SALW Control, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants and Peace-building in in Southern Afri

1. SALW Control, Disarmament, Demobilization,and Reintegration of Former Combatants and Peace-building in inSouthern Africa Presented at COST Action A25 Final Conference " Armed Violence" - 17-19 March, Brussels By Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa University of the Witwatersrand

2. Outline Introduction Conceptual background/Definitions Analysis of the Southern African Situation Conclusions

3. Introduction SALW, Control, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a necessary step if permanent and sustainable peace is to be built after a conflict �Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants form a continuum that is itself a part of the entire peace process: Where disarmament ends demobilization must begin and must eventually lead to reintegration, if sustainable peace and development are to be secured in countries emerging from conflict.� - United Nations

4. Conceptual background/Definitions Disarmament :Survey, Collection, Storage, Disposal and/Reutilization of weapons of combatants & often also of the civilian population Demobilization: Downsizing or complete disbandment of armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) as part of broader transformation from war to peace Reintegration :Assistance measures for former combatants and dependants to (re) settle in post-war communities (social), become part of democratic decision making process (political), engage in sustainable civilian livelihoods (economic) and adjust attitudes, expectations and deal with war-related mental trauma (psychological) Combatant: All members of armed group- gun carrying; logistics & administration (women and children/hangers on)

5. Analysis of the Southern African Situation Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, suffered, at various times during the 1960s to the early 1990s, armed conflict. Post-conflict DDR aimed at addressing problems of postconflict peace building. An overarching goal was the pursuit of peace and stability through the management of weapons and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants. In all the different cases, DDR fell short of meeting this target with different security and stability impacts within a decade or so of the implementation of DDR.

6. Analysis of the Angola Situation Angola represents how ineffective DDR can easily cause antagonistic armies to recidivate. Failed attempts at DDR twice contributed to the resumption of armed conflict between the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) DDR first undertaken between 1991 and 1992 as part of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II. International community�s unpreparedness to provide comprehensive support and related questionable confidence and commitment by the parties contributed to torpedo the process Inadequately funded and poorly equipped UNAVEM II, had an inadequate mandate to verify the D&D Insecure and mistrustful parties bypassed D&D and maintained contingency fighting capabilities Lack of proper security infrastructure and measures for effective storage and control of weapons that had been collected from the armies. Contd. On next slide

7. Tents and grass huts used as safe houses could not be padlocked UNAVEM II undermanned � five-man UNAVEM teams monitored about 30,000 troops Financial limitations and hardships disincentived troops to disarm and demobilize and many deserted the poorly secured cantonment areas. These inadequacies combined to foster disappearance of arms. Loopholes in the D&D process allowed opposing armies to retain/return to combat readiness and easily recidivate after UNITA rejected the 1992 election outcome. War ensued from October 1992- late 1994, during which human casualties were conservatively placed at 300,000, or, 3% (Human Rights Watch) Contd. On next slide

8. Serious threat to security caused by ineffective disarmament was replayed under UNAVEM III-led peace process. Inspite of Lusaka Protocol (November 20, 1994) allocating UNAVEM III overall responsibility for the D&D process UNITA circumvented DDR- maintained elite fighting force while 12,543 of its 68,310 personnel registered for DDR systematically deserted, leaving only 55,013 in the camps, including 7,000 under-aged soldiers Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN Secretary-General, noted that UNITA surrendered mainly mediocre military equipment Smaller Observation Mission in Angola (MONUA) replaced UNAVEM III on June 30, 1997. MONUA�s ineffective surveillance & abortive sanctions regime, allowed UNITA to invest illicit diamond trade returns in a substantial remilitarization program. Angolan govt used oil revenues, mining concessions, bank loans to buy military equipt MONUA�s failure to complete Angola�s on-and-off DDR ended in remobilization by both sides, followed by renewed military confrontation. This effectively dealt the Lusaka peace process a death blow. Current DDR exercise followed the MPLA government forces� military defeat of the UNITA. Gvt lent primacy to domestically managed DDR of UNITA. UNITA disbanded DDR met with significant obstacles including politicized ex-combatants, lack of adequate facilities, inaccessible roads, mine infestation, and inadequately prepared areas.(UN)

9. Analysis of the Mozambique Situation DDR under a UN peace operations framework. General Peace Agreement (GPA) for Mozambique of October 4, 1992, signed in Rome between the ruling FRELIMO and opposing RENAMO, ended Mozambique�s 17-year-old civil war. UN Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) established and tasked with DDR of the parties Disarmament an enormous task as estimated 0.5m-6m weapons imported into the country during the civil war (Gamba 1999:42). Only a modest part was collected by UNOMOZ by December 1995; 6,097,727 rounds of ammunition, 3,677 grenades, 351 kg of mortar bombs, 225,717 landmines, 24,124 unspecified weapons, and 1,263,424 ammunition and mortar bombs had been collected (Lundin et al. 2000:204). UNOMOZ gave in to politically motivated demands by the government not to stick with the original plan to send weapons collected from assembly areas to regional depots pending their destruction (McMullin 2004:632) A large proportion of the 190,000 weapons collected and not destroyed during the UN operation recirculated locally and regionally (Gamba 1999:43). This inflated the estimated millions of uncontrolled firearms that were not collected by UNOMOZ Contd. On next slide

10. Recognizing the security threats of the proliferation of illicit arms post-UNOMOZ weapons control exercises have been carried out by the state security forces and in partnership with neighboring governments. One such national exercise carried out by the police in 1996 resulted in the destruction of 202 heavy weapons, 2,252 weapons, 2,495 landmines, and 123,129 unexploded ordinances (Lundin et al. 2000:205). In a significant joint seek-and-destroy mission code-named ��Operation Rachel,�� between 1995 and 1999, South African and Mozambican police forces used various incentives and other persuasive methods with the civilian population to pinpoint known arms caches throughout Mozambique. Contd. On next slide

11. Analysis of the Namibia Situation DDR occurred in a UN peacekeeping context. UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) supervised D&D of South West Africa People�s Organization (SWAPO) forces, ��ethnic and paramilitary�� units and withdrawal of South African military forces Gap between ��DDRs�� two ��Ds�� and the R. Inauspicious start to DDR as UNTAG not fully emplaced Clashes btn SA forces and PLAN killing 140 UNTAG subsequently succeeded D&D about 50 000 SWAPO and local South West Africa fighters Safe storage as weapons collected deposited in ��double-locked�� drill halls Success of the two ��Ds�� in DDR was not reinforced by the independence government�s failure to plan and implement comprehensive reintegration programs.

12. Post-independence reintegration Establishment of NDF & NAMPOL absorbed between 8 000 - 10 000 of ex-combatants Independence gvt failed to plan and implement comprehensive R Stop gap reintegration measures included paying PLAN ex-combatants a one-off R1 400 gratuity; Pay and scatter? and establishment of an ill-fated Demobilization Brigade established to impart mainly agriculture & construction training skills Adverse economic context Human insecurity; unemployment, disability plight 1995- Demonstrations- DDR peace/stability dividend elusive 1997/98- Significant protests for welfare support & recognition Gvt responded with the Peace Project- affirmative public sector employment for 11 950 unemployed & registered ex-combatants About 90% of 11 950 absorbed Peace Project has since prevented widespread new ex-fighter stability threats

13. Analysis of the South Africa Situation National minutes, accords, agreements mainly by National Party Government and the African National Congress paved way for transition Multi-Party military negotiations centred on new SANDF [D]D&R secondary Pretoria Minute of August 6, 1990 led to ANC suspending armed struggle and ostensible self-mngd Disarmament Self Defence Units DF Malan Accord (Feb. 1991) provided control over ANC Umkhonthe WeSizwe (MK) cadres and weapons Accord provided for registration of specific MK arms for protecting the political leadership. Gvt Gazette of March 1991 indemnified MK members Disarmament of some 4,000 MK fighters and return to SA from camps in Uganda and Tanzania as ��unarmed civilians�� during the UNHCR voluntary repatriation operation Not elaborately linked to ex-fighter reintegration Contd. On next slide

14. MK argue their Headquarters collected the weapons and then handed them over to the Transitional Executive Council for planned destruction A July 1993 month-long amnesty period for people to hand over weapons only collected 18 weapons with 3 days to go Disarmament not in any way complete. This may have contributed to South Africa�s multicausal and destructive small arms scourge, violent crime and high murder rate. ��Finally, not all firearms were collected. Some of them, we have found in the cash-in-transit robberies. Thus (till) today, the government is still giving amnesties with regards to handing in of illegal firearms.�� (SAPS) Deputy Provincial Commissioner Africa Khumalo (Interview 2005)

15. D&R 22 931 MK and APLA cadres on CPR but ineligible [age, ill health, minimum reqnts] or unwilling to join SANDF Cadres assembled at SADF bases for administration [BMAT oversight] 3-legged reintegration strategy: Once-off gratuity Counseling & advisory service Service Corp training scheme Lack of ex-c input, resources; location in DoD, old SADF structures, no networks with commerce and industry Lack of physical & psychological rehab programmes Resort to traditional or peer support as professional, clinical support expensive Strong women�s movement-Gender-aware constitution (SC?) Contd. On next slide

16. Assessment Human insecurity- major unemployment problem , e.g., a CCR study found that 66% of sample unemployed, many without marketable job-skills Impeding post-apartheid economic context Violent crime- cash-in-transit heists Small scale protests to highlight grievances� 27 unemployed ex-MK in Durban Aug 93; 100 unemployed ex-MK/APLA Aug 2002 in the Western Cape; Ex-fighters part of Aug 2002Soc Mvt Forum anti-World Summit on Sustainable Dvpt protests in JHB Remedial Initiatives DoD reorganizing Service Corps Move to establish National War Veterans Association to allow implementation of Military Veterans Act-Elusive financial dividend

17. Analysis of the Zimbabwe Situation Lancaster House Agreement of Dec 79 ended war btn Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), ZANLA and ZIPRA Emphasis on ceasefire, constitution, elections Integration and practical DDR postponed Minimalist Commonwealth Monitoring Force during transition- ceasefire, separation and containment of antagonists in Assembly Points and bases

18. Post-independence; disarm as you demobilize policy Retention of weapons by the combatants awaiting integration problematic Armed clashes occurred in integration camps between antagonistic ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants. The government then disarmed the guerillas following pronounced Entumbane clash of November 9�11, 1980 ZIPRA combatants withdrawal Some involved in dissident activity (1981-1987) 5th Brigade campaign More than 10 000 civilians lost their lives

19. Demobilization Policy of 81-83: Demobilize and scatter? Demobilization Directorate established to manage policy Fiscal and security considerations Targeting mainly ex-ZANLA and ZIPRA Programme components: Further education Technical training Expert guidance- employment (/self), cooperatives Demobilization allowance- Z$185*24 mths/Z$4400 lump sum No provision for rehab yet in 1980 abt 5000 demobilized disabled 1980- War Victims Compensation Act 1981- National Rehabilitation Centre planned to offer disabled combatants 6-month rehab programme established Absence of coherent implementation plan 1985 Centre closed to ex-combatants Comprehensive & gendered DDR assistance absent

20. Post-Demobilization Combatant Status

21. Assessment Majority of cooperatives, business crumbled-Lack of managerial skills, technical know-how, marketing strategies, drought, proactive monitoring mechanism Unfavorable economic, social, political contexts Demobilization allowance insufficient & inept financial mgt Human security indicators among ex-combatants- 25 000 unemployed (1990)

22. Assessment 1997- ex-combatants mobilize around war veterans� identity & engage in rolling protests following suspension of WVCF- swords- DDR peace dividend elusive Relationship between government and veterans based on power seeking; appeal to liberation war; use of violence/intimidation 1997-remedial action- 2nd policy on D and R Impact- Financial peace dividend elusive

23. Conclusions Disarmament was used to ameliorate the security threat posed by continued presence of illicit weapons. None of the countries had an elaborate SALW control programme. Can be contextually understood as the concept had not yet gained currency. DDR�s capacity to address SALW problematic where the stakes are high and mistrust exists between previously warring parties DDR�s potential of contributing a peace dividend was not fully realized. DDR should be an integral part of the peace process There should be no gap between the two Ds and the R DDR should be comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable DDR cannot standby a stagnant/imbalanced economy DDR needs to be implemented in a participative manner

24. Flexible implementation approach combined with a vibrant monitoring and evaluating mechanism Accountable and transparent implementing institutions Corrective measures that do not disrupt the national social and economic fabric should be devised Symbiotic relationship between effective DDR and genuine national reconciliation Success of DDR is a function of both external help and local political will Establishment of representative national ex-fighter associations at the earliest possible time is important Pay & Scatter only buys time: DDR programmes should strategically balance the security imperatives and genuine concern for the welfare of ex-fighters Ensuring the human security of ex-fighters via effective DDR facilitates regime and national security which then allows DDR to achieve its promise of positive contribution to peace building. Whilst UN peacekeeping operations may have exact mandates to implement under specified timeframes there is need to ensure continuity through post-withdrawal synergy with relevant local bodies

25. THANKS FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION ---END---