Minorities and Democratization

1. Minorities and Democratization David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran Columbia University Bahar Leventoglu SUNY – Stonybrook

2. Project Background • Interested in Racial Gerrymandering in the US • In the 1990’s, saw many Republican-Black Democrat coalitions in redistricting • Makes sense electorally: concentrating black voters in a few districts helps elect Republicans elsewhere • But not for policy – one side has to do better • So do this with numbers • Estimate plans that maximize substantive represen-tation, and those that maximize descriptive rep. • Are they the same, or is there a tradeoff?

3. Findings • In the 1970’s & 1980’s, maximize substantive representation by electing blacks to office • But starting in 1990’s, do better by creating districts of no more than 45% black • At that point, good chance of electing minority rep. • But don’t lose too much influence elsewhere • On the other hand, maximize # of minorities elected by concentrating up to 75% BVAP • Not the same as maximizing substantive rep. • So a Pareto Frontier has emerged over time

4. Lessons: AP Version • Districting can give minority voters: • A lot of influence in a few districts, or • Less influence in more districts • At times one strategy is best, at times the other may be superior • In the US, the answer changed due to: • Decreased polarization in the electorate • Increased polarization in Congress

5. Lessons: CP Version • In a majoritarian system, minorities must form coalitions to influence policy • There are two ways to do this: • In elections, via encompassing parties, or • In the legislature, via vote trading • Political institutions can favor one of these alternatives over the other • This holds true for all types of minorities

6. Segue into this paper… • So, within majoritarian systems: institutions  coalitions  min. influence • But of course, many systems are not majoritarian • This is itself an object of choice and change • Minorities don’t always do better w/democracy • Voting to Violence • Important issue now in many places

7. Questions – Reciprocal Effects • How does the presence of ethnic factionalization affect democratization? • Does it make it easier or harder to transition to democracy? • Does it matter if the ruling party is from the majority or minority group? • How does democratization affect minorities? • More discrimination, or less?

8. Model – Acemoglu & Robinson • Society with two classes: upper (U) and lower (L) • Group i is proportion li of the population, with lL>lU • Total wealth x in society, U starts with ax, alU U L

9. Model – Acemoglu & Robinson • Only issue is degree of redistributive taxes (t) • U, of course, wants t=0; L would tax rich & transfer • At first, only U members can vote, but can democratize U 0<tL<1 L

10. Game Tree U: Democratize? Note: For A&R, revolutionary outcome destroysproportion Y of economy, and Ugets 0 utility. Y N U: Set tU L: Set tL L: Revolt? Nature Y N For us, lose Y as before, but then move to democracy. tU Not Success “Revolutionary Outcome” tU R

11. 1 2 U L Model – ELO • To A&R model, we add a second ethnic group • Assume L>U, and 1>2 (so L1 is largest group) • Groups decide independently whether to uprise.

12. Revised Game Tree

13. Model – ELO • So now, two taxes are possible: economic and ethnic • Ethnic tax t2 yields “discrimination rents” to majority 1 2 U te L Note: t1 is always 0 in equilibrium. t2

14. Model – ELO • In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {te, t2} • If L1 has a majority, proposal passes • Otherwise, form coalition: 1 2 U L

15. Model – ELO • In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {te, t2} • If L1 has a majority, proposal passes • Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic) 1 2 U L

16. Model – ELO • In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {te, t2} • If L1 has a majority, proposal passes • Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic) or L1-L2 (class) 1 2 U Note: Reversionpolicy in case of disagreement is te=t2=0. L

17. Equilibrium • In autocracy, U1 sets {te=0, t2=1} • No way to credibly commit to any te>0 other than democratization • Check equilibrium under democracy and see which U1 prefers • If L1 > 50% of the population, then it sets {te=1, t2=1} • So focus on L1 < 50% case

19. Implications • Less peaceful democratization the larger is l2, the size of the minority • Peaceful democratization occurs at intermediate levels of uprising cost Y • Either both L1 and L2 revolt together, or L2 alone revolts • Probability of transition independent of size of the economy (x)

20. Extensions • Power Sharing in Autocracy • U1 can attract L1 or U2 as coalition partner • Democracy can be worse for minorities • U2 starts off in power • Makes peaceful transitions less likely • Two-period model with class mobility • Induces upper-lower class sympathy • Increases likelihood of transitions with anti-minority coalition in democracy

21. Conclusions • Ethnic diversity reduces the probability of peaceful democratic transitions • Upper class loses discrimination rents • Lower class does well in: • Autocracy  violence potential • Democracy  numbers • Addresses question of when politics revolves around an ethnic dimension