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This article by Edward W. Felten from Princeton University's Secure Internet Programming Lab explores the tradeoff that users make between security and functionality in various systems. It examines the argument that improving security measures may not necessarily result in an overall improvement in security due to users trading away security for more functionality. The article also addresses objections and debates surrounding this topic.
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Outrageous Opinion:Nothing We Do Can Improve Security Edward W. FeltenSecure Internet Programming LabDept. of Computer SciencePrinceton University
The Lesson of Anti-Lock Brakes •Anti-lock brakes (ABS) were supposed tomake cars safer.•But people with ABS just drove faster, and closer together.•Result: no real change in accident rates•Users traded away safety for speed
Nothing We Do Can Improve Security •Security mechanisms will always beconfigurable by users.•Users trade off security vs. function•Typical user approach:–Maximum functionality; “good enough” security•If we provide better security, users willtrade it away for functionality.•Ergo, security will not improve
Objection:Security Isn’t “Good Enough” Yet •Not really an exception to the rule–“turned off” is a configuration choice•If we improve base-level security, peoplewill find riskier uses for systems•Invariant: most users operate at theragged edge of “secure enough”
Objection:We’re Still Doing Good • •Even if users trade away security, they’retrading it for something they value•But: tradeoff makes it even harder tomeasure how we’re doing•Maybe we’re actually doing a good job ?!?