when it had produced only more efficient horse drawn plows.

3. Steam to Electricity Old system designed to reduce friction: machines were grouped around a prime mover (steam engine) - power transmitted by belts, gears and axles. New system: each machine has its own power source and, in order to facilitate the flow of production, machines laid out in most efficient manner to achieve that end. Change from a system designed to reduce friction where machines were grouped around a prime mover (steam engine) from which power was transmitted by a series of belts, gears and axles, to a system where each machine has its own power source and, in order to facilitate the flow of production, machines are laid out in the most efficient manner to achieve that goal. Change from a system designed to reduce friction where machines were grouped around a prime mover (steam engine) from which power was transmitted by a series of belts, gears and axles, to a system where each machine has its own power source and, in order to facilitate the flow of production, machines are laid out in the most efficient manner to achieve that goal.

4. Sundering of the Nation-State World is organizing itself into a series of interconnected networks. Simultaneously, nation states find themselves torn in two directions - upward toward international security, trade, and social organizations and downward by subnational movements that want to splinter the state. In essence, the world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networks that while in contact with other networks are not controlled by them. Simultaneously, nation states find themselves torn in two directions - upward toward the international security, trade, and social organizations and downward by subnational movements that want to splinter the state. In essence, the world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networks that while in contact with other networks are not controlled by them. Simultaneously, nation states find themselves torn in two directions - upward toward the international security, trade, and social organizations and downward by subnational movements that want to splinter the state.

5. Emergence of the Small Empowerment of the individual - entrepreneurship, free agency Downsizing, outsourcing, networking of businesses Growth of regional and cultural consciousness Biotechnology - the Genome Project Nanotechnology - nanomachines Non-linear complex systems and the significance of small events (tipping points or "points of singularity") Emergence of the small Empowerment of the individual - entrepreneurship, free agency Downsizing, outsourcing, networking of businesses Growth of regional and cultural consciousness Biotechnology - the Genome Project Nanotechnology - nanomachines Non-linear complex systems and the significance of small events (tipping points or "points of singularity") The implication for small armed forces, such as Canada's, is that a technologically capable force is now a real possibility. Emergence of the small Empowerment of the individual - entrepreneurship, free agency Downsizing, outsourcing, networking of businesses Growth of regional and cultural consciousness Biotechnology - the Genome Project Nanotechnology - nanomachines Non-linear complex systems and the significance of small events (tipping points or "points of singularity") The implication for small armed forces, such as Canada's, is that a technologically capable force is now a real possibility.

6. Large/Few vs. Small/Many In time, the large, the complex, and the few will have to yield to the small and the many. Systems composed of millions of sensors, emitters, microbots, and miniprojectiles, will, in concert, be able to detect, track, target, and land a weapon on any military object large enough to carry a human. Analysts talk about the mesh, a system of systems including not only links between people and computers, but also weapons systems, aeroplanes, remote cameras, automated factories and warehouses, intelligent buildings, hospitals, weather stations, satellites, and so on. Today, platforms rule the battlefield. In time, however, the large, the complex, and the few will have to yield to the small and the many. Systems composed of millions of sensors, emitters, microbots, and miniprojectiles, will, in concert, be able to detect, track, target, and land a weapon on any military object large enough to carry a human. The advantage of the small and the many will not occur overnight everywhere; tipping points will occur at different times in various arenas. They will be visible only in retrospect. Today, platforms rule the battlefield. In time, however, the large, the complex, and the few will have to yield to the small and the many. Systems composed of millions of sensors, emitters, microbots, and miniprojectiles, will, in concert, be able to detect, track, target, and land a weapon on any military object large enough to carry a human. The advantage of the small and the many will not occur overnight everywhere; tipping points will occur at different times in various arenas. They will be visible only in retrospect.

7. Parallel with the Economy First was the Agrarian Revolution. Then followed the Industrial Revolution with mass production and mass warfare. If we are now in the process of transforming the way we create wealth, from the industrial to the informational, there is a parallel change taking place with warfare. It is logical to assume the fourth generation of war will also take its shape from society. War was initiated by the agrarian revolution, or in our terminology "the first wave of change." With the coming of the industrial revolution, particularly the French Revolution and Napoleon, you begin to get mass production, you begin to get mass conscription. You begin to get machine guns for the machine society. With mass production, you get mass destruction - industrialized warfare. And if we are now in the process of transforming the way we create wealth, from the industrial to the informational, or call it whatever you wish, there is a parallel change taking place with warfare, of which the Gulf War gives only the palest, palest little hint. The transition actually started back in the late-1970s, early-1980s, to a new form of warfare based on information superiority. It mirrors the way the economy has become information-dependent.War was initiated by the agrarian revolution, or in our terminology "the first wave of change." With the coming of the industrial revolution, particularly the French Revolution and Napoleon, you begin to get mass production, you begin to get mass conscription. You begin to get machine guns for the machine society. With mass production, you get mass destruction - industrialized warfare. And if we are now in the process of transforming the way we create wealth, from the industrial to the informational, or call it whatever you wish, there is a parallel change taking place with warfare, of which the Gulf War gives only the palest, palest little hint. The transition actually started back in the late-1970s, early-1980s, to a new form of warfare based on information superiority. It mirrors the way the economy has become information-dependent.

8. Fourth-generation warfare is highly irregular. "Asymmetric" operations � in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatants. Many small firms can outdo the giants through their agility. Emphasis is on bypassing an opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets. Many businesses thrive by exploiting niches that the giants find difficult or costly to service. the implementation of �dominating manoeuvre� by �agile� military forces deployed on a �just-in-time� basis parallels agile manufacturing and just-in-time production systems. Viewed in the context of military history, fourth-generation warfare is highly irregular. "Asymmetric" operations � in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatants, and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets � are a defining characteristic of fourth-generation warfare. Coalition forces will face decentralized, non-state actors (perhaps supported by a rogue nation or two) who understand just how big an impact attacks on markets, communications, and cultural icons can have on the Western psyche. Viewed in the context of military history, fourth-generation warfare is highly irregular. "Asymmetric" operations � in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatants, and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets � are a defining characteristic of fourth-generation warfare. Coalition forces will face decentralized, non-state actors (perhaps supported by a rogue nation or two) who understand just how big an impact attacks on markets, communications, and cultural icons can have on the Western psyche.

9. Paradigm Shift

10. Mathematics and Change

11. Chaos Wars If you look around the world today, you can list approximately 51 significant conflicts going on somewhere at any given time. US military forces are active in about five places. But big conflict, big war seems to be a thing of the past. Are we in a new era of lots of persistent low-level conflicts, what could be called the "era of chaos wars"? If you look around the world today, you can list approximately 51 significant conflicts going on somewhere at any given time. US military forces are active in about five places. But big conflict, big war seems to be a thing of the past. Are we in a new era of lots of persistent low-level conflicts, what could be called the "era of chaos wars"?

14. The Mesh Combat requires doing two things: finding targets and hitting them (while avoiding the same fate). PGMs allow their possessors to hit most anything. Tomorrow's meshes will allow their possessors to find anything worth hitting. Every trend in information technology favours the ability to collect more and more data about a battlefield, knitting a finer and finer mesh which can catch smaller and stealthier objects. Combat requires doing two things: finding targets and hitting them (while avoiding the same fate). PGMs allow their possessors to hit most anything. Tomorrow's meshes will allow their possessors to find anything worth hitting. Every trend in information technology favours the ability to collect more and more data about a battlefield, knitting a finer and finer mesh which can catch smaller and stealthier objects. A long period can be expected in which elements of the Mesh coexist with current platforms. The United States, for instance, will probably be able to deploy fleets of light satellites for surveillance before others can target our existing stock of heavy low-earth orbiters. During that interim the choice of using platforms or the Mesh for any particular mission would depend on which worked better or was more cost- effective. Thus, an initial architecture for the Mesh need not have all capabilities at once as long as platforms to do the same job can survive. Combat requires doing two things: finding targets and hitting them (while avoiding the same fate). PGMs allow their possessors to hit most anything. Tomorrow's meshes will allow their possessors to find anything worth hitting. Every trend in information technology favours the ability to collect more and more data about a battlefield, knitting a finer and finer mesh which can catch smaller and stealthier objects. A long period can be expected in which elements of the Mesh coexist with current platforms. The United States, for instance, will probably be able to deploy fleets of light satellites for surveillance before others can target our existing stock of heavy low-earth orbiters. During that interim the choice of using platforms or the Mesh for any particular mission would depend on which worked better or was more cost- effective. Thus, an initial architecture for the Mesh need not have all capabilities at once as long as platforms to do the same job can survive.

15. Dominant InfoAge Social Structure is the Network Exploration of emergent social structures leads to an overarching conclusion: dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks. New information technology paradigm provides material basis for network's pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure. Our exploration of emergent social structures across domains of human activity and experience leads to an overarching conclusion: as a historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies .... While the networking form of social organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure. Our exploration of emergent social structures across domains of human activity and experience leads to an overarching conclusion: as a historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies .... While the networking form of social organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure.

16. Hierarchy to Network

17. Evolution of Street Gangs

18. Citizen Activists Ordinary citizens have used the handheld video camera, the telephone, the fax and other communications technologies to make their causes known: Philippines, South Africa, Zapatistas, ban landmines movement. Anti-WTO activists in Seattle were systematic, well-organized and well-funded. Using modern communications, including the Internet, they were able to execute simultaneous actions by means of pulsing and swarming tactics coordinated by networked and leaderless "affinity groups". Ordinary citizens have used the handheld video camera, the telephone, the fax machine and other communications technologies to make their causes known, from the "people power" revolution in the Philippines to the antiapartheid movement in South Africa and the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico.(One could probably add the successful movement to ban landmines.) The anti-WTO activists in Seattle were systematic, well-organized and well-funded. Using extremely good modern communications, including live internet feeds, they were able to execute simultaneous actions by means of pulsing and swarming tactics coordinated by networked and leaderless "affinity groups". Ordinary citizens have used the handheld video camera, the telephone, the fax machine and other communications technologies to make their causes known, from the "people power" revolution in the Philippines to the antiapartheid movement in South Africa and the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico.(One could probably add the successful movement to ban landmines.) The anti-WTO activists in Seattle were systematic, well-organized and well-funded. Using extremely good modern communications, including live internet feeds, they were able to execute simultaneous actions by means of pulsing and swarming tactics coordinated by networked and leaderless "affinity groups".

19. Empowering Disparate Groups A new generation of communications satellites will inexpensively link virtually every part of the globe. Importantly, one report noted that for "disadvantaged regions of the world . . . The coming satellite communications revolution could be one of those rare technological events that enable traditional societies to leap ahead." Until now, many activist groups lacked the ability to coalesce in an effective manner. But the spectacular decline in the cost of computers and communications technology has the potential to dramatically empower them. U.S. News & World Report, for example, recently predicted that a new generation of communications satellites would inexpensively link virtually every part of the globe. Importantly, the author noted that for "disadvantaged regions of the world . . . The coming satellite communications revolution could be one of those rare technological events that enable traditional societies to leap ahead." Until now, many activist groups lacked the ability to coalesce in an effective manner. But the spectacular decline in the cost of computers and communications technology has the potential to dramatically empower them. U.S. News & World Report, for example, recently predicted that a new generation of communications satellites would inexpensively link virtually every part of the globe. Importantly, the author noted that for "disadvantaged regions of the world . . . The coming satellite communications revolution could be one of those rare technological events that enable traditional societies to leap ahead."

20. Decline in Distinction Between Military and Civilian The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear.

21. Civilian/Police Counter-Terrorism Los Angeles has set up a Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), a hybrid organization blending networked organizational features with traditional government structures: law enforcement, fire services and health authorities at all levels of government. TEW serves as a mechanism for monitoring terrorist trends and potentials, and rapidly disseminating alerts and warnings. TEW uses an "intelligence toolbox" consisting of virtual reachback to technological specialists and advanced methodologies to help project consequences. Los Angeles has set up a Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), a hybrid organization blending networked organizational features with traditional government structures. Bringing together law enforcement, fire services and health authorities at all levels of government, TEW serves as a mechanism for monitoring terrorist trends and potentials, and rapidly disseminating alerts and warnings. TEW uses an "intelligence toolbox" consisting of virtual reachback to technological specialists and advanced methodologies to help project consequences and event horizon (point of "singularity"). Los Angeles has set up a Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), a hybrid organization blending networked organizational features with traditional government structures. Bringing together law enforcement, fire services and health authorities at all levels of government, TEW serves as a mechanism for monitoring terrorist trends and potentials, and rapidly disseminating alerts and warnings. TEW uses an "intelligence toolbox" consisting of virtual reachback to technological specialists and advanced methodologies to help project consequences and event horizon (point of "singularity").

22. A New Mode of Conflict Cyberwar means operating in small, dispersed units, so well internetted that they can coordinate, coalesce, and then disperse again in repeated swarming attacks. Initially, light ground units infiltrate and take up dispersed positions. As areas cleared, helicopter insertions made more frequently. Units may then act as scouts and guides (sensors), calling in accurate air, artillery and missile fire on multiple targets. Cyberwar means gaining an "information edge" so significant that a small force can defeat a large one. Specifically, cyberwar means operating in small, dispersed units, so well internetted that they can coordinate, coalesce, and then disperse again in repeated swarming attacks. Cyberwar thus requires a ground presence, but without relying on conventional ground forces. It may call for what we have termed a "BattleSwarm Doctrine" to supersede the reigning (US) AirLand Battle Doctrine. How does cyberwar unfold? Initially, light ground units infiltrate and take up dispersed positions. As areas are cleared, helicopter insertions are made more frequently and safely. The units may then act as scouts and guides, calling in accurate air, artillery and missile fire on multiple targets. At times and places of their choosing, the units may also engage in direct combat. Cyberwar means gaining an "information edge" so significant that a small force can defeat a large one. Specifically, cyberwar means operating in small, dispersed units, so well internetted that they can coordinate, coalesce, and then disperse again in repeated swarming attacks. Cyberwar thus requires a ground presence, but without relying on conventional ground forces. It may call for what we have termed a "BattleSwarm Doctrine" to supersede the reigning (US) AirLand Battle Doctrine. How does cyberwar unfold? Initially, light ground units infiltrate and take up dispersed positions. As areas are cleared, helicopter insertions are made more frequently and safely. The units may then act as scouts and guides, calling in accurate air, artillery and missile fire on multiple targets. At times and places of their choosing, the units may also engage in direct combat.

23. Ever since the end of the Cold War Western forces have lagged in developing the correct military response to 4GW�a response that calls for reliance on smaller units versed in manoeuvre warfare. This kind of fighting eschews heavy firepower, attrition, and long-range, high-altitude bombardment. It favours joint-service operations and close-quarters combat involving small, fast-moving units with lighter equipment. Ever since the end of the Cold War Western forces have lagged in developing the correct military response to 4GW�a response that calls for reliance on smaller units versed in manoeuvre warfare. This kind of fighting eschews heavy firepower, attrition, and long-range, high-altitude bombardment. It favours joint-service operations and close-quarters combat involving small, fast-moving units with lighter equipment.

24. In tactical terms, this means coordinating intelligence on a global scale. It means rapier thrusts against 4GW bases and cells, slicing up the networks linking the cells, and taking out the fanatics who supply the brains and the resources to conduct this kind of indiscriminate warfare. Because the nation-state no longer holds a monopoly on destructive force, a most important change in how 4GW is confronted is to henceforth ordain that the sanctuary of "national sovereignty" is no longer sacrosanct, can no longer be honoured when employed as a facade for sheltering, endorsing and provisioning non- national 4GW assets and formations. As in any conflict, the military task must be to disarm the enemy and neutralize his offensive capability, employing the weapons and tactics appropriate for the task. In tactical terms, this means coordinating intelligence on a global scale. It means rapier thrusts against 4GW bases and cells, slicing up the networks linking the cells, and taking out the fanatics who supply the brains and the resources to conduct this kind of indiscriminate warfare. Because the nation-state no longer holds a monopoly on destructive force, a most important change in how 4GW is confronted is to henceforth ordain that the sanctuary of "national sovereignty" is no longer sacrosanct, can no longer be honoured when employed as a facade for sheltering, endorsing and provisioning non- national 4GW assets and formations. As in any conflict, the military task must be to disarm the enemy and neutralize his offensive capability, employing the weapons and tactics appropriate for the task.

25. To understand the potential shape of the fourth generation of war, we must look at the political, economic, and social changes in society as well as the changes in technology since the advent of the third generation of war. Politically the world has undergone vast changes. The third generation of war developed when international relations were defined in terms of the European nation states that dominated them. In contrast, the fourth generation of war is coming of age during a period of exponential increase in the number and type of players on the international scene. To understand the potential shape of the fourth generation of war, we must look at the political, economic, and social changes in society as well as the changes in technology since the advent of the third generation of war. Politically the world has undergone vast changes. The third generation of war developed when international relations were defined in terms of the European nation states that dominated them. In contrast, the fourth generation of war is coming of age during a period of exponential increase in the number and type of players on the international scene.

26. Emergence of Netwar Conflicts will increasingly be "netwars" or clashes involving networks rather than traditional, hierarchical adversaries. Ronfeldt, analysts at the RAND think tank. In their recent book for the U.S. Defense Department, Networks and Netwars, Advances in communications and technology have given rise to network organizations, according to John Arquilla and David the authors argue that conflicts will increasingly be "netwars" or clashes involving networks rather than traditional, hierarchical adversaries. The definition of network organizations is not well-developed�some analysts even question whether networks can be described as a type of organization. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that they are. Ronfeldt, analysts at the RAND think tank. In their recent book for the U.S. Defense Department, Networks and Netwars, Advances in communications and technology have given rise to network organizations, according to John Arquilla and David the authors argue that conflicts will increasingly be "netwars" or clashes involving networks rather than traditional, hierarchical adversaries. The definition of network organizations is not well-developed�some analysts even question whether networks can be described as a type of organization. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that they are.

27. Network of 9/11 Hijackers

29. Frequency Distribution of Links This is an example of the power law characterized by a small number of large values and a large number of small values. Such a distribution also fits income distribution and the distribution of publication numbers by academic faculty.This is an example of the power law characterized by a small number of large values and a large number of small values. Such a distribution also fits income distribution and the distribution of publication numbers by academic faculty.

30. Log/Log Graph of HiJacker Net

31. Network Analysis Bombnet is a group of social network analysts studying the structure and potential vulnerabilities of terrorist networks. Bombnet is a group of social network analysts studying the structure and potential vulnerabilities of terrorist networks.

32. Netwar vs. Cyberwar Cyberwar is concerned with traditional military aspects like Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, also called C3I. Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations and societies. Netwar - focuses on new processes enabled by technology (Networks: Nodes/Links) Cyberwar - technologizes present structures. Netwar is the hybrid civil/military side of cyberwar. While cyberwar is concerned with traditional military aspects like Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, also called C3I, intelligence collection, processing and distribution, tactical communications, positioning, identification of friend-or-foe and so-called 'smart' weapons systems. Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations and societies. Netwar - focuses on new processes enabled by technology (Networks: Nodes/Links) Cyberwar - technologizes present structures. Netwar is the hybrid civil/military side of cyberwar. While cyberwar is concerned with traditional military aspects like Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, also called C3I, intelligence collection, processing and distribution, tactical communications, positioning, identification of friend-or-foe and so-called 'smart' weapons systems. Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations and societies.

33. The Evolution of Flows and Forces Mel�e � the primeval state of war with no discernible organization, no need for C2, and no technologies beyond the visual and the aural acuity of the combatants. Aerial dogfights in both World Wars are examples. Massing � where written messages and primitive signaling enabled a hierarchically organized central authority to command and to control dispersed mass forces, achieving maximum shock and firepower. These tactics were last seen in attrition war on the linear battlegrounds of World War I, World War II, and in Korea. Mel�e � the primeval state of war with no discernible organization, no need for C2, and no technologies beyond the visual and the aural acuity of the combatants. Aerial dogfights in both World Wars are examples. Massing � where written messages and primitive signaling enabled a hierarchically organized central authority to command and to control dispersed mass forces, achieving maximum shock and firepower. These tactics were last seen in attrition war on the linear battlegrounds of World War I, World War II, and in Korea. Mel�e � the primeval state of war with no discernible organization, no need for C2, and no technologies beyond the visual and the aural acuity of the combatants. Aerial dogfights in both World Wars are examples. Massing � where written messages and primitive signaling enabled a hierarchically organized central authority to command and to control dispersed mass forces, achieving maximum shock and firepower. These tactics were last seen in attrition war on the linear battlegrounds of World War I, World War II, and in Korea.

34. Manoeuvre � exploiting electronic communication and sensing technologies for command and control of complex, synchronized, multilinear operations that surprised, penetrated and flanked, and focused on the decisive point. These have been described as two-way technologies that turned armed forces into sensing as well as fighting units and were most recently seen as AirLand doctrine in operation Desert Storm. Swarming � "a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions � sustainable pulsing of force or fire � from a myriad of small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units", and where information and sensing technologies empower lower level units to function more effectively without hierarchical command levels. Manoeuvre � exploiting electronic communication and sensing technologies for command and control of complex, synchronized, multilinear operations that surprised, penetrated and flanked, and focused on the decisive point. These have been described as two-way technologies that turned armed forces into sensing as well as fighting units and were most recently seen as AirLand doctrine in operation Desert Storm. Swarming � "a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions � sustainable pulsing of force or fire � from a myriad of small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units", and where information and sensing technologies empower lower level units to function more effectively without hierarchical command levels. Manoeuvre � exploiting electronic communication and sensing technologies for command and control of complex, synchronized, multilinear operations that surprised, penetrated and flanked, and focused on the decisive point. These have been described as two-way technologies that turned armed forces into sensing as well as fighting units and were most recently seen as AirLand doctrine in operation Desert Storm. Swarming � "a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions � sustainable pulsing of force or fire � from a myriad of small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units", and where information and sensing technologies empower lower level units to function more effectively without hierarchical command levels.

35. Swarming Swarming It will work best � perhaps it will only work � if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units (called "pods" organized in "clusters"). Swarming It will work best � perhaps it will only work � if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units (called "pods" organized in "clusters").

36. Tactics of Swarming Tactics of swarming Swarming can be conceptually broken into four stages: locate, converge, attack, and disperse. Swarming forces must be capable of sustainable pulsing: Swarm networks must be able to come together rapidly and stealthily on a target, then redisperse and be able to recombine for a new pulse. It is important that swarm units converge and attack simultaneously. Each individual swarm unit (pod) is vulnerable on its own, but if united with other friendly units, overall lethality can be multiplied, because the phenomenon of the swarm effect is greater than the sum of its parts. Tactics of swarming Swarming can be conceptually broken into four stages: locate, converge, attack, and disperse. Swarming forces must be capable of sustainable pulsing: Swarm networks must be able to come together rapidly and stealthily on a target, then redisperse and be able to recombine for a new pulse. It is important that swarm units converge and attack simultaneously. Each individual swarm unit (pod) is vulnerable on its own, but if united with other friendly units, overall lethality can be multiplied, because the phenomenon of the swarm effect is greater than the sum of its parts.

37. Swarming + PGMs Vulnerability of massed formations on the ground to airpower and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), makes the Dispersed Swarm manoeuvre more appropriate for the future. Swarm units can use indirect standoff weapons (both organic - carried on their persons - and nonorganic - a remote asset that has to be called to) such as missile-launched "smart" munitions or offshore naval platforms deep in the rear. Shift from direct-fire to indirect-fire weapons will improve the mobility of the individual unit on the ground and reduce its signature. Vulnerability of massed formations on the ground to airpower and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), makes the Dispersed Swarm manoeuvre more appropriate for the future. Swarm units can use indirect standoff weapons (both organic � carried on their persons�and nonorganic � a remote asset that has to be called to) such as missile-launched "brilliant" munitions or offshore naval platforms deep in the rear. Because of this ability to apply force against a target with assets located far away, light units will potentially be much more lethal than their counterparts from the past. Shift from direct-fire to indirect-fire weapons will improve the mobility of the individual unit on the ground and reduce its signature. Vulnerability of massed formations on the ground to airpower and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), makes the Dispersed Swarm manoeuvre more appropriate for the future. Swarm units can use indirect standoff weapons (both organic � carried on their persons�and nonorganic � a remote asset that has to be called to) such as missile-launched "brilliant" munitions or offshore naval platforms deep in the rear. Because of this ability to apply force against a target with assets located far away, light units will potentially be much more lethal than their counterparts from the past. Shift from direct-fire to indirect-fire weapons will improve the mobility of the individual unit on the ground and reduce its signature.

38. Some Recent Examples The al Qaeda network recognizes the effectiveness of swarming. It exploits the nonlinear nature of the battle space and sees the value of attacking from multiple directions with dispersed units. Small bands of widely distributed Kosovo Liberation Army fighters and, to a lesser extent, allied special forces, provoked the Serbs to manoeuvre and fire, instantly making them vulnerable to being attacked from the air. It was the small bands of widely distributed Kosovo Liberation Army fighters and, to a lesser extent, allied special forces who provoked the Serbs to manoeuvre and fire, which instantly made them vulnerable to being attacked from the air. The swarming technique requires a key feature of networks � adaptability. In a hierarchy, people are defined by the boxes they fill on the organizational chart. In a network, people change their roles depending on the situation. One way of bringing adaptability into federal hierarchies is the use of matrix teams. It was the small bands of widely distributed Kosovo Liberation Army fighters and, to a lesser extent, allied special forces who provoked the Serbs to manoeuvre and fire, which instantly made them vulnerable to being attacked from the air. The swarming technique requires a key feature of networks � adaptability. In a hierarchy, people are defined by the boxes they fill on the organizational chart. In a network, people change their roles depending on the situation. One way of bringing adaptability into federal hierarchies is the use of matrix teams.

39. BattleSwarm Cyber/netwar means operating in small, dispersed units, so well internetted that they can coordinate, coalesce and then dissever in repeated swarming attacks. In order effectively to disorganize enemy forces, it would require mobilizing - and deploying in "BattleSwarm" - a force only one tenth the size of the enemy forces. In a hierarchy, people are defined by the boxes they fill on the organizational chart. In a network, people change their roles depending on the situation. Cyber/netwar means operating in small, dispersed units, so well internetted that they can coordinate, coalesce and then dissever in repeated swarming attacks, In order effectively to disorganize enemy forces, it would require mobilizing - and deploying in "BattleSwarm" - a force only one tenth the size of the enemy forces. Cyber/netwar means operating in small, dispersed units, so well internetted that they can coordinate, coalesce and then dissever in repeated swarming attacks, In order effectively to disorganize enemy forces, it would require mobilizing - and deploying in "BattleSwarm" - a force only one tenth the size of the enemy forces.

40. Future armed forces look like hordes of cyber-Mongols. Arrayed not in platoons or battalions but in "clusters" and "pods." Call in airstrikes and direct cruise missiles remotely. Infiltrating the landscape in copters and off-road buggies, they float like butterflies but sting like sledgehammers. Future armed forces look like hordes of cyber-Mongols. Deceptively lightly armed, these fast, almost invisible specialized forces have no trenches, no forts, no supply dumps. They are arrayed not in platoons or battalions but in "clusters" and "pods." They use encrypted radios, satellite siting and precision-guided munitions. They can call in airstrikes and direct cruise missiles remotely. Infiltrating the landscape in copters and off-road buggies, they float like butterflies but sting like sledgehammers. Future armed forces look like hordes of cyber-Mongols. Deceptively lightly armed, these fast, almost invisible specialized forces have no trenches, no forts, no supply dumps. They are arrayed not in platoons or battalions but in "clusters" and "pods." They use encrypted radios, satellite siting and precision-guided munitions. They can call in airstrikes and direct cruise missiles remotely. Infiltrating the landscape in copters and off-road buggies, they float like butterflies but sting like sledgehammers.

41. Offensive Swarming

42. Swarming Attack Pattern

43. From Mars to Minerva RAND Corporation researchers Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe information as a physical property, on a par with matter and energy. Derive a new conception of power, and therefore of war. Instead of being based on material resources, from now on power resides in relations between people, and thus in organization. From the brute power of the god Mars we are passing to Minerva, the goddess of wisdom. Shift from war based on mutual capacities for destruction, to war in which the capacity for disruption, or dis-organization, assumes equal importance. Researchers distinguish four levels of what they call their "vision". At the heart of the notions elaborated by RAND Corporation researchers Arquilla and Ronfeldt is a very particular view of what information is. They move beyond the classic definitions (the message or the medium, in the distinction laid down in the 1960s) and describe information as a physical property, on a par with matter and energy. From this they derive a new conception of power, and therefore of war. Instead of being based on material resources, from now on power resides in relations between people, and thus in organization: it becomes immaterial. From the brute power of the god Mars we are passing to Minerva, the goddess of wisdom. This means a shift from war based on mutual capacities for destruction, to war in which the capacity for disruption, or dis-organization, assumes equal importance. On this basis, the researchers distinguish four levels of what they call their "vision": At the heart of the notions elaborated by RAND Corporation researchers Arquilla and Ronfeldt is a very particular view of what information is. They move beyond the classic definitions (the message or the medium, in the distinction laid down in the 1960s) and describe information as a physical property, on a par with matter and energy. From this they derive a new conception of power, and therefore of war. Instead of being based on material resources, from now on power resides in relations between people, and thus in organization: it becomes immaterial. From the brute power of the god Mars we are passing to Minerva, the goddess of wisdom. This means a shift from war based on mutual capacities for destruction, to war in which the capacity for disruption, or dis-organization, assumes equal importance. On this basis, the researchers distinguish four levels of what they call their "vision":

44. At the conceptual level, information gives form to structure. A major consequence of the information revolution - the rise of network forms of organization. The core of their military doctrine is the notion of "BattleSwarm". With each combatant in contact with all others, and unit commanders communicating with air force commanders and with other units it should be possible to employ fewer personnel with greater effectiveness. The overall strategy is what may be called "guarded openness". The free circulation of information serves the interests of the Allies and victory in tomorrow's wars will go to those who can tell the best story. It will be a dirty, no-holds-barred propaganda war of competing worldviews and alternative visions of the future (Meme Wars). At the conceptual level, information gives form to structure. A major consequence of the information revolution - the rise of network forms of organization. The core of their military doctrine is the notion of "BattleSwarm". Having intelligence about the circumstances and movements of your enemy, combined with a sophisticated system of communication (each combatant is in contact with all others, and unit commanders communicate with air force commanders and with other units) should make it possible to employ fewer personnel with greater effectiveness. The overall strategy is what may be called "guarded openness". The free circulation of information serves the interests of the Allies and victory in tomorrow's wars will go to those who can tell the best story. At the conceptual level, information gives form to structure. A major consequence of the information revolution - the rise of network forms of organization. The core of their military doctrine is the notion of "BattleSwarm". Having intelligence about the circumstances and movements of your enemy, combined with a sophisticated system of communication (each combatant is in contact with all others, and unit commanders communicate with air force commanders and with other units) should make it possible to employ fewer personnel with greater effectiveness. The overall strategy is what may be called "guarded openness". The free circulation of information serves the interests of the Allies and victory in tomorrow's wars will go to those who can tell the best story.

45. Power of Mind Military power resides in the domain of the mind and the will: thinking, valuing or attitude, and insight or imagination. Military power can increase in effectiveness even as it decreases in violence. May be called neocortical warfare. Military power resides in the domain of the mind and the will; the provinces of choice, "thinking," valuing or "attitude,"and insight or "imagination." Further, because of this, military power can increase in effectiveness even as it decreases in violence. As a consequence, we may infer that sea,.land, air and space operations help establish the essential preconditions for meeting national security political objectives without force, or what may be called neocortical warfare. Military power resides in the domain of the mind and the will; the provinces of choice, "thinking," valuing or "attitude,"and insight or "imagination." Further, because of this, military power can increase in effectiveness even as it decreases in violence. As a consequence, we may infer that sea,.land, air and space operations help establish the essential preconditions for meeting national security political objectives without force, or what may be called neocortical warfare.

46. Telematic Laws Telematic laws Moore's law states that microprocessor chips will either halve in price or double in power every 18 months. Gilder's law states that total bandwidth of communications systems will triple every 12 months. Metcalfe's law explains, in global constellations such as the Internet, the value of the network increases geometrically with the number of people who use it. Grosch's law held that doubling the cost of a computer multiplied its power fourfold. Since then, the cost- performance ratio of computers has flipped; it is greater at the lower end than the upper end. Microprocessors deliver more mips (million instructions per second) for the buck than their more sophisticated mainframe or even supercomputer rivals. Telematic laws Moore's law states that microprocessor chips will either halve in price or double in power every 18 months. Gilder's law states that total bandwidth of communications systems will triple every 12 months. Metcalfe's law explains, in global constellations such as the Internet, the value of the network increases geometrically with the number of people who use it. Grosch's law held that doubling the cost of a computer multiplied its power fourfold. Since then, the cost- performance ratio of computers has flipped; it is greater at the lower end than the upper end. Microprocessors deliver more mips (million instructions per second) for the buck than their more sophisticated mainframe or even supercomputer rivals.

47. Tactical Command, Control and Communication Systems (TCCCS)

48. Athene - Command & Control at the battalion and above level for use in harsh combat conditions. SAS- situational awareness system displays battlefield information in real time at the Battalion Battle Group and below level. Athene - Command & Control at the battalion and above level for use in harsh combat conditions. SAS- situational awareness system displays battlefield information in real time at the Battalion Battle Group and below level.

49. Situational Awareness System Enables the battlefield commander to track and direct all his assets in near real-time, using global positioning satellites (GPS). Instantaneous moving map manipulation and display on a theatre-wide scale. Detailed maps are scanned and stored. Boosts by a factor of up to 25 times the amount of geographic information available to today's soldier on the battlefield. It is a state-of-the-art military asset management and communications package that allows the commander on the battlefield to track and direct all his assets in near real-time, using global positioning satellites (GPS). Axion will provide the software engine for instantaneous moving map manipulation and display on a theatre-wide scale. Within SAS, detailed maps are scanned and will be stored in Axion's advanced image compression format. This boosts by a factor of up to 25 times the amount of geographic information available to today's soldier on the battlefield, without requiring expensive computer upgrades. It is a state-of-the-art military asset management and communications package that allows the commander on the battlefield to track and direct all his assets in near real-time, using global positioning satellites (GPS). Axion will provide the software engine for instantaneous moving map manipulation and display on a theatre-wide scale. Within SAS, detailed maps are scanned and will be stored in Axion's advanced image compression format. This boosts by a factor of up to 25 times the amount of geographic information available to today's soldier on the battlefield, without requiring expensive computer upgrades.

50. Digital Mapping Enables commanders and planners to view maps at the exact scale and level of detail most appropriate to the task being considered. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) capabilities allow the latest physical and objective data to be overlaid, together with dispositions of own and opposition resources. Transmit map data to operational units for local production, on-screen viewing. Digital mapping allows commanders and planners to view maps at the exact scale and level of detail most appropriate to the task being considered. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) capabilities allow the very latest physical and objective data to be overlaid, together with dispositions of own and opposition resources. It can print mission-specific maps for field commanders, or transmit map data to operational units for local production, on-screen viewing, or integration with land, sea or air navigational systems. Digital mapping allows commanders and planners to view maps at the exact scale and level of detail most appropriate to the task being considered. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) capabilities allow the very latest physical and objective data to be overlaid, together with dispositions of own and opposition resources. It can print mission-specific maps for field commanders, or transmit map data to operational units for local production, on-screen viewing, or integration with land, sea or air navigational systems.

51. Head Mounted Display Head mounted display The helmet HUD (heads-up display) allows maps to be displayed with relative positions of pod mates, or three-dimensional layouts to be superimposed in their field of vision. Such wearable computers link together components such as a radio system, a rifle-mounted video camera and thermal sight, and GPS. Head mounted display The helmet HUD (heads-up display) allows maps to be displayed with relative positions of pod mates, or three-dimensional layouts to be superimposed in their field of vision. Such wearable computers link together components such as a radio system, a rifle-mounted video camera and thermal sight, and GPS.

52. battleWEB Vehicle

53. Tactical Infosphere Tactical infosphere is a term for information on demand, or information pull as opposed to push. SAS and Athene programmes designed to provide a portion of the information required to fill the infosphere. Almost every Canadian tactical vehicle and selected soldiers on foot will be part of the continuously updated database. In the future, enemy locations may be entered by sensors, including soldiers, and passed automatically throughout the system. Tactical infosphere is a term for information on demand, or information pull as opposed to push. In Canada, the situation awareness (SAS) and land force command system (Athene) programmes are designed to provide a portion of the information required to fill the infosphere. SAS maintains the locations of all friendly forces based on real GPS-determined location, and sends this information to the Iris Communications System. Almost every Canadian tactical vehicle and selected soldiers on foot will be part of the continuously updated database. This situational awareness information is shared with Athene and other C2 sub-systems in the Iris infosphere. At present SAS displays only friendly force information but, in the future, enemy locations may be entered by sensors, including soldiers, and passed automatically throughout the system. Situational awareness information is generated automatically and filtered and consolidated in an hierarchical manner. Tactical infosphere is a term for information on demand, or information pull as opposed to push. In Canada, the situation awareness (SAS) and land force command system (Athene) programmes are designed to provide a portion of the information required to fill the infosphere. SAS maintains the locations of all friendly forces based on real GPS-determined location, and sends this information to the Iris Communications System. Almost every Canadian tactical vehicle and selected soldiers on foot will be part of the continuously updated database. This situational awareness information is shared with Athene and other C2 sub-systems in the Iris infosphere. At present SAS displays only friendly force information but, in the future, enemy locations may be entered by sensors, including soldiers, and passed automatically throughout the system. Situational awareness information is generated automatically and filtered and consolidated in an hierarchical manner.

54. Disparate pieces of information must be integrated into a cohesive system. Involves pulling different types of sensor information into this infosphere, processing this information in different places, transporting it and presenting it in a manner that permits a commander to make an intelligent decision based on the data. Integrating all the disparate pieces of information technology into a cohesive system of systems is a challenge. This involves pulling different types of sensor information into this infosphere, processing this information in different places, transporting it and presenting it in a manner that permits a commander to make an intelligent decision based on the data. Future Army network communications must be mobile, wireless and available when needed. As the Army proceeds with its transformation, its forces will find themselves spread over an extended battlespace. Having fewer assets dispersed over a larger geographic area will challenge the ability of operators to keep the network up and running. And, this network must be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Integrating all the disparate pieces of information technology into a cohesive system of systems is a challenge. This involves pulling different types of sensor information into this infosphere, processing this information in different places, transporting it and presenting it in a manner that permits a commander to make an intelligent decision based on the data. Future Army network communications must be mobile, wireless and available when needed. As the Army proceeds with its transformation, its forces will find themselves spread over an extended battlespace. Having fewer assets dispersed over a larger geographic area will challenge the ability of operators to keep the network up and running. And, this network must be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

55. Real-Time Warfare Knowledge army does not require co-location of cells to plan, direct and monitor the progress of operations. Complete sharing of available information and using the information-pull principle means that up-to-date information is being added to the infosphere continually. Commander and his staff will be separated geographically so they are in the location that best supports their individual functions. Video conferencing and electronic white boarding will enable these virtual CPs to operate in real-time. With the tactical infosphere in place, the knowledge army does not require co-location of cells to plan, direct and monitor the progress of operations. A complete sharing of available information and using the information-pull principle means that up-to-date information is being added to the infosphere continually while it is being drawn, as required, by planners and other users. The command post in the millennium will be a virtual CP. The commander and his staff will be separated geographically so they are in the location that best supports their individual functions. Specialist staffs will be linked through the infosphere so they can maintain a critical mass of expertise and facilities. Information technology advances such as video conferencing and electronic white boarding will enable these virtual CPs to operate in real-time. Commanders will concentrate on directing operations while staffs produce plans and monitor on-going operations and enemy reactions and intentions. With the tactical infosphere in place, the knowledge army does not require co-location of cells to plan, direct and monitor the progress of operations. A complete sharing of available information and using the information-pull principle means that up-to-date information is being added to the infosphere continually while it is being drawn, as required, by planners and other users. The command post in the millennium will be a virtual CP. The commander and his staff will be separated geographically so they are in the location that best supports their individual functions. Specialist staffs will be linked through the infosphere so they can maintain a critical mass of expertise and facilities. Information technology advances such as video conferencing and electronic white boarding will enable these virtual CPs to operate in real-time. Commanders will concentrate on directing operations while staffs produce plans and monitor on-going operations and enemy reactions and intentions.

56. Virtual Reality Training for War Modified version of the popular game "Doom" enables troops to interact and practise fairly realistic small unit tactics and fireteam drills. Computer simulator makers have developed workstations that allow company, battalion, brigade, and even division level officers to practise large unit engagement techniques in realistic virtual circumstances. Develop interactive skills that are useful in practising modern "Air-Land-Battle" doctrine, that is needed in today's extremely fluid battlefield environment. Recently, reports have surfaced of a U.S. Marine Corp experiment with a modified version of the popular game "Doom", that allows troops to interact and practise fairly realistic small unit tactics and fireteam drills without any danger to them. It would appear to be a safe and cost effective training alternative for Close Quarter Battle and urban/guerrilla warfare tactics. Sun MicroSystems and other computer simulator makers are also said to have developed workstations that allow company, battalion, brigade, and even division level officers to practise large unit engagement techniques in realistic virtual circumstances. These computer developments allow combat commanding officers to develop interactive skills that are useful in practising modern "Air-Land-Battle" doctrine, that is needed in today's extremely fluid battlefield environment. Recently, reports have surfaced of a U.S. Marine Corp experiment with a modified version of the popular game "Doom", that allows troops to interact and practise fairly realistic small unit tactics and fireteam drills without any danger to them. It would appear to be a safe and cost effective training alternative for Close Quarter Battle and urban/guerrilla warfare tactics. Sun MicroSystems and other computer simulator makers are also said to have developed workstations that allow company, battalion, brigade, and even division level officers to practise large unit engagement techniques in realistic virtual circumstances. These computer developments allow combat commanding officers to develop interactive skills that are useful in practising modern "Air-Land-Battle" doctrine, that is needed in today's extremely fluid battlefield environment.

57. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Computing By linking together hundreds of soldiers, each equipped with a head-mounted display that broadcasts details of a virtual environment, it would be possible for military units to accurately simulate various scenarios. Section/pod could virtually practise an attack while out in the field, before carrying it out for real. "Your training system suddenly becomes your mission-planning system. Before I go attack that hill. I'm going to run a simulation of it with my squad over the next 10 minutes, and simulate it virtually while we're waiting here for orders." The current focus of the army's research is on ways of improving battle simulations. It believes that by linking together hundreds of soldiers, each equipped with a head-mounted display that broadcasts details of a virtual environment, it would be possible for military units to accurately simulate various scenarios. In an interview with O'Reilly Network's OpenP2P.com, a US defence analyst explained that in the future a squad could virtually practise an attack while out in the field, before carrying it out for real. "Your training system suddenly becomes your mission-planning system. Before I go attack that hill. I'm going to run a simulation of it with my squad over the next 10 minutes, and simulate it virtually while we're waiting here for orders." The current focus of the army's research is on ways of improving battle simulations. It believes that by linking together hundreds of soldiers, each equipped with a head-mounted display that broadcasts details of a virtual environment, it would be possible for military units to accurately simulate various scenarios. In an interview with O'Reilly Network's OpenP2P.com, a US defence analyst explained that in the future a squad could virtually practise an attack while out in the field, before carrying it out for real. "Your training system suddenly becomes your mission-planning system. Before I go attack that hill. I'm going to run a simulation of it with my squad over the next 10 minutes, and simulate it virtually while we're waiting here for orders."

58. Information Warfare "Info War" is not the same as intelligence operations, although it is clearly related to intelligence. An attack on an adversary�s entire information, command and control, and, indeed, decision-making system. Directed at shrinking or interfering with the enemy�s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop while expanding and improving our own. Planners describe the objective of information war as "information dominance." Information warfare is emerging as a potent new element of strategy. "Info War" is not the same as intelligence operations, although it is clearly related to intelligence. As it is emerging in U.S. Defense Department thinking, information warfare is an attack on an adversary�s entire information, command and control, and, indeed, decision-making system. As Air Force Plans puts it: information warfare is "any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy�s information and its functions; protecting ourselves against the actions; and exploiting our own information operations." Information warfare is directed at shrinking or interfering with the enemy�s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop while expanding and improving our own. Strategists now speak of information as a "strategic asset," and planners describe the objective of information war as "information dominance." Information warfare is emerging as a potent new element of strategy. "Info War" is not the same as intelligence operations, although it is clearly related to intelligence. As it is emerging in U.S. Defense Department thinking, information warfare is an attack on an adversary�s entire information, command and control, and, indeed, decision-making system. As Air Force Plans puts it: information warfare is "any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy�s information and its functions; protecting ourselves against the actions; and exploiting our own information operations." Information warfare is directed at shrinking or interfering with the enemy�s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop while expanding and improving our own. Strategists now speak of information as a "strategic asset," and planners describe the objective of information war as "information dominance."

59. There are 7 different forms of Information Warfare: (i) command-and-control warfare (which strikes against the enemy's head and neck), (ii) intelligence-based warfare (which consists of the design, protection, and denial of systems that seek sufficient knowledge to dominate the battlespace), (iii) electronic warfare (radio- electronic or cryptographic techniques), (iv) psychological warfare (in which information is used to change the minds of friends, neutrals, and foes), (v) "hacker" warfare (in which computer systems are attacked), (vi) economic information warfare (blocking information or channelling it to pursue economic dominance), and (vii) cyberwarfare (a grab bag of futuristic scenarios). All these forms are weakly related. There are 7 different forms of Information Warfare: (i) command-and-control warfare (which strikes against the enemy's head and neck), (ii) intelligence-based warfare (which consists of the design, protection, and denial of systems that seek sufficient knowledge to dominate the battlespace), (iii) electronic warfare (radio- electronic or cryptographic techniques), (iv) psychological warfare (in which information is used to change the minds of friends, neutrals, and foes), (v) "hacker" warfare (in which computer systems are attacked), (vi) economic information warfare (blocking information or channelling it to pursue economic dominance), and (vii) cyberwarfare (a grab bag of futuristic scenarios). All these forms are weakly related.

60. Distributed Intelligence Most of the recent benefits of information technology are going, not into more powerful computers, but into more widely distributed intelligence. Computers can be slaved to sensors and networked. Most of the recent benefits of information technology are going, not into more powerful computers, but into more widely distributed intelligence. This truism of commercial life can be applied to the battlefield with even greater force. Proliferation in the civil world has its limits -- one person can get on but one functioning computer at a time. In the military realm, though, computers could be slaved to sensors and networked. The use of intelligent devices on the battlefield has no theoretical lower limit. Several factors suggest that such distribution is not only possible but optimal. Most of the recent benefits of information technology are going, not into more powerful computers, but into more widely distributed intelligence. This truism of commercial life can be applied to the battlefield with even greater force. Proliferation in the civil world has its limits -- one person can get on but one functioning computer at a time. In the military realm, though, computers could be slaved to sensors and networked. The use of intelligent devices on the battlefield has no theoretical lower limit. Several factors suggest that such distribution is not only possible but optimal.

61. Role of Unattended Sensors Unattended sensors in a future theatre of operation detect enemy movements, identify and locate targets, and feed that information via unmanned aerial vehicle communications network nodes to the command centre. Commanders collate their data with other information from space and Allied-based sources, then signal unattended battlefield and airborne weapons to launch against enemy assets. Unattended sensors in a future theatre of operation detect enemy movements, identify and locate targets, and feed that information via unmanned aerial vehicle communications network nodes to the command centre. Commanders collate their data with other information from space and Allied-based sources, then signal unattended battlefield and airborne weapons to launch against enemy assets. These networked weapons keep track of battle damage and trade-off targets as they are destroyed. Throughout these operations, Allied forces execute complex manoeuvres on the basis of high-speed data flowing to vehicles and even individuals. Despite their rapid mobility, the forces do not lose any contact with their full-time, self-organized network. Unattended sensors in a future theatre of operation detect enemy movements, identify and locate targets, and feed that information via unmanned aerial vehicle communications network nodes to the command centre. Commanders collate their data with other information from space and Allied-based sources, then signal unattended battlefield and airborne weapons to launch against enemy assets. These networked weapons keep track of battle damage and trade-off targets as they are destroyed. Throughout these operations, Allied forces execute complex manoeuvres on the basis of high-speed data flowing to vehicles and even individuals. Despite their rapid mobility, the forces do not lose any contact with their full-time, self-organized network.

62. �Precision weapons without current, precise knowledge of target locations are pretty useless.� Sandia advocates networking small gadgets that might package a global positioning locator, sensor, RF communicator, and a small computer. These relatively inexpensive devices would be widely distributed and in contact with each other to give a comprehensive picture of enemy movements. A fractal approach � small patterns that repeat larger patterns � to integrating security will help autonomous groups integrate data currently in separate boxes. Targeted groups include law enforcement, intelligence, public health, first responders, scene commanders, local governments, and private citizens. �Precision weapons without current, precise knowledge of target locations are pretty useless.� Sandia advocates networking small gadgets that might package a global positioning locator, sensor, RF communicator, and a small computer. These relatively inexpensive devices would be widely distributed and in contact with each other to give a comprehensive picture of enemy movements. A fractal approach � small patterns that repeat larger patterns � to integrating security will help autonomous groups integrate data currently in separate boxes. Targeted groups include law enforcement, intelligence, public health, first responders, scene commanders, local governments, and private citizens. In the near term, dozens of Sandia researchers over the next few months will develop sensor systems that identify and track large objects such as missile launchers in a desert environment. The ultimate intent over the next few years is to link hundreds of sensors that will identify and track people in urban environments.�Precision weapons without current, precise knowledge of target locations are pretty useless.� Sandia advocates networking small gadgets that might package a global positioning locator, sensor, RF communicator, and a small computer. These relatively inexpensive devices would be widely distributed and in contact with each other to give a comprehensive picture of enemy movements. A fractal approach � small patterns that repeat larger patterns � to integrating security will help autonomous groups integrate data currently in separate boxes. Targeted groups include law enforcement, intelligence, public health, first responders, scene commanders, local governments, and private citizens. In the near term, dozens of Sandia researchers over the next few months will develop sensor systems that identify and track large objects such as missile launchers in a desert environment. The ultimate intent over the next few years is to link hundreds of sensors that will identify and track people in urban environments.

63. Information on Demand The military is seeking ways to help soldiers on the ground in places such as Afghanistan get information faster. The idea is to let them establish ad hoc computer connections with forces, say, inside helicopters in Uzbekistan, or with officers back home and even with allies abroad, without getting bogged down in multiple security levels and incompatible software systems. The military is seeking ways to help soldiers on the ground in places such as Afghanistan get information faster. The idea is to let them establish ad hoc computer connections with forces, say, inside helicopters in Uzbekistan, or with officers back home and even with allies abroad, without getting bogged down in multiple security levels and incompatible software systems.

64. Rapid Prototyping: Parts on Demand Today armies depend on pre-positioned supplies or a gigantic logistics tail to provide, say, spare helicopter parts. Future armies, relying on advanced computing and "rapid prototyping," will before long be able to make many needed items on the spot. The technology can build objects of any desired shape out of metal, paper, plastic, or ceramics, according to instructions transmitted from data bases thousands of miles away. This will reduce the need for permanent foreign bases or supply depots. Second Wave armies depend on pre-positioned supplies or a gigantic logistics tail to provide, say, spare helicopter parts. Third Wave armies, relying on advanced computing and "rapid prototyping," will before long be able to make many needed items on the spot. The technology can build objects of any desired shape out of metal, paper, plastic, or ceramics, according to instructions transmitted from data bases thousands of miles away. "It is now possible," reports the New York Times, "to, in effect, fax parts to remote sites." This and similar technologies will speed and simplify the projection of military power, reducing the need for permanent foreign bases or supply depots. Second Wave armies depend on pre-positioned supplies or a gigantic logistics tail to provide, say, spare helicopter parts. Third Wave armies, relying on advanced computing and "rapid prototyping," will before long be able to make many needed items on the spot. The technology can build objects of any desired shape out of metal, paper, plastic, or ceramics, according to instructions transmitted from data bases thousands of miles away. "It is now possible," reports the New York Times, "to, in effect, fax parts to remote sites." This and similar technologies will speed and simplify the projection of military power, reducing the need for permanent foreign bases or supply depots.

65. Grid Technology Related to Rapid Prototyping will be the widespread implementation of Internet2 technology, enabling computer users to order computing power from the grid. Super-high-bandwidth Internet2 and readily available supercomputing power promises to deliver applications like streamed high-definition video, telemedicine, research collaboration, and distance learning. This will facilitate "reachback", the remote contacting of any information source, civilian or military, from the battlefield. Among corporations, IBM is working in the Netherlands to connect five universities with a computing grid system. The company uses grid computing to link its research centres. IBM's development is being done through the open-source model, which scientists hope will ensure seamless interoperability. In the future, especially with widespread implementation of Internet2 technology, computer users will be able to order computing power from the grid. The combination of the super-high-bandwidth Internet2 and readily available supercomputing power promises to deliver applications like streamed high-definition video, telemedicine, research collaboration, and distance learning. Among corporations, IBM is working in the Netherlands to connect five universities with a computing grid system. The company uses grid computing to link its research centres. IBM's development is being done through the open-source model, which scientists hope will ensure seamless interoperability. In the future, especially with widespread implementation of Internet2 technology, computer users will be able to order computing power from the grid. The combination of the super-high-bandwidth Internet2 and readily available supercomputing power promises to deliver applications like streamed high-definition video, telemedicine, research collaboration, and distance learning.

66. Platform-Centric vs. Net-Centric There is a parallel in the way Western forces fight battles today and the way computing worked in the 1980s. Just as you and your friend worked on incompatible operating systems and software, the military operates on independent weapons platforms. Carrier groups are platforms, as are Leopard tanks and F-18 aircraft, each operating with their own standards. And just as you and your friend wasted time trying to coordinate your different platforms, military experiments have found that platform-centric warfare takes twice as long to destroy 50 percent fewer targets than does network-centric warfare. There is a parallel in the way Western forces fight battles today and the way computing worked in the 1980s. Just as you and your friend worked on incompatible operating systems and software, the military operates on independent weapons platforms. Carrier groups are platforms, as are Leopard tanks and F-18 aircraft, each operating with their own standards. And just as you and your friend wasted time trying to coordinate your different platforms, military experiments have found that platform-centric warfare takes twice as long to destroy 50 percent fewer targets than does network-centric warfare.

67. Net-Centric Warfare

68. Value of Netcentricity Allows for vast global connectivity, real-time collaboration, and rapid and convenient information exchange. It has produced a significant byproduct as well - reduced costs. Moving information is far less costly than moving people and things. For the individual networked soldier the numerous elements of support: weapons, intelligence, medical services, etc. may be viewed simply as peripherals, to be contacted instantaneously as required. Every facet of our lives is being touched by netcentricity, which allows for vast global connectivity, real-time collaboration, and rapid and convenient information exchange. Netcentricity has produced a significant byproduct as well - reduced costs. Moving information is far less costly than moving people and things. Every facet of our lives is being touched by netcentricity, which allows for vast global connectivity, real-time collaboration, and rapid and convenient information exchange. Netcentricity has produced a significant byproduct as well - reduced costs. Moving information is far less costly than moving people and things.

69. Netcentricity has allowed companies to downsize while simultaneously increasing productivity. For example, FedEx's PowerShip customer tracking software boosted both customer volume and satisfaction while allowing for an 80-percent reduction in customer service representatives. For the military, the promise of being able to mass effects rather than forces, to leave people and machines where they are, and to create smaller, in-theatre footprints, are just a few of the benefits to be derived from its version of netcentricity: Net-Centric Warfare (NCW). Netcentricity has allowed companies to downsize while simultaneously increasing productivity. For example, FedEx's PowerShip customer tracking software boosted both customer volume and satisfaction while allowing for an 80-percent reduction in customer service representatives. For the military, the promise of being able to mass effects rather than forces, to leave people and machines where they are, and to create smaller, in-theatre footprints, are just a few of the benefits to be derived from its version of netcentricity: Net-Centric Warfare (NCW).

70. NCW describes how the military will organize and fight in the Information Age. By networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters, a shared awareness is created, which enables faster decision-making, higher tempo operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and self-synchronization. And because NCW promises a better distribution of resources to tasks than was possible in the past, operations, which may have been impossible under a traditional warfare model, might become feasible in the future. NCW describes how the military will organize and fight in the Information Age. By networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters, a shared awareness is created, which enables faster decision-making, higher tempo operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and self-synchronization. And because NCW promises a better distribution of resources to tasks than was possible in the past, operations, which may have been impossible under a traditional warfare model, might become feasible in the future.

71. New Weapons and Countermeasures Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) Non-Lethal Weapons Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Stealth Technology Anti-Ballistic Missile System Bluetooth and Networking of Sensing Devices Space Technology Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) Non-Lethal Weapons Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Stealth Technology Anti-Ballistic Missile System Bluetooth and Networking of Sensing Devices Space Technology Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) Non-Lethal Weapons Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Stealth Technology Anti-Ballistic Missile System Bluetooth and Networking of Sensing Devices Space Technology

72. New Infantry Weapon Removable top barrel hurls 20mm high-explosive air-bursting fragmentation rounds more than a half-mile. The lower barrel shoots NATO-standard 5.56mm ammunition. These rounds provide accurate single-round or bursts to about 500 yards. Laser-guided electronics as sophisticated as on a modern tank. Removable top barrel hurls 20mm high-explosive air-bursting fragmentation rounds more than a half-mile. The lower barrel shoots NATO-standard 5.56mm ammunition. These rounds provide accurate single-round or bursts to about 500 yards. Laser-guided electronics as sophisticated as on a modern tank. Removable top barrel hurls 20mm high-explosive air-bursting fragmentation rounds more than a half-mile. The lower barrel shoots NATO-standard 5.56mm ammunition. These rounds provide accurate single-round or bursts to about 500 yards. Laser-guided electronics as sophisticated as on a modern tank.

73. Lasers of Lead Australian inventor Mike O'Dwyer has developed a machine gun that can fire bullets at a rate of 1 million rounds per minute. Rather than use mechanical firing pins to shoot bullets one by one, O'Dwyer's gun holds multiple bullets in the barrel -- one behind the other. Electronic charges set off in different parts of the barrel, just fractions of a second apart, fire the bullets in fast succession using traditional gunpowder. The all-electronic handgun uses the technology to ensure the gun can only be fired if its user is wearing a special ring that emits an electronic signal. This means the gun would be worthless if it is taken from a policeman or soldier by an assailant.

74. Counter-Network Networks Taking a cue from LA's TEW we might envision the following elements in a military network to fight terrorist networks: A network of modules (pods) each comprised of experts (snipers, urban guerrillas, paratroops, mountaineers, peacekeepers, chemical analysts, medical team, PGM (sea/land/air) launchers, recce troops, etc.) Individual experts/soldiers in contact with relevant contacts anywhere in the network. Virtual reachback to experts in business, government and academia in realtime. Group software enables pods and individuals to collaborate on plans and actions when responding to threats. Taking a cue from LA's TEW we might envision the following elements in a military network to fight terrorist networks: A network of modules (pods) each comprised of experts (snipers, urban guerrillas, paratroops, mountaineers, peacekeepers, chemical analysts, medical team, PGM (sea/land/air) launchers, recce troops, etc.) Individual experts/soldiers in contact with relevant contacts anywhere in the network. Virtual reachback to experts in business, government and academia in realtime. Group software enables pods and individuals to collaborate on plans and actions when responding to threats.

75. A Role for NGOs Another way to boost the quality and quantity of intelligence is to cultivate more of an open source model - by including nongovernmental organizations, like Amnesty International, in the network. This will make it possible to draw on the knowledge of activist groups already engaged in waging social netwars around the world. Adding NGOs to a sensory network will also help develop loyalty to a cause. The al Qaeda network draws its strength from the tight religious and kinship bonds among its members. To be effective, the Allies' counternetwork will need to have its own binding, democracy-driven value system. Another way to boost the quality and quantity of intelligence is to cultivate more of an open source model - by including nongovernmental organizations, like Amnesty International, in the network. This will make it possible to draw on the knowledge of activist groups already engaged in waging social netwars around the world. Much of the intelligence we need is openly available - it's just a matter of looking in the right places. Adding NGOs to a sensory network will also help develop loyalty to a cause. The al Qaeda network draws its strength from the tight religious and kinship bonds among its members. To be effective, the Allies' counternetwork will need to have its own binding, democracy-driven value system. Another way to boost the quality and quantity of intelligence is to cultivate more of an open source model - by including nongovernmental organizations, like Amnesty International, in the network. This will make it possible to draw on the knowledge of activist groups already engaged in waging social netwars around the world. Much of the intelligence we need is openly available - it's just a matter of looking in the right places. Adding NGOs to a sensory network will also help develop loyalty to a cause. The al Qaeda network draws its strength from the tight religious and kinship bonds among its members. To be effective, the Allies' counternetwork will need to have its own binding, democracy-driven value system.

76. Books on Networks