The Nuclear Terrorist Threat to Russia and the World -- What is to be Done?

1. The Nuclear Terrorist Threat to Russia and the World -- What is to be Done? Matthew Bunn, Harvard University 2nd Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference September 19-20, 2003 http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atom

2. Terrorists and nuclear explosives • With HEU, gun-type bomb -- as obliterated Hiroshima -- very plausibly within capabilities of sophisticated terrorist group • Implosion bomb (required for Pu) more difficult, still conceivable (especially if they got help)

3. Hiroshima -- result of a gun-type bomb

4. Securing nuclear stockpiles --a global problem • Thousands of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material exist in hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries worldwide • Security ranges from excellent to appalling -- no binding global standards in place • >130 operational research reactors fueled with HEU in ~ 40 countries -- most with modest security • Russia has world’s largest stocks, still in transition from Soviet security system not designed for open society with open borders -- rest of FSU has little experience, few resources, for guarding nuclear materials • Issues around the world: e.g., Pakistan (high security but very high threat -- outsider and insider)

5. Outsider threats • Large overt attack • e.g., Moscow theater, October 2002: ~ 40 heavily armed, well-trained, suicidal terrorists, striking without warning • Multiple coordinated teams • e.g., 9/11/01 -- 4 teams, 4-5 participants each, well-trained, suicidal, from group with access to heavy weapons and explosives, >1 year intelligence collection and planning, striking without warning • Significant covert attack • e.g., Indian incident with thieves drilling through wall for sources • Use of unusual vehicles • e.g., helicopters used in many recent jail escapes • e.g., speedboat planned for use in $200M Millenium Dome theft

6. Insider threats • The desperate insider • Danger in Russia reduced with Russian economic stabilization (but still frequent incidents of minor theft by soldiers and sailors) • The greedy/corrupt insider • e.g., recent arrest of Atomflot deputy director Tyulyakov (corruption? radioactive theft?) -- countless other cases worldwide • The ideologically sympathetic insider • e.g., case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in Pakistan • The blackmailed insider • Chechens, others have used tactic of kidnapping a child of an official -- many other possibilities • Outsiders and insiders may work together

7. Do terrorists want nuclear weapons? Clear Bin Laden statements, some Chechen interest Is it conceivable terrorists could make a crude bomb if they got the material? Is there material that might be vulnerable to theft and transfer to terrorists? Is it likely that terrorists, if they had a crude device, could smuggle it to Moscow, Washington, or New York? Yes No         Summary: the nuclear terrorist threat

8. Much has been accomplishedto reduce this threat • Russian unilateral steps to tighten security for nuclear facilities -- especially since Chechen terrorist attacks, 9/11 • U.S.-Russian cooperation has improved security for hundreds of tons of potential bomb material, thousands of nuclear warheads, at dozens of sites • Enough bomb material for thousands of nuclear weapons has been permanently destroyed • Project Vinca (removal of HEU from Yugoslavia) showed potential for U.S.-Russian cooperation to address insecure stockpiles around the world • Hundreds of dedicated Russian and U.S. experts have made major contribution to world security

9. But much remains to be done… Weapons-Usable Material MPC&A Upgrades in Russia Expected by Oct. 1, 2003 MT=Metric Tons

10. Strong Presidential statements highlight the danger of terrorists with WMD • Bush: “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction….History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.” -- National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 9/02 • Putin: “We do not think that the major threats nowadays are presented by ICBMs…We all know exactly how New York and Washington were hit…Was it ICBMs? What threat are we talking about? We are talking about the use of mass destruction weapons terrorists may obtain—chemical weapons, biological weapons, and so on. Russia is convinced that this is what should be given the most serious thought to.” -- Press conference, 1/01

11. Matching statements to actions… If they really see nuclear terrorism as a high-priority threat: • Why have disputes over access to sensitive sites, liability and tax issues, slow contracting procedures, visa problems, and other impediments been allowed to slow progress in securing nuclear weapons and materials for years? • Why were security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles around the world not identified as a priority of the Global Partnership? • Why has the Russian government consistently underfunded its own nuclear security upgrade programs (e.g., $200M cost to meet Russian physical protection regulations -- GAN 2002 report)? • Why has the Russian government only given the 12th GUMO the resources to install a handful of the already-purchased site security upgrade kits each year, leaving equipment in warehouses for years? • Why has the U.S. government decided not to help upgrade security for Russian operational tactical warhead sites?

12. Key priorities if the Presidents agreed on a high-priority cooperative program • “Global cleanout” -- fast-paced effort to remove nuclear material from most vulnerable sites around the world • Accelerated, strengthened MPC&A cooperation • Fast-paced agreed deadline -- e.g., FSU upgrades done in 4 years • Focus also on sustainability -- security that will last, including after international assistance ends • Security strong enough to meet post-9/11 threats • Requires Presidential decision to finally resolve access issue, sweep aside other impediments to acceleration • Joint U.S.-Russian efforts to cooperate with other countries -- e.g., Pakistan, India, China -- to improve nuclear security • Accelerated blend-down of HEU; securing and monitoring most dangerous warheads; strengthened global standards; expanded support for the IAEA…

13. The challenge • If Presidents Bush and Putin really believed that nuclear terrorism was an urgent threat, and that actions they could take could substantially reduce it, many problems would be solved -- how do we convince them? • If the two Presidents announced that they had agreed to reduce this threat as much as possible as quickly as possible, what specific actions would we recommend? On the day after a nuclear terrorist attack, what would we wish we had done to prevent it? Why aren’t we doing it now?

14. 2010: the vision • No nuclear terrorism has occurred, no nuclear weapons or materials have fallen into the hands of terrorists or hostile states • All nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide are secure and accounted for, to stringent international standards • All high-consequence nuclear facilities are secure from both outsider and insider sabotage and attack • All large radiological sources are under effective control • Effective measures are in place to interdict nuclear smuggling • There is sufficient transparency to give the international community confidence these steps have been taken

15. 2010: the danger • Multiple unrecovered thefts of weapons-usable nuclear material have occurred • Weapons-usable nuclear materials in some countries around the world remain dangerously insecure -- as do nuclear power plants and spent fuel facilities in some countries • Substantial numbers of large radioactive sources remain unaccounted for • Intelligence indicates that a thriving black market in nuclear material exists, and that several terrorist groups, as well as states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, have gained access to enough weapons-usable material for a bomb • Nuclear terrorist attacks may have already occurred -- or could occur at any time

16. For further reading… • Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials • http://www.nti.org/cnwm • Letter Report from the Co-Chairs of the Joint Committee on U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, John P. Holdren and Nikolai P. Laverov • http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/s02052003?OpenDocument