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BC’s Referenda: What did we learn? June 13, 2009

BC’s Referenda: What did we learn? June 13, 2009. Wendy Bergerud Fair Vote Canada, national council Fair Voting BC, treasurer BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. Acknowledgements.

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BC’s Referenda: What did we learn? June 13, 2009

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  1. BC’s Referenda:What did we learn?June 13, 2009 Wendy Bergerud Fair Vote Canada, national council Fair Voting BC, treasurer BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform

  2. Acknowledgements • I have benefitted greatly from comments and discussions from several people discussing the aftermath of the 2009 referendum. • These are primarily my opinions – I’m not sure that FVBC has an official position on this, but certainly we all have different takes.

  3. First referendum: May 17, 2005 3

  4. Second referendum: May 12, 2009 4

  5. External Factors • Government framed the question: No or Yes to BC-STVinstead of: FPTP (status quo) or BC-STV (change)

  6. External Factors • Government framed the question: • Changed referendum question but not their regulations. • They allowed FPTP proponents to call themselves NO-STV • And we did almost NOTHING to frame the question differently – in fact, we often framed it the same way!

  7. External Factors • Liberal Party campaigned on “Keep BC Strong” and onStability aka no change in governing party • Encouraged fear about the economic situation and that no change in gov’t would be best

  8. Referenda Thresholds For the government to be obliged to implement BC-STV the government set two thresholds: 60% (48 out of 79) or more of the ridings must pass it at the 50% threshold 60% or more of the popular vote. 8

  9. BC Referendum Results 2005: 77 out of 79 ridings (97%) voted yes 57.8% popular vote for yes. 2009 7 out of 85 ridings (8%) voted for BC-STV 39.1% popular vote for BC-STV. 9

  10. Referendum Threshold • The 60% threshold is undemocratic • We must attack this – if this stands as legitimate then I don’t see any future hope. • New Zealand would still have FPTP if they’d used 60%.

  11. Referendum Funding • $500,000 for RIO • Less than 2005 • Simply not enough even for dedicated staff • $500,000 for NO-STV • Enough to spread FUD • Especially for well-known columnists who already get lots of media time.

  12. Referendum Funding • $500,000 for British Columbians for BC-STV, but not enough for: • Education for all voters • Grassroots Organization, AND • Media campaign • But may appear to many to be treating both sides equally

  13. Gov’t provide information? • Gov’t would NOT reprint • assembly’s report, make RIO fact sheets available nor make Elections BC’s info pamphlets available. • Everything was “online” • This disenfranchised those not online or who didn’t know how to reach the RIO • Elections BC did a lot to advertise that there was an election and referendum

  14. Extra Campaign Funding • Support from FVC and the UK’s ERS was substantial • Even with significant fund-raising we didn’t have the millions we needed. • We did have about $800,000 in all, which, in fact, is pretty amazing!

  15. Internal Factors • Who should run a referendum campaign? • NOT electoral reformers! • Reformers can argue about details but who cares? – Not many! • Instead, we need campaign managers • We need folks who can build a grass roots movement • We need experts in OTHER fields

  16. Internal Factors • Referenda campaigns are markedly different from political campaigns • Conferences didn’t boost the grassroots movement (or get media attention) like we hoped – need to find other methods. • Board members too used to no resources and relying on our own limited skill-set.

  17. Internal Factors • Board didn’t use our early large donations soon enough • we should have hired someone to plan our campaign and get it started, whether or not we got the gov’t fundng. • Plan was not in place in February. • Almost everything got going later than necessary.

  18. Internal Factors • Lack of good communications between the various parts of the organization led to disjointed work, lack of empowerment and bad feelings. • Requirement for Financial Agent authorization stymied many local groups from producing their own material • Campaign was too centralized

  19. Internal Factors • Didn’t counter the opposition’s newspaper ads, either with our own newspaper ads or with TV and radio ads • Our opposition did what we expected but we weren’t prepared. • Assembly not mentioned in our mass media • Didn’t raise millions of dollars ahead of time!

  20. Getting votes for change • What catches the attention of those who would never join a Citizens’ Assembly? • What would motivate them to vote for change? • Education but Not formal education, maybe the other kind of PR? (while remaining factual)

  21. Getting votes for change • Make the change feel comfortable and familiar • How do we do that? • Involve adult educators and/or PR specialists • Identify and counter the negative perceptions of coalition governments and proportional representation • in a simple manner, somehow!

  22. Getting votes for change • Educate about flaws of FPTP • What outcomes of FPTP really bother people? – connect the dots for folks • How might others see the proposed change negatively, even though these perceptions are wrong? • Counter these negative perceptions. • Build a true grassroots movement (somehow!)

  23. Photo by Kent Kallberg

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