Democratization

1. Democratization Jon Fiva, Oct. 31, 2007 Supplement to thelectures

2. Why did the West extend the franchise? (A&R, 2000) • Suppose that a country is initially run by a wealthy elite. • The elite faces demand from the poor majority for policies that benefit the latter. • How will the elite respond? • Redistribution • Franchise extension

3. Why did the West extend the franchise? (A&R, 2000) • The elite alwayspreferredistribution to franchise extension. • Why do they not alwayschooseredistribution to thepoor? • The policiesfavored by thepoormay be overturned at a later date, whenpressures for socialchanges have eased. • Only by transfering de jure politicalpower, which is muchharder to reverse, canthe elite crediblecommit to a regime thatdelieverspoliciesfavored by the masses.

4. Why did the West extend the franchise? (A&R, 2000) • Threat of revolution varies with circumstances. • The elite cannot make credible promises to redistribute when the threat is transitory  democracy • EXAMPLE 1: ENGLAND • When the threat is permanent, the rich are able to commit.  redistribution • EXAMPLE 2: GERMANY

5. Democratization in W. Europe • In theearlydaysofdemocracythe franchise wasrestricted to a subsetofthepopulation. • Minimum income /tax • Property holding requirements • Gender • Ethnic or religiousaffiliation • Age • Universial franchise wascompleted in two stages. • The economic franchise • Property and incomequalifications for male voterswerelifted (completed in most countries by 1920). • The female franchise • Womengotthe right to vote (typicallyafter WW1 or after WW2).

6. Britain as an example • Beginning in 1832, thebritishpolitical elites made a series ofstrategicconcessionsaimed at incorporatingtheprevioslydisenfranchisedintopolitics. • Alternatives wasseen to be socialunrest, chaos and possiblyrevolution. • Democratizationchangedtheeconomicinsitutionsaway from thosepreferred by the elite (e.g. allowing trade unions).

7. Britain as an example • ”There is no-one more decidedagainstannualparliaments, universialsuffrage and theballot, thanam I …. The principalof my reform is to preventthenecessityofrevolution … I amreforming to preserve, not to overthrow”. (EarlGrey in the British parliament 1832, cited in A&R) • ”the 1832 reform act … introduced by the whigs … as a measure to stave off anyfurhterthreatofrevolution by extendignthe franchise to themiddleclass”. (Darwall (1934), cited in A&R)

8. Britain (source: Wikipedia) • Suffrage in the United Kingdom was slowly changed over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries to allow universal suffrage • Reform Act 1832 - extended voting rights to adult males who rented propertied land of a certain value, so allowing 1 in 7 males in the UK voting rights • Reform Act 1867 - enfranchised all male householders, so increasing male suffrage to the United Kingdom • Representation of the People Act 1884 - amended the Reform Act of 1867 so that it would apply equally to the countryside; this brought the voting population to 5,500,000, although 40% of males were still disenfranchised, whilst women could not vote • Between 1885-1918 moves were made by the suffragette movement to ensure votes for women. However the duration of the First World War stopped this reform movement. See also The Parliamentary Franchise in the United Kingdom 1885-1918. • Representation of the People Act 1918 - the consequences of World War I convinced the government to expand the right to vote, not only for the many men who fought in the war who were disenfranchised, but also for the women who helped in the factories and elsewhere as part of the war effort. Property restrictions for voting were lifted for men, who could vote at 21; however women's votes were given with these property restrictions, and were limited to those over 30 years old. This raised the electorate from 7.7 million to 21.4 million with women making up 40% of the electorate. Seven percent of the electorate had more than one vote. The first election with this system was the United Kingdom general election, 1918 • Representation of the People Act 1928 - this made women's voting rights equal with men, with voting possible at 21 with no property restrictions

9. Germany as an example • Social unrest as large as in England. • But universal male suffrage came later • Although after 1870 all males over 25 had the right to vote formally. Voting was controlled in the rural areas by the landlords. • Final emergence of democracy first in 1919 • The country with the most developed socialist party did not extend the franchise, but instituted the welfare state. • ”The main aim of [Bismarck’s] welfare program was to avoid revolution through timely social reform and to reconcile the working classes to the authority of the state” (Williamson, 1998, cited in A&R).

10. Germany (source: Wikipedia) • Otto von Bismarck führte 1867 im Norddeutschen Bund das allgemeine Wahlrecht (für Männer) ein, um die Liberalen zu schwächen. Richtigerweise ging er davon aus, dass die breite Bevölkerung auf dem Lande eher konservativ wählen werde. Langfristig jedoch stärkte das allgemeine Wahlrecht vor allem die Sozialdemokratie. 1871 erhielt auch das neugegründete Deutsche Reich das Männerwahlrecht. • In Preußen, dem wichtigsten Einzelstaat, wurde nach dem Steueraufkommen des Einzelnen unterschiedlich gewichtet (siehe Dreiklassenwahlrecht). Auch andere deutsche Staaten hatten diskriminierende Regeln. • Es ist zu berücksichtigen, dass 1871 noch 34 Prozent der deutschen Gesamtbevölkerung jünger als 15 Jahre alt war (1933 24 Prozent, Bundesrepublik 1980 18 Prozent).[2] Eine Altersgrenze von 25 Jahren schloss also einen großen Prozentsatz der Bevölkerung aus. So kam es, dass 1871 nur knapp zwanzig Prozent der Gesamtbevölkerung wählen durften, trotz allgemeinen Männerwahlrechts. • Erst nach Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Gründung einer neuen republikanischen Staatsform (Weimarer Republik) wurde mit dem 19. Januar 1919 das Frauenwahlrecht in Deutschland erstmalig umgesetzt. Gleichzeitig wurde auch das bis dahin in Preußen noch geltende „Dreiklassenwahlrecht“ abgeschafft, das die besitzenden (z. B. Hausbesitzer) und einkommensstarken Bevölkerungsschichten bei der Zuteilung von Mandaten im Preußischen Landtag bis dahin bevorteilt hatte, und das aktive und passive Wahlalter auf 20 Jahre gesenkt. Außerdem wurde Deutschland damals eine parlamentarische Demokratie, da der Reichstag (indirekt) über die Zusammensetzung der Regierung mitbestimmen konnte.

11. What about Norway? (source: Wikipedia) • grunnloven av 1814: • § 50. Stemmeberettigede ere kun de norske Borgere, som have fyldt 25 Aar, have været bosatte i Landet i 5 Aar, og enten • a. ere, eller have været Embedsmænd, • b. paa Landet eie eller paa længere Tid end 5 Aar have byxlet matriculeret Jord, • c. ere Kjøbstadborgere, eller i Kjøbstad eller Ladested eie Gaard eller Grund, hvis Værdie i det mindste er 300 Rigsbankdaler Sølvværdie. • Around 10% of the population had the right to vote. • 1884: Mannlige borgere som har en inntekt på 500 kroner (på landet) og byborgere med en inntekt på 800 kroner og som betaler skatt oppnår stemmerett. • 1898: Alle menn over 25 år om har bodd 5 år i landet får stemmerett. • 1907: Kvinner over 25 år med en innekt over 300 kroner (på landet) eller 400 kroner i byene eller var gift med en mann som betalte slik skatt og var over 25 år fikk stemmerett. • 1913: Almen stemmerett for kvinner innført. • 1923: Alder for stemmrett senket til 23 år. • 1946: Alder for stemmrett senket til 21 år. • 1948: Alder for valgbarhet senket fra 30 til 21 år • 1967: De som har fylt 20 år valgdagen oppnår stemmrett. • 1972: De som i løpet av valgåret fyller 20 år oppnår stemmrett. • 1978: Alder for stemmrett senket til 18 år. • Dagens tekst i grunnloven: Stemmeberettigede ere de norske Borgere, Mænd, og Kvinder som senest i det Aar Valgthinget holdes have fyldt 18 Aar.

12. Norway • While most other European countrieswere run by aristocracy and moncarchs, wastheimpactofthe ’academic elite’ (and landowners) stronger in Norway (’Embetsmannsstaten’). • Heterogenous elite. • Struggle for independence in 19th century. • The theoryof A&R probably less importantherethan in Sweden. • ”Swedishdemocracyhadtriumphedwithout a revolution – but not withoutthethreatofrevolution” (Tilton, 1974, cited in A&R).

13. Institutions as a commitment device Jon Fiva, Oct. 31, 2007

14. North and Weingast, 1989, J Ec. History • A&R draws on the ideas by North and Weingast. • N&W (1989): Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in the seventeenth-century England • N&W stresses the importance of institutions in 17th century England. • Institutions as a commitment device • Self-enforcing institutions

15. Historical starting point • The crownpassed from the Tudors to the Stuarts in 1603. • King wassupposed to ’live of his own’. • Considerablydiscretionarypower over revenuecollection and spending. • TaxationwithoutParliament’ consent • Endemicrevenue problems. • Had to sellof land. • Search for newrevenues • New customs • Forcedloans (under threat), whichthey later reneged on. • Sale ofmonopolies • Sale ofpeerage, hereditarytitles • Title ofbaronet for £1.095 promisingfixednumber (in 1614) • When all thetitleswereallocated, newtitleswereannounced– price fell to £220 (in 1622) • Very limited checks and balances to thecrown

16. Conflict • Conflict between the Stuart monarchs intent on maintaining and expanding their absolutist powers • ’the divine right of kings’ • … and a Parliament that intended to reduce them. • Parliament eventually won leading to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

17. Glorious revolution 1688 • Initiatedtheeraof ”parliamentarysupremacy” • ”King in parliament” ratherthan ”kingalone” • King no longer abovethelaw • DirectcheckontheCrown. • Parliamentgained • Exclusive right to tax • Right to audithowthegovernment spent money • Veto right over expenditures • Independenceofthejudiciary from theCrown. • Crowncouldno longer unilaterallylegislate • A crediblethreat to theCrownregardingfutureirresponsiblebehavior. • Dehtroningof Charles I (during thecivilwar in 1649) and James II (in 1688). • In return for greaterParliamentarypower, theparliamentagreed to putthegovernment back on sound financialfooting. • This removedtheunderlyingsourceofthefinancialcrisis • This changesgreatlyenhancedthepredictabilityofgovernmentaldecisions.

18. Strong increase in governments ability to tap resources from the societyPre –revolution: was only to borrow about £1mill. At 6-30% interest (in comparison Holland: £5 mill. at 4% interest)Post-revolution: figures immideately grew fourfold. And interest rates also fell. Risk was substantially lower.

19. Conclusion • Change in institutions in 1688 allowed • property rights to be secured, • wealth to be protected, • and confiscatorybehavior by thegovernment to be eliminated. • N&W more general argument is thatinstitutional reform can be a way for the elite to crediblycommit to futurepolicies by delegatingtheirenactment to intereststhatwill not reversethemex-post. • Institutionsare more durable thanpolicies

20. References • A&R book: http://www.amazon.com/Economic-Origins-Dictatorship-Democracy-Acemoglu/dp/0521855268 • Wacziargreviewof A&R: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/313/5793/1576?ijkey=tR/1aKtC/lK6k&keytype=ref&siteid=sci • Reviewof A&R in EJ: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02031_4.x • Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscaloutcomes 1830–1938, European EconomicReview, February 2006, Pages 249-283T.S. Aidt, Jayasri Dutta and Elena Loukoianova