Environmental security and conflict

1. Environmental security and conflict Rafael Grasa Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  rafael.grasa@uab.es

5. Armed conflicts, 1946–2005 For the data, see Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen (2006) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. In this figure, the number of conflicts is normalized by the number of independent countries. Figure created by Lars Wilhelmsen.

6. Armed Conflicts in 2005 Countries with conflict on their territory in 2005 (dark brown color), countries with conflict on their territory after the end of the Cold War (light brown color), and the geographical centre of the conflict (red circle). Source: Halvard Buhaug, on the basis of the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data, see www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict.

7. Evolution of the security concept Traditional – national (military) security Now: process, multidimensional----Process: Common security Comprehensive security - national security (freedom from war and occupation) - political security (freedom from repression) - economic and social security (freedom from want) - cultural security (freedom from ethnic/religious oppression) - environmental security Insecurity should be reserved for major threats!

8. Environmental security • Environment: physical factors that condition human affairs (UNESCO: enviroment + human beings) • Environmental security means to reduce or prevent • environmental consequences of war • environmental disasters at the level of war • erosion of the earth’s carrying capacity • natural disasters • war and armed conflict resulting from environmental change

9. Consequences of Armed Conflict • Battle-related deaths and war-related deaths • Genocide and politicide in war and after • Destruction of physical and human capital, slow ec. growth • Weaker social norms and political chaos • Weapons proliferation, crime • Refugees and internally displaced persons • Regional effects • Environmental destruction (e.g. landmines) • - Vietnam War • - Gulf War • - Landmines and cluster weapons • - Nuclear winter

10. Environmental disasters at the level of war • Resource scarcity as public health problem • lack of clean freshwater and sanitation • Industrial accidents • Bhopal, 1984, 2000 people killed; Chernobyl; Aral Sea • Pollution • industry and transportation in cities • Climate change - sea-level rise, flooding, drought

11. Natural disasters • Can be as effective killers as war – or worse • Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 2004 killed 225,000 • Natural disasters 1995–2004 killed > 800,000 • Volcanic eruptions and meteor strikes even more deadly • Most natural disasters are (by definition) not man-made • But some may be exacerbated by man/human activity • UN High-Level Panel: dramatic increase in major disasters demonstrates how environmental degradation exacerbates the destructive potential of natural disasters • Climate change - sea-level rise, flooding, drought

12. Environmental factors in conflict: Five views • Neomalthusianism: Resource scarcity/demography leads to conflict (Homer-Dixon) • Political ecology: It’s the distribution of resources! • Cornucopianism: There is no inherent resource scarcity (critic to Neomalthusianism) • Institutionalism: Cooperation can overcome scarcity • Resource curse: Resource abundance is the problem

13. The Malthusian Model Population grows exponentially Food production grows linearly Positive checks (higher death rate): War, famine, and pestilence Negative checks (lower birth rate): Abortions, infanticide, birth control

14. The neo-Malthusian model Population pressure & high resource consumption Resource depletion Resource scarcity Resource competition Armed conflict

15. The Homer-Dixon Model • Demand-induced scarcity • (mainly driven by population growth) • Supply-induced scarcity • (mainly driven by depletion or degradation of a resource) • Structural scarcity • (mainly driven by resource distribution)

16. Some arguments for the scarcity thesis • Resource scarcity is the single most important issue in armed conflict – if you include territory • This is even more true after the end of the Cold War • Territorial disputes can be proxies for disputes about other scarce resources (minerals, energy sources, food, water, etc.) • Sharing a river seems to contribute to international conflict • Historical evidence of resource scarcity leading to internal fighting and even societal collapse • Ambiguous evidence from the present linking scarcity of water and land to internal conflict

17. Studies of effects of resource scarcity • Hauge & Ellingsen (1998): environmental degradation stimulates civil war - Theisen: but these findings cannot be replicated - State Failure Task Force (1998): environmental degradation does not stimulate state failure - de Soysa (2002): change variables do not measure degradation • Binningsbø et al. (2005): ecological footprint  peace * few robust findings for internal conflict * more robust findings for water and interstate conflict

18. Cornucopian objections • methodological • economic • political • demographic

19. Methodological objections • few systematic studies • many studies limited to countries in conflict • spurious factors – is poverty the key? • is resource scarcity a cause of conflict or an effect?

20. Economic objections • environmental Kuznets curve • resources can be substituted • technological innovation • market pricing

21. Air pollution – an environmental Kuznets curve? Income per person, 1985 PPP$ SO2 levels in 47 cities in 31 countries. Source: Lomborg (2001: 176), mainly based on World Bank data

22. The long-term decline in food prices World Bank, various sources (personal communication with Betty Dow, Commodities Information Analyst, Development Prospects Group, World Bank, 7 September 2006). The price is weighed by the Manufactures Unit Values Index and is given in constant 1990 USD, thus reflecting real prices. For the trend to reflect real food availability all markets have to be open (in order to make the price mechanisms work properly). If this caveat holds, there seems to be a marked decline in global food prices up to the mid 1980s when it stabilizes. The peak in 1974 is due to increased production costs (and perhaps increased hoarding) due to the 1973 oil crisis.[1]

23. Political objections • Democracy and environmental performance (or commit-ment) - Freedom of information - Pluralism - Pragmatism - International cooperation - Market orientation - Greater respect for human life • The democratic peace (internal, external) • Cooperation trumps conflict

24. Environmental cooperation • Law of the Sea • River authorities • Joint hydroelectric projects • Cooperation cuts across conflict boundaries • Webs of interdependence? • Towards an International Dike Authority for Low-Lying Areas?

25. Demographic objections • Population pressure may not always be harmful • Ester Boserup • Julian Simon • Limited impact of three forms of population pressure: • population density • population growth • youth bulges • Global population explosion has been called off

26. World population, 1950-2300 Source: World Population to 2300. ST/ESA/SER.A./236. New York: United Nations, Population Division, 2004, www.un.org/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdf.

27. The resource curse Abundance of natural resources lead to • low economic growth • corruption • poor governance • resource capture and looting

28. Natural resources and civil war

29. Criticism of the resource curse literature • Share of natural resources exports to GDP does not reflect lootability (saqueo) • Results are not robust • Case selection, as in neo-malthusian stories • Nation-level data too rough

30. Diamonds and conflict I Source: Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates & Päivi Lujala, 2003. ‘Lootable Natural Resources and the Duration of Armed Civil Conflict, 1946-2001’, paper presented at the 11th Norwegian National Meeting in Political Science, Trondheim, 8–10 January.

31. Diamanter og konflikter II Source: Elisabeth Gilmore, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Jan Ketil Rød, 2005. 'Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset', Conflict Management and Peace Science 22(3): 257–292.

32. Opium and coca cultivation since 1950 Source: Päivi Lujala, NTNU, unpublished.

33. Will the future be different from the past? • Are we eroding the earth's carrying capacity? • - neomalthusians and cornucopians disagree sharply • Many gloomy predictions in the past were wrong • - population, food, raw materials • Are changes now less reversible? • - biodiversity loss, soil erosion and deforestation less so • Is the best strategy to prevent or to alleviate? • - global warming

34. Some tentative conclusions • Cornucopians are justified in questioning the apocalyptic visions of global man-made collapse • - global warming a major uncertainty • Neomalthusians rightly point to local scarcity conflicts over land, water, etc. • - but these are low-level conflicts and tied to the quality of government and the level of development • The 'resource cursers' argue correctly that some conflicts are fueled by natural resource wealth • - but some of their generalizations are as hasty as those of the neomalthusians • Liberal policies provide our best general answer to threats to human security, including environmental • - promote democracy – by peaceful means!

35. The commodity-conflict relation is becoming better understood • Primary commodities strongly associated with conflict, and oil in particular • Two key mechanisms: (1) through the weakening of the state (2) through the financing of rebels, sometimes by corporations • Effect (1) seems dominant but some clear cases of effect (2) also • Here follow 5 suggestions for dealing with these governance problems

38. Recommendation 1 • Publication of Payments: Make it mandatory • The Problem with Voluntary Compliance: • The countries where voluntary compliance is least likely are the countries where you need it most • If voluntary compliance fails, corporations will still want to deal with unrepresentative governments • If it succeeds, regimes in resource rich countries are still likely to be overthrown, more so than governments in corporations’ home countries • Advantages of Mandatory Compliance • For governments: Mandatory requirements can strengthen the position of willing governments • For corporations: It can level the playing field in cases where corporations compete against other corporations that are not constrained by human rights concerns • Practicalities • There are different ways this can be done: delisting, through IFI conditionality, through other legislation

39. Recommendation 2 • Establish a Global Public Information Center • The Problem: • Lack of transparency about what is transparent! • What deal did Chad get? I don’t know, Chadians don’t know. We are not sure even what we are supposed to know about this transparent deal • Suggestion: Establish a single site, posting relevant legislation bids and contracts from all resource producing states • Advantages: • Makes it obvious when documents are not available • Posting could be used as a condition for financing • Practicalities: Could be hosted by the World Bank, by the OSI…

40. Recommendation 3 • Maintain Income Taxes • The Problem: States accessing resource revenues are tempted to drop income axes, in part because they are distortionary, in part because they are difficult to collect and sometimes unpopular. But doing this weakens the linkages between the state and society. • Suggestion: Maintain Income Taxes • Advantages: • Avoid hollowing out of state structures • Make revenues dependent on national income • Make revenues dependent on popular support • Practicalities: Use natural resources revenues for targeted expenditure not for general budgetary support

41. Recommendation 4 • Get corporations involved at the peace negotiations table • The Problem: • The implementation of peace negotiations is often jeopardized by the lack of employment possibilities for ex-combatants. Investors fears of a re-start of conflict can become self-fulfilling prophecies. • Advantages of getting corporations involved at the peace negotiations table • For corporations: Awareness of quality of deals and interests of groups • For the country: Help provide basis and confidence in economic terms of the deal • Risks • May stifle competitions • Moral hazard

42. Recommendation 5 • Make contracts conditional upon criteria for Regime Recognition • The Problem: Successful mining may lead to the desire to capture the state. Whoever gets the sate gets control of the assets. This increases political risk. • Suggestion. Tie accounts and contracts to available mechanisms for recognizing regimes • For example: Regimes recognized by the African Union • For example: Establish “club” criteria for recognition, similar to the Millennium Challenge Account provisions