GOOD

1. GOOD Essay Examples

2. �Does David Velleman�s theory of action provide an adequate account of reasons for action?�

3. Introduction

4. Concise Explains how the question will be answered Gives general structure of the essay Gives general content of the essay No unnecessary information No undefined technical terms

5. Largely irrelevant to the question Undefined technical terms Doesn�t get to the point No clear indication of how the question will be answered/the essay will be structured.

6. Irrelevant material Weak or no connection with the question Weak or ambiguous claims No indication that the question has been understood No indication of how the question will be answered

7. Body

8. Clear and concise Well referenced Paraphrases and shows understanding of quoted material Puts argument into a form that is easy to read and understand

9. Generally unclear Not clear the author understands the material. No explanation of some important claims Poor referencing Doesn�t flow well

10. No paragraphs Very unclear Material not specifically directed at the question No references No clear argument: no explanation of how the problems raised are actually problems for the theory.

11. Conclusion

12. Concise Ties the essay together: Explains how the argument leads to the conclusion Clearly answers the question

13. Unclear Very weak conclusion Fence sitting. Does not answer the question. Tries to say too much and so ends up saying very little of value.

14. Unclear New material introduced in conclusion Incorrect usage of technical terms Not clear whether author has understood the question, or material, at all

15. Structure

16. Doesn�t try to tackle too much Three main points Argues for one side: will answer the question one way or the other

17. Far too much material No room for good discussion/argument of any of the topics For/against structure doesn�t flow well Ends up fence-sitting

18. No real structure No clear argument

19. & Bibliography

20. References in text: Authors last name, date of publication and page number (could be put in foot note) Bibliography: Consistent Alphabetical order Date order Name of author Date of publication Title Book/journal title (issue) Publisher

21. Incomplete references Lacking page numbers Lacking date/author Bibliography lacking information Wikipedia reference This will lose marks!

22. No referencing No bibliography Say goodbye to 10 marks from your essay 2.1 becomes a 2.2!

23. When considering Frankfurt style cases we need to be careful to remember what they do and do not show: As Kadri Vihvelin says, what they do not show is that abilities to do otherwise are irrelevant to human action (Vihvelin 2005, pp.31-32). In fact, it should be clear that Frankfurt cases fail to show that alternate possibilities are necessary for human action and that we should adopt a system which provides a compatibilist understanding of �ability to do otherwise.� If alternate possibilities were not necessary for freedom then we would be right to adopt a determinist position; however, seeing as Vihvelin has shown that they are in fact necessary, we should reject the determinist position in favour of a Libertarian metaphysics.

24. In this section I make the following two claims: (i) Taking responsibility is not a necessary condition on having control over an actions performance; and (ii) having control over an action�s performance is not sufficient for being morally responsible for that action (and its consequences). Taking responsibility for an action, according to Fischer and Ravizza, involves forming an attitude towards the kind of behaviour realised by that action such that (a) one sees oneself as the agent of that kind of behaviour; and (b) one sees oneself as an apt target for the reactive attitudes which that behaviour might generate (1998: p.225). Call this a responsibility attitude. If we can present a case in which an agent is in control of what they are doing, and yet lacks a responsibility attitude, we will have shown that such an attitude is not a necessary condition on control (Mele 2000 makes a similar point in relation to taking responsibility being a necessary condition on moral responsibility).

25. Should we think that reasons are internal or external? It is thought by many that an answer to this question is especially important if we want to come to a firm conclusion about whether there can be an objective rational standpoint that a person can take: If reasons are internal then what is rational looks subjective; whereas if they are external they ought to be an objectively rational course of action to take. Bernard Williams first introduced this distinction in his 1981 Moral Luck and since then it has been taken up into the general discourse of philosophers of action (most notably Kosgaard and Velleman). Now, more than ever, it looks as though we are in a position to give an answer to this question. If reasons are internal then they are reasons for an agent only if they have a relevant desire. If they are external however, they will be reasons for an agent irrespective of their set of desires. We might think that moral reasons are external seeing as it seems we have an obligation, say, not to kill irrespective of what we desire. This lends itself to the thesis that reasons are external. However, if we consider more pragmatic reasons they seem much more clearly internal. For example, we only have a reason to open a door if we desire to go through it.

26. Michael Rushmichael.rush@manchester.ac.ukChris Ovendenchris.ovenden@manchester.ac.uk

27. Q&A