50 likes | 188 Views
Government E-1275: Nov. 6, 2007 Session #7. The Korean Peninsula. Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula. ’60s-’70s: ROK-DPRK as “relative equals” (Cha, p. 49, 59-60). June ’50: DPRK’s strategic “window of opportunity.” U.S. conventional & nuclear forces in ROK:
E N D
Government E-1275: Nov. 6, 2007Session #7. The Korean Peninsula
Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula • ’60s-’70s: ROK-DPRK as “relative equals” (Cha, p. 49, 59-60). • June ’50: DPRK’s strategic “window of opportunity.” • U.S. conventional & nuclear forces in ROK: • nuclear cannons, nuclear-tipped missiles, Atomic Demolition Mines (ADM). • frequent joint military exercises (Cumings, pp. 52-54). • Declining position of DPRK: • End of Cold War; China’s role (Cumings, p. 58). • Economic crises/famines in the 90s; ROK’s economic miracle. • DPRK’s provocations: • Troop maneuvers in Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom (’95); Taepodong missile test over Japan (Aug. ’98); naval incursions into ROK waters (June ’99). • Cha’s interpretation: DPRK resorts to military provocations due to its declining relative power vis-à-vis ROK/U.S. • Cumings’ interpretation: DPRK reacts to U.S. military exercises/ provocations.
The 1st Nuclear Crisis • DPRK’s announcement to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March ’93. • Response to U.S. provocations (Team Spirit exercises, nuclear weapons, war games); IAEA’s demands for “special inspections” of undeclared sites (Cumings, p. 65). • DPRK’s withdrawal of fuel rods into cooling ponds (May ’94); Clinton administration’s preparations for war (June ’94). • Former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang (June ’94). • The October 1994 Framework Agreement: in return for suspension of nuclear activities, light-water reactors (LWR) provided by Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
Second Nuclear Crisis (Oct. ’02-) • U.S. policy: • Pres. Bush’s “Axis of Evil,” State of the Union Speech (Jan. ’02). • Assistant Sec. State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang (Oct. ’02-). • refusal to arrange for bilateral talks/deals toward U.S.-DPRK diplomatic normalization. • Proposal for a “grand bargain” (M. O’Hanlon/M. Mochizuki). • DPRK’s motivations: provocative gestures to extract concessions. • Missile test (Aug. ’98): over northern Japan. • Missile test (July ’06): Nodong succeeded, Taepodong failed; Carter/Perry op-ed. • Explosion of small nuclear device (Oct. ’06). • ROK diplomacy: • President Kim Dae Jung (’97-’02)’s “Sunshine Policy”; President Roh Moo-hyun inherited this policy (’02-’07). • Certain level of distrust b/w Seoul & Washington, D.C.
The Six-Party Talks (Aug. ’03-) • U.S.: DPRK’s nuclear weapons as a global threat. • Links to the “global war on terror”; DPRK’s transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists. • Unilateral disarmament (Libya) without concessions as a model (Park, p. 79). • Japan: • Concerns about DPRK’s missile capabilities (Nodong). • Politicization of the abduction issue; fear that U.S. may abandon Japan. • ROK: • Anti-Americanism and President Roh Moo-hyun’s election in Dec. ’02. • DPRK: weakness and state failure as a main problem. • Korean nationalism: Oct. ’07 summit b/w Roh and Kim Jong Il. • China: • Skepticism about DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability. • Strong interest in status quo: strikes/protests in northeast China; food & oil supplies to DPRK. • Beijing’s interest in taking leadership in Asia’s multilateral forum. • The Paradox: Who can and want to apply pressure to DPRK.